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This book is about Erving Goffman’s frame analysis as it, on the one hand, 
was presented in his 1974 book Frame Analysis and, on the other, was  actually 
conducted in a number of preceding substantial analyses of different aspects 
of social interaction, such as face-work, impression  management, fun in 
games, behaviour in public places, and stigmatisation. There was, in other 
words, a frame analytic continuity in Goffman’s work. In an article pub-
lished after his death in 1982, Goffman also maintained that he, through-
out his career, had been studying the same object: the interaction order. In 
this book, the author states that Goffman also applied an overarching per-
spective on social interaction: the dynamic relation between ritualisation, 
vulnerability, and working consensus. However, there were also cracks in 
Goffman’s work and one is shown here with reference to the leading question 
in Frame Analysis – what is it that’s going on here? While framed on a ‘mi-
crosocial’ level, that question ties in with ‘the interaction order’ and frame 
analysis as a method. If, however, it is framed on a societal level, it mirrors 
metareflective and metasocial manifestations of changes and unrest in the 
interaction order that, in some ways, herald the emphasis on contingency, 
uncertainty and risk in later sociology. Through analyses of social media 
as a possible new interaction order – where frame disputes are frequent – 
and of interactional power, the applicability of  Goffman’s frame analysis is 
illustrated. As such, this book will appeal to scholars and students of social 
theory, classical sociology, and social interaction.
Anders Persson is Professor of Sociology and Educational Sciences respectively 
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The Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman (1922–82) studied 
 social interaction in a society where old-fashioned customs encountered 
modernising forces that were transforming political life, working life, 
 everyday life, and other lives. He defended his doctoral dissertation in 
1953. In the speech he would have delivered as president of the American 
 Sociological Association at the 1982 congress had he not been prevented by 
illness, Goffman referred to the interaction order that he had investigated. 
This interaction order changed a great deal during the thirty years that 
Goffman was active, but much of what was valid at the beginning of this pe-
riod was still valid at its close. During the thirty-five years that have passed 
since Goffman’s death, the interaction order has presumably changed to 
a greater extent than earlier, at any rate in certain parts of the world; e.g., 
when it comes to relationships between young and old, men and women, 
authorities and others. What we call globalisation has resulted in the spread 
not only of goods, food dishes, labour, the market economy,  refugees, tra-
ditions, illnesses, Western democracy, Islamist terror, identities, models 
of organisation, military activities for policing the world, bed bugs, music 
styles, and consumption goods, but also of different ways of interacting 
socially. Furthermore, new media – in particular mobile phones, the In-
ternet, and social media – have exposed the interaction order to a transfor-
mational pressure, in that spatial proximity is no longer a prerequisite for 
social  interaction. Many societies have thus come to be meeting places for 
hyper- modern forms of social interaction and old-fashioned social customs, 
which sometimes leads to conflict but is also most likely handled in precisely 
the smooth way that Goffman felt characterised the interaction order. Quite 
a few of Goffman’s texts feel dated, not least because of a language that was 
then completely normal but which has later been transformed in many ways. 
However, his substantial analyses are amazingly vital and can be applied to 
current social phenomena, something I will illustrate in this book by explor-
ing in depth Goffman’s frame concept and frame analyses.
Ever since I became seriously interested in Goffman’s sociology  twenty-five 
years ago, his texts have stimulated my own research on schools, power, edu-
cation, politics, and social interaction. In 2012 I published a comprehensive 
Preface
viii Preface
book (448 pages) in Swedish: Ritualisation and Vulnerability – Face to Face 
with Goffman’s Perspective on Social Interaction (Persson, 2012b), a book 
that aims both to introduce Goffman’s sociology and to study certain as-
pects of it closer, among other things Goffman’s frame perspective as it is 
presented in his book Frame Analysis. However, Frame Analysis has been 
a mystery to me since I first became acquainted with it. At first I believed 
that I myself was the reason why I found the book mysterious, because, 
among other things, English is not my native tongue, but I then realised 
that the book was sophisticated, multifaceted, contradictory, and a number 
of other things. This was probably important in the context, but what fi-
nally made me believe that I understood the book was that I began framing 
Frame Analysis as a book in which a method for studying the many realities 
of social interaction was developed in a rather praxis-oriented way. This 
framing has opened a number of opportunities for understanding and using 
Frame Analysis, which are presented and discussed in the present book. The 
purpose of this book is to investigate Erving Goffman’s frame perspective: 
both the way it is presented in Frame Analysis from 1974, and as it is prac-
tised in Goffman’s substantial analyses of frames, in particular those that 
precede Frame Analysis.
Scholarly research is an activity that develops in interplay and tension 
between the anchoring in, renewal of, and breaching of traditions, and then 
both positive and negative influences are of importance. Goffman had fairly 
little to say about this when it came to his own sociology, but in  return there is 
an extensive body of literature that critically investigates and makes detailed 
connections between Goffman’s sociology and that of others, and that point 
out a number of different and contradictory influences: Durkheim, Simmel, 
Freud, Cooley, Parsons, Lorenz, and Hughes. I have chosen another path in 
this book, but I can assure the reader that I am well acquainted with a signif-
icant part of the literature regarding Goffman’s sociology. This other path 
means that I have chosen to study Goffman’s entire oeuvre against the back-
ground of the frame analysis he describes in his book Frame Analysis. I have 
then searched for a frame analytical pattern in Goffman’s texts, and the 
results are presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The pattern I found is strongly 
connected to two other recurring characteristics of Goffman’s sociology. 
First, a single object of study: the interaction order, which is described in 
Chapters 3 and 6. Second, an overarching perspective that functions as a 
kind of framework for interpretation throughout all of Goffman’s works: 
which is described as ‘the dynamic relation between ritualisation, vulner-
ability, and working consensus’, and presented in Chapter 3. In addition, 
the book in your hand is introduced in Chapter 1, and  Goffman himself, 
his position within the sociological scholarly community, and his scholarly 
vision are described in Chapter 2. Furthermore, in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 I at-
tempt to illustrate in three studies how the framing perspective can be used. 
The first study deals with social interaction in social media, and through a 
frame analysis I attempt to show that a new interaction order is developing 
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in social media that diverges in a number of different ways from the inter-
action order that Goffman studied. The same set of problems is dealt with 
in the second study, this time applied to online chess, because chess has 
proven to be very constant over time, but in its online variant it is changing 
faster than ever before, something that is illustrated and explained with the 
help of parts of Goffman’s conceptual apparatus. In the third study, which 
concerns social interaction and the exercise of power, I attempt to show that 
Goffman’s interaction order to a great extent has to do with influence and 
the avoidance of influence, and that it, in combination with framing, can be 
developed into a kind of power perspective. In the final chapter I present a 
number of concluding remarks, and in an epilogue I reflect on the fascinat-
ing phenomenon of Las Vegas, a city whose very conditions of existence are 
a framed boundlessness, and where Goffman himself conducted participant 
observations of gambling. The book also includes a complete bibliography 
of Goffman’s published texts.
Former versions of chapter 2, 3, 5 and Epilogue have been published in 
Swedish in my book Ritualisering och sårbarhet – ansikte mot ansikte med 
Goffmans perspektiv på social interaktion (Persson, 2012b). A former ver-
sion of chapter 7 has been published in the journal Language, Discourse and 
 Society (Persson, 2012a). Finally, chapter 8 has been published in Swedish in 
Årsbok 2015 (Yearbook 2015) by Vetenskapssocieteten i Lund (The Science 
Society of Lund) (Persson, 2015).
I would like to thank the following institutions and persons for support 
in writing this book. The Department of Educational Sciences and the Joint 
Faculties of Humanities and Theology at Lund University, for stimulating 
working conditions; The Swedish Writers’ Union, the Elisabeth Rausing 
Memorial Fund, and The Swedish Association for Educational Writers, 
for financial support to the translation of the manuscript from Swedish to 
English; colleagues at the Department of Educational Sciences for everyday 
supportive, social interaction; the participants in the UFO-seminar (the Ed-
ucational Research Seminar at Lund University) for improving comments 
on one of the chapters in this book; two anonymous reviewers; translator 
Dr Lena Olsson; Editor Neil Jordan and Editorial Assistant Alice Salt, 
Copyeditor Sarah Sibley and Production Editor Joanna Hardern all at 
Routledge, for refining my text.
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In the autumn of 2016 two prominent American men caused dismay by vio-
lating the norms of social interaction. One of them was a Republican presi-
dential candidate who with his populist bluster transformed – and continues 
to transform – American politics into a theatre of the absurd. The second 
was a musician and poet whose Nobel Prize in literature had just been 
made public, and who for this reason did nothing other than remain silent. 
A  discussion in the media is underway about the message of the presidential 
candidate and about whether the old protest singer is a worthy prizewinner. 
It is, however, interesting that the discussion is also about how these two 
men create disorder by breaking the frame of what the Canadian-American 
 sociologist Erving Goffman (1922–82) called the interaction order, and then 
primarily with respect to ceremonial rules of behaviour or, to use another 
word, etiquette. As such, violations against frames are analysed by Goffman 
in his book Frame Analysis, and in the case of the Nobel prizewinner we 
may perhaps understand his actions in the following way: ‘every celebra-
tion of a person gives power to that person to misbehave unmanageably’ 
 (Goffman, 1974, p. 431). However, the actions of the presidential candidate 
can hardly be understood in this way.
trump, Dylan, and frame-breaking
In an article in Washington Post the presidential candidate’s lack of self- 
discipline is emphasised: ‘Again and again he couldn’t help himself’, and 
‘temperament matters’. Trump crowns his contempt for women as in-
dependent individuals with the words, ‘such a nasty woman’ instead of 
even trying to conduct a political conversation with his female combatant 
(Hohmann, 2016). In a comment in the leading Swedish newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter, Hillary Clinton is described as ‘normal’ and Trump as ‘childish’ 
(Björling, 2016a). In addition, Trump committed another crime against dem-
ocratic etiquette by saying that he will only recognise the election results if 
he himself wins, which made an editorial writer call this ‘the most shameful 
statement made by a presidential candidate in a hundred and sixty years’. 
A year later the infantilisation continues, but now it’s Trumps staff that are 
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the educators and the White House is being compared to an adult day care 
centre where the staff treats Trump as an ‘undernapped toddler on the verge 
of a tantrum’ (Graham, 2017). Lack of self-discipline, temperament, nor-
mal, childish, shameful, undernapped toddler – it is as if the political stage 
has become a school. In Sweden we have to go back to the beginning of the 
1990s and the political party Ny Demokrati (New Democracy) to find even 
the hint of a political analogue. What the message of the party – ‘drag under 
galoscherna’ (‘giving it some welly’) – meant politically, other than a kind 
of general expression of populist dissatisfaction directed against an alleg-
edly unwieldy bureaucracy, taxes, and rules for entrepreneurs, was probably 
not very important. It was the belittling of political culture, the violation of 
 etiquette in itself, that was the message and which on that occasion brought 
the party into the Swedish Parliament.
It is the same way with Trump: the violation of etiquette is his message, 
not the content, if there even is one. When Trump commits violations of 
etiquette in debates on prime-time television, it is possible that they are un-
planned, which I find hard to believe, but they become his message when 
voters who have been hit hard by economic crises and competition for 
low-income jobs receive it. These voters probably do not put their trust in 
the traditional political elite but are attracted to ‘an otherness’ that does 
not respect the rules that usually, even in times of crisis, regulate political 
discourse. So Trump does not have to know very much about politics in 
order to place himself right in ‘his’ socio-political field. It is enough for him 
to mutter ‘wrong’ and accuse Clinton of cheating, threaten to put her in 
jail, and drag her husband’s womanising into the discussion. All this is nei-
ther here nor there but that is the very point: Trump’s populism means that 
he displays a lack of respect for the etiquette of politics. The day after the 
 debate in which a presidential candidate had done the most shameful thing 
in 160 years we heard his supporters review the debate: ‘Trump hit exactly 
the right note. He managed to explain what he wants to do on particular 
issues’ (Björling, 2016b). For those of us who in some sense belong to the 
system – educated people with jobs and all the things appurtenant to this, 
and thus with a more or less committed faith in the political system that has 
to do with acquiring the support of voters for administrating or changing 
things – this statement is incomprehensible and the right and the left can 
suddenly be united in their condemnation of Trump’s lack of respect for et-
iquette. ‘Chaos is also a system, but it is the system of the others’, to borrow 
the words of Imre Kertész (2015).
Erving Goffman, whose sociology forms the topic of this book, developed 
a number of concepts in order to understand the order of social interac-
tion. For instance, he made a useful analytic differentiation between  various 
kinds of verbal and corporeal expressions that we communicate with when 
we interact with other people: expressions given, over which the sender has 
relatively much control, and expressions given off, over which the  receiver 
has greater control because they are the result of the receiver’s interpre-
tations of what the sender communicates. Trump’s expressions given 
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strike the right chord in certain voters, but it seems to be their interpretation 
of the expressions given off that provides substance to Trump’s message, 
and the violation of etiquette then acquires great importance. When Trump 
burns his bridges, socially speaking, not least when he refuses to recognise 
the metapolitics that secure the regulations and etiquette of politics across 
party lines, his voters appear to interpret this as his being serious about his 
politics. After Trump’s inauguration as president in 2017, a kind of organ-
ised division into two of the expressions was made that makes it possible 
for Trump to continue violating etiquette in his Twitter messages, while the 
official presidency is, to a great extent, separated from these. He thus com-
municates his messages over two different channels, the one being more of a 
channel for voters and the other more of a channel for the presidency. Once 
in a while the division between these two is not upheld; e.g., when Trump 
in March of 2017 refused to shake hands in public with Angela Merkel, but 
the two channels are mainly kept separate. Role distance, to use another of 
Goffman’s concepts, is thus created – perhaps even a double role distance, 
where Trump as a populist distances himself in his Twitter messages from the 
political etiquette of the presidency while as the president he simultaneously 
assumes the role of a realist politician who, in opposition to his populist 
messages during the election campaign, bombs Syria and IS in  Afghanistan, 
lowers taxes for high income earners, and celebrates NATO. Five months 
into his presidency an editorial in The  Economist summed it up as follows 
(‘Donald Trump’s Washington is Paralysed,’ 2017): ‘As harmful as what 
Mr Trump does is the way he does it.’ A Swedish columnist adds to this: 
‘Never before has the United States had a president so utterly devoid of style 
and dignity, a vulgar, ostentatious billionaire who never reads books and 
who occasionally encourages his followers to use violence’ (Ohlsson, 2017).
But what about Dylan? His violation of etiquette vis-à-vis the Nobel prize 
institution is his silence, and this seems to upset some people as much as 
Trump’s talk, and also here a kind of pedagogical discourse develops. In a col-
umn we can read the following: ‘Why the hell doesn’t the man say anything? 
What is it he’s brooding over? How hard can it be to pick up the phone and 
say “YES, PLEASE”…’. And a few paragraphs later: ‘Perhaps Bob  Dylan is 
silent because he quite simply hasn’t learned how to behave properly. Maybe 
he just needs some help getting on the right track’ (Hilton, 2016). Many other 
people, soon enough an entire village, wanted to participate in the educa-
tion of this 75-year-old rascal who was now also described as ‘impolite and 
arrogant’ by one of the eighteen members of the Swedish Academy, but the 
etiquette expert Magdalena Ribbing offers a completely different analysis: 
‘He’s been awarded this prize for being a person of genius, and one has to 
allow geniuses to have their peculiarities. He may not have been awarded 
it at all if he had been a well-groomed person in a grey suit who replied to 
invitations within a week’ (Jones, 2016). To return to the expressions given 
and given off, we never really know what expressions given off really means, 
and they thus invite interpretation. Perhaps in this case the silence is Dylan’s 
almost inscrutable expression, left to others to interpret.
4 Introduction
What is it that’s going on here?
This introductory exercise shows that Goffman’s perspective on social inter-
action is still useful, in spite of its foundations being laid down in the 1950s. 
When Goffman in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, published in 
1959 and partly based on his doctoral dissertation from 1953, develops a 
dramaturgical perspective on social interaction in organisations and insti-
tutions, he justifies this strategy as a complement to four other perspectives 
used at that time and still found frequently in social science studies: the 
technical one, which emphasises efficiency; the political one, which largely 
has to do with the exercise of power; the structural one, which focuses on so-
cial status and relationships in networks; and the cultural one, which deals 
with moral values (Goffman, 1959, p. 239ff). The dramaturgical perspective 
emphasises what Goffman called impression management, which in part 
means that both individual and collective actors to a lesser or greater extent 
attempt to act or make it appear as if they are acting largely in accordance 
with community and social norms for how actors should be, act, and in-
teract in different contexts, and in part means that actors attempt to influ-
ence other people so that they will embrace the actors’ own definition of a 
common social situation. In a way it can be said that a dramaturgical per-
spective represents a combination of the political and cultural perspectives, 
because it combines an exercise of power in the form of influence (albeit, on 
a level of social interaction rather than on a societal level) with values, or, in 
 Goffman’s version, norms.
Concretely, the dramaturgical perspective means two things: first, that 
Goffman strongly emphasises the expressive aspect of social action, by 
which it should be understood that not only do we act, but we also think 
about how our actions are perceived by other people, or, in other words, 
the impressions our actions give rise to in other people. Secondly, it means 
that Goffman is using quite a few concepts from the world of the theatre in 
order to emphasise precisely the expressive aspect of action; e.g., role, per-
formance, stage, frontstage, and backstage. This perspective could probably 
have been perceived as superficial when the book was published, but if we 
see it as a prophecy it has been extremely successful. Returning to Trump, 
one may well ask what he is other than a product of a certain setting, not 
least because he is completely ignorant, politically speaking. His thing is 
impression management! – not least through the expression ‘You’re fired!’, 
Trump’s stock line in the reality show The Apprentice earlier and which 
now also appears to have become his stock line in the White House. The 
 dramaturgical perspective has also surfed the neoliberal tsunami of marke-
tisation, which has not only fragmented the only real existing alternative to 
capitalism as a system, but also, with the help of new public management, 
transformed almost all the institutions in society that are not actors in the 
market into actors in politically constructed markets, where they are forced 
to sell something that previously was not a commodity and thus implement 
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impression management. Since 1959 the marketisation of society as a whole 
has increased, and impression management now describes a completely 
central aspect of the actions of market actors, whether they are individu-
als or organisations. Impression management in the form of inflated real 
estate values and share prices, doped-up performances, and rigged CVs, 
has thus been entered into the annals of history with names like Fannie 
Mae,  Kaupthing Bank, Justin Gatlin, and Paolo Macchiarini. Goffman’s 
 perspective – which in addition consists of so much more than a dramatur-
gical perspective – is in many ways more alive than ever before.
If by way of introduction I should attempt to summarise my view of 
 Goffman’s sociology, I would like to emphasise that Goffman has a kind 
of generic perspective, which in Chapter 3 is presented as the dynamic rela-
tion between ritualisation, vulnerability, and a temporarily working consensus. 
This is a kind of metaperspective on social interaction that to a great extent 
decides how Goffman interprets and understands the object of study that 
links his texts: the social interaction order. Within the framework of this ob-
ject of study, three themes stand out in Goffman’s sociology. First, a theme 
of politeness and respect, which was expressed clearly in his investigations 
of rituals in the 1950s and of social interaction in the 1960s. Second, the 
theme of social illusion, which is pervasive because of Goffman’s particular 
interest in the construction of social illusions that follows from expectations 
of normality and that is created by us all under the cover of the rituals of 
everyday life when we engage in impression management but also by so-
cial imposters of different kinds, and that is given significant expression in, 
e.g., the books The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and Stigma around 
1960 and Frame Analysis from the 1970s. Third, and finally, a theme of crisis 
in the 1970s within whose framework an investigation of the crisis of the 
social interaction order can be discerned, not least in the books Relations 
in Public 1971 and Frame Analysis. At the same time that there is a frame 
analytic continuity in Goffman’s studies of the interaction order, we can 
also, on a different level, see a kind of break that first becomes clear in the 
book  Relations in Public (1971). While the texts preceding this book were 
to a great extent characterised by assumptions about order and accounts 
that suggested order, Goffman slips in a dissonant chord in Relations in 
 Public that may be called contingency. Contingency also becomes a power-
ful theme in the book that followed three years later, Frame Analysis, some-
thing that can be illustrated not least by the question that gives meaning to 
his frame analysis itself: What is it that’s going on here?

Part I
Goffman and the interaction 
order

Erving Goffman was born in 1922 into a Russian-Jewish family in Canada.1 
His parents had immigrated from the Ukraine just before and during World 
War I and lived at first in the small community of Mannville, where they ran 
a shop, and later in Dauphin. When Goffman was 15 years old, his family 
moved to Winnipeg, a city that at this time had around a quarter of a mil-
lion inhabitants. According to Winkin (2010), Goffman was not particularly 
good at school, but he was very interested in his chemistry set, with which he 
experimented when at home. Goffman was described by a classmate from 
St. John’s Technical High School in Winnipeg as being ‘in a different world: 
encapsulated, aloof and remote’. He was one of the gang, but according to 
Winkin (2010, p. 56f) he was different because Goffman’s family differed 
socially, politically, and culturally to some extent from many other families 
in the area: they lived in a slightly better area, were not politically active, 
and did not go to synagogue.
Goffman began his undergraduate studies at the University of Manitoba 
in Winnipeg in 1939, and his major was chemistry. After a break spent work-
ing at the National Film Board of Canada, he continued his studies and 
graduated from the University of Toronto in 1945 with a major in sociol-
ogy. In the same year he was admitted as a doctoral student in sociology at 
the University of Chicago, received his Master’s degree from there in 1949, 
and in 1953 defended his doctoral dissertation ‘Communication Conduct 
in an Island Community’, which had its origins in fieldwork conducted on 
the Shetland island of Unst. He was a teacher at the Department of  Social 
Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh in 1949–51 and worked as a 
research assistant from 1952 to 1954 at the University of Chicago in two 
different research projects, whose leaders were Edward A. Shils and E. C. 
 Banfield, respectively. The following year he was employed as a guest re-
searcher at the National Institute of Mental Health in the United States 
and, among other things, spent one year of participant observation in a 
mental health institution. In 1958, Herbert Blumer invited Goffman to the 
Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, where he 
became a full professor in 1962. During a period in the 1960s he worked as 
a blackjack dealer at a casino in Las Vegas, and also advanced to become a 
2 Goffman style: Outsider on the 
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so-called pit boss.2 It is said that his stay at the casino was a participant ob-
servation, and it is mentioned in passing in the publications where  Goffman 
writes about gambling (1967 and 1970 [1969]). Goffman often played black-
jack in Las Vegas and was reported to the police for card counting in the mid 
1960s, something that was also reported to the management of UC Berkeley. 
 Furthermore, Goffman spent the year 1966 at the Harvard Center for Inter-
national Affairs, and was in 1968 appointed Benjamin Franklin Professor 
of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, the dou-
ble disciplines perhaps mirroring that he empirically worked as an anthro-
pologist, and theoretically as a sociologist, where he stayed until his death 
in 1982. In his obituary in Time Magazine (6 December 1982), Goffman is 
described as an ‘unorthodox sociologist whose provocative books […] devel-
oped his somewhat mordant theories of contemporary ritual, based upon 
the overlooked small print of daily life’.
In a brief memoir, Thomas Schelling (2015), winner of the 2005 Swedish 
National Bank’s Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
and the person who invited Goffman to be a guest researcher at the  Harvard 
Center for International Affair, writes: ‘I consider him one of the two or 
three greatest social scientists of his century. I’ve often remarked that if 
there were a Nobel Prize for sociology and/or social psychology he’d de-
serve to be the first one considered. He was endlessly creative’. Today many 
people, but far from everyone, agree with Fine and Manning’s (2003, p. 58) 
description of Goffman as
the most significant American social theorist of the twentieth century; 
his work is widely read and remains capable of redirecting discipli-
nary thought. His unique ability to generate innovative and apt met-
aphors, coupled with the ability to name cogent regularities of social 
 behavior, has provided him an important position in the sociological 
canon.  Further, his sardonic, outsider stance has made Goffman a re-
vered  figure – an outlaw theorist who came to exemplify the best of the 
sociological imagination.
As has already been mentioned, Goffman published his first book – The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life – in 1959, and he thereafter published 
an additional ten books and collections of essays, the last one in 1981 with 
the title Forms of Talk. At the time of writing, all of Goffman’s eleven books 
are still in print, including Gender Advertisements, which was long out of 
print and now has a new cover that really illustrates Goffman’s words on 
the last page of the book that advertisers ‘make frivolous use of what is al-
ready something considerably cut off from contextual controls’. Goffman’s 
first article had the title ‘Symbols of Class Status’ and was published in the 
 British Journal of Sociology in 1951. In total, he published twenty-three ar-
ticles in scholarly journals, of which four were reviews and one was an an-
swer to a critical review of his sociology. Goffman published the majority 
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of his articles in the journal Psychiatry. He contributed to six anthologies 
(or  similar works), either as an author or with transcripts of oral presenta-
tions, comments, and contributions to debates.3
An established outsider
Goffman’s sociology has been, and still is, the subject of extensive scholarly 
discussion, and, in addition, his texts are used by many.4 After his death, a 
minor industry of secondary literature on Goffman appeared, which prob-
ably has to do with his exciting sociology but also with the fact that he was 
a brilliant analyst in terms of scholarship and a special person in social 
terms, who died relatively young. Lemert (2003) speaks of ‘the social power 
of the enigma’ as an explanation for the significant interest in Goffman. The 
image of Goffman that appears in the secondary literature is the image of a 
sociologist who is controversial and contradictory and who seems to leave 
few people indifferent. He was an outsider, in spite of being given access to 
many of the most desirable domains in sociology. Being an outsider on the 
inside was in many ways his style.
As a student in Toronto, Goffman found Émile Durkheim, A. R. 
 Radcliffe-Brown, W. Lloyd Warner, Sigmund Freud, and Talcott Parsons to 
be important sources of inspiration, and at Chicago, Georg Simmel,  Herbert 
Blumer, and Everett Hughes were added to this group (Fine, Manning, & 
Smith, 2000). Becker (2003) makes a point of the fact that both sociological 
and anthropological influences come together in Goffman’s sociology: the 
former from Simmel via Hughes, one of Goffman’s teachers in Chicago, 
and the latter from Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown via Warner, another of 
his teachers. Collins (1994) has also emphasised the anthropological aspect 
of Goffman’s sociology, which is expressed in the analysis of social inter-
action as social rituals. When rereading The Presentation of Self in 2009, 
Giddens was struck by just how anthropological the book is, referring to 
its basic  approach: ‘the sort of man-from-Mars style that Goffman deploys’ 
 (Giddens, 2009, p. 290). Burns (1992) points to different sources of inspiration 
in Goffman’s scholarly development, not least the Chicago School of sociol-
ogy during his years as a doctoral student at the Department of Sociology 
in Chicago. The First Chicago School had reached its zenith in the 1930s, 
but continued to inspire sociologists much later. Fine, Manning, and Smith 
(2000) consider Goffman a central actor in the ‘Second Chicago School’, 
and according to Winkin (1999, p. 34f) Goffman responded well to the 
 Chicago habitus, which he describes with the concepts empiricism, humour, 
and empathy without the ambitions of a social worker. There were also other 
influences. Burns (1992) suggests that the time spent as a researcher with the 
National Institute of Mental Health, where Goffman worked with partici-
pant observation in mental health institutions, was important for Goffman’s 
scholarly development. Goffman’s contacts with the British anthropologist 
and communication researcher Gregory Bateson, who early on used the 
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concept of metacommunication (Ruesch & Bateson, 1951), was, according 
to Burns, also important. Finally Burns also mentions Goffman’s contacts 
with language philosopher John Searle at Berkeley and, later, with sociolin-
guists Dell Hymes and William Labov at the University of Pennsylvania as 
being important. Among these sources of inspiration we can find the roots 
of Goffman’s urban ethnographic sociology, his preference for participant 
observation, and his orientation towards ritualised communicative action 
and behaviour. Goffman allowed these roots to nourish a project that was 
all his own, which at one and the same time included society as a normative 
order that limits the freedom of the individual, ‘the others’ as both audience 
and those who exert influence, and an active individual who both adapts 
him- or herself and tries to preserve her or his scope of action, who wishes 
to be an individual and at the same time receive recognition from the group.
Goffman was an outsider, but a contradictory one. He did not work with 
any strange or deviant problems, but his studies concerned particularly 
 basic issues in sociology and ‘common’ occurrences in social interaction – 
i.e., what happens and why what happens happens when people interact 
with each other and when an individual interacts with unknown others 
and with the norms of society. Nor was he an outsider in the sense that he 
was outside the sociological establishment; on the contrary, his works are 
among some of the most widely read in modern sociology. Even if there was 
a certain hesitation with respect to sociology, his books received positive 
reviews early on. Kaspar D. Naegele described Goffman’s first version of 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life from 1956 as ‘delightful and puz-
zling’, ‘brilliant’ but also ‘precariously suspended between the New Yorker 
and Stephen Potter’. The reviewer wanted more influential sociologists such 
as Weber among the references, and objected to Goffman’s naive division 
of the individual into a socialised and a non-socialised self, and concluded 
that ‘what we “are” and what we “seem” are both constituted in society’ 
(Naegele, 1956, p. 632). In his review of the same work, social anthropologist 
Robert N. Rapoport begins by saying that ‘Dr. Goffman […] shows himself 
to be an  European-type universal scholar gone west – a Simmel in Damon 
Runyon’s idiom’, and draws the conclusion that the book is worth reading 
and rereading, ‘not only for its contributions to sociological perspectives, 
but as a personally enriching experience, a sometimes forgotten function of 
sociology’ (Rapoport, 1957, p. 28). In another review of the same work, so-
ciologist Gregory P. Stone draws the conclusion that ‘the monograph under 
review impresses one as one of the most trenchant contributions to social 
psychology in this generation’ (Stone, 1957, p. 105). In his review of the 1959 
edition of The Presentation of Self, Lloyd Fallers, Professor of Sociology and 
 Anthropology at the University of Chicago, wrote that Goffman’s analysis 
was full of useful concepts, while he at the same time felt that the book was 
weak when it came to links to other sociological analyses (Fallers, 1962, 
p. 191). Several other reviews follow approximately the same pattern: com-
mendatory when it comes to the contents, but at the same time hesitant, not 
least with respect to the possibility of generalisation.
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Goffman was awarded several prizes and honours. In 1961 he received 
the MacIver Award of the American Sociological Association for his book 
The Presentation of Self. In 1978 he was awarded the international com-
munication prize In Medias Res, and in the following year the American 
 Sociological Association’s Mead Cooley Award in Social Psychology. The 
Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction posthumously awarded him 
The George Herbert Mead Award for Lifetime Achievement in 1983. In 1976 
Goffman was appointed an honorary doctor at the University of Manitoba 
in Canada, and in 1977–78 he received a Guggenheim Fellowship. Finally 
Goffman was appointed an honorary doctor at the University of Chicago in 
1979 with the following motivation: ‘Acute analyst of interpersonal transac-
tions, your work has transformed the entire field of microsociology’.5
In spite of many good reviews, honours, and the fact that Goffman shortly 
before his death in 1982 was elected president of the American Sociological 
Association, it is still possible to say that he was outside the sociological 
establishment. Even if he perhaps did not want to be included, it seems as 
though he wanted to reach the top of this establishment. Goffman saw the 
presidency of the American Sociological Association as a confirmation that 
he was the foremost sociologist in the United States, at any rate according 
to Sherri Cavan (2011), one of Goffman’s doctoral students in the 1960s. 
 Nevertheless, he did not seem to want to use his position to promote the 
practice of a certain kind of sociology, and as the president-elect he ad-
vertised the contents of the 1982 annual meeting in San Francisco with the 
following words:
I feel even more that it is unrealistic, and abuses words in a manner we 
must not allow to become characteristic of us, for a president-elect or 
anyone else to proclaim what the theme of an annual meeting is to be. 
There are already enough inflated pronouncements in the world; our job 
is to dissect such activity, not increase the supply. (Goffman, 1981b, p. 4)
In the same article he instead promoted the value of criticism and analysis:
If we can’t uncover processes, mechanisms, structures and variables 
that cause others to see what they hadn’t seen or connect what they 
hadn’t put together, then we have failed critically. So what we need, 
I feel, is a modest but persistent analyticity: frameworks of the lower 
range. (Goffman, 1981b, p. 4)
Goffman’s contradictory outsidership was not simply a result of his sociol-
ogy being overseen by certain leading forces within the sociological com-
munity, but may also have depended on the fact that Goffman was far too 
ethnographic to be a theoretician and at the same time far too theoretical to 
be an ethnographer, to freely quote Fine, Manning and Smith (2000, p. ix). 
He thus ended up on the sidelines of two of the main orientations. His outsid-
ership may also have been voluntary: ‘Goffman seemed to fight all his life a 
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battle to remain rooted in the underground, to keep from becoming any kind 
of Establishment – even a rebellious counter-Establishment’, writes Collins 
(1986, p. 112). Sherri Cavan (2011) feels that Goffman in addition chose to be 
an outsider in a number of other respects: in his participant observations, in 
his relationships with colleagues, and with respect to the media and public 
life. She describes him as ‘a lone observer’,6 which, spontaneously speaking, 
seems to capture both his way of working and his position. Ulf Hannerz, 
Professor of Social Anthropology at Stockholm University, says that during 
a reception in a hotel room, probably in connection with the annual con-
ference of the American Anthropological Association in New York in 1971, 
Goffman showed up in a ‘rather plain sweater of mixed grey shades’ and
talked to me and one or another person there, but was mainly parked 
behind a TV set, making observations. After he had left I pointed 
out that “that was Goffman who just left”, which occasioned some 
 astonishment – some people had apparently believed that he was a TV 
repairman.7
At the same time that Goffman in his sociology appeared to be extraordi-
narily aware of the relationship between individuals and groups, he himself 
defied various sociological group affiliations ascribed to him by others. In 
a letter from 1969 to Everett C. Hughes we can see a glimpse of this affilia-
tion dilemma. The background of Goffman’s letter, here quoted by Jaworski 
(2000, p. 304), was an article in Time about Goffman (‘Exploring a Shadow 
World,’ 1969):
That was a very nice letter on Time, time, and left handedness. […] There 
is that commitment to the jointly lived life of one’s discipline that leads 
you to write book reviews and letters in the first place. No one insists on 
it; you can’t put the pieces in a bibliography. They are something extra, 
something that won’t get paid for, something to show that even when an 
official occasion is not in progress, a man should be involving himself 
in the life that exists between himself and others. They always tell me, 
those pieces of yours, what I am not that I should be.
Goffman was rather rarely active in collegial contexts and only wrote four re-
views during his entire career (Goffman, 1955b, 1955c, 1957c, 1957d), none of 
which dealt with any central sociological works. He was a discussant during 
a session on ‘public and private opinions’ at a conference on public opinion 
research (Proceedings of the Twelfth Conference on Public Opinion Research, 
1957). He had agreed to lead a session on the theme ‘Revisions and relations 
among modern microsociological paradigms’ at the World Congress of 
 Sociology in August of 1982, says Helle (1998), but he had to cancel because 
of his illness and died three months later. Goffman was never the editor of 
an anthology and was always the sole author of his texts. One exception 
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is possibly the text ‘Some Dimensions of the Problem’ (Goffman, 1957b), 
where Goffman according to a footnote had written some three pages about 
patients as normal deviants, but which does not list him as a co-author. 
Goffman was, finally, a member of the editorial teams for the periodical 
Sociometry in 1962 (associated editor), the American Journal of Sociology 
in 1962 (advisory editor), and Theory and Society in 1976–82, where among 
others the founder of the periodical, Alvin Gouldner, as well as Anthony 
Giddens, Theda Scocpol, and Charles Lemert were also members. He was 
also a member of the editorial committee for the sociolinguistic periodical 
Language in Society from 1974 until his death. Goffman was also the editor 
of the book series University of Pennsylvania Publications in Conduct and 
Communication together with Dell Hymes.
Goffman’s research style and scientific viewpoint
Goffman had a particular way of conducting research in practice, a style 
of research where three ‘methods’ were combined. First, observation, and 
second, a contrasting method, which in principle had to do with trying to 
generate knowledge about a phenomenon by studying or reflecting on its 
opposite, an approach that is described in this way in Frame Analysis:
Whatever it is that generates sureness is precisely what will be employed 
by those who want to mislead us. […] In any case, it turns out that the 
study of how to uncover deception is also by and large the study of how 
to build up fabrications. […] In consequence one can learn how our 
sense of ordinary reality is produced by examining something that is 
easier to become conscious of, namely, how reality is mimicked and/or 
how it is faked. (Goffman, 1974, p. 251)
The third method is conceptualisation, which was used as a tool for 
 systematisation, analysis, and interpretation. According to Susan Birrell 
(see  Williams, 1988, p. 88), Goffman is supposed to have created over 900 
 concepts, an assertion that suggests that the creation of concepts was an 
important method for Goffman.
In principle, Goffman was a proponent of the observational method, not 
least because he had little faith in the interview method on account of its reli-
ance on the actors’ own statements.8 Goffman used the observational method 
in order to approach social realities and collect his own empirical material, 
while at the same time the contrasting method was used in order to break up 
ingrained ways of thinking about these realities.  Conceptualisation – which 
can also be described as a systematising, analytic, and defining manner of 
thinking – was the tool that was used to process the collected and critically 
reflected material. Goffman combined observation, contrastive effect, and 
conceptualisation in this way; e.g., in his doctoral dissertation and in The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
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But Goffman also combined the three methods in another way.  Using 
conceptualisation, an introductory delimitation of a kind of space is initially 
made, a space that is separated and, in a way, removed from its surrounding 
context. It thus becomes possible to investigate this space using observation 
and a continued conceptualisation that identify the parts that are included in 
the space that is being studied. The parts are shown at work through a num-
ber of empirical illustrations, and this chain of events within the delimited 
space is often called ‘dynamics’; e.g., ‘the dynamics of the character game’ 
in the essay ‘Where the Action Is’ (Goffman, 1967, p. 248), ‘the dynamics 
of ratified participation’ in the article ‘Footing’  (Goffman, 1981a, p. 135), 
and ‘the dynamics of shameful differentness’ in Stigma  (Goffman, 1963b, 
p. 140). Finally, connections are made between the delimited, investigable 
space and more comprehensive societal contexts using a contrasting effect, 
which sometimes represents dramatic changes of levels, from the level of 
social interaction to a societal level.
This second manner of combining observation, contrastive effect, and 
concept formation becomes, on the whole, rather apparent in the essay ‘Fun 
in Games’ (Goffman, 1961b), where Goffman in the introduction establishes 
his delimited space using references to everyday life as well as formal defi-
nitions of different forms of interaction. This is followed by a plethora of 
definitions under the heading ‘formalizations’, whereafter ‘dynamics of en-
counters’ are studied, and as a conclusion a contrasting level shift is made, 
from the commitment of individuals to gambling to a commitment to social 
interactions in general. Both the first and the second way of combining ob-
servation, contrastive effect, and conceptualisation work as critical meth-
ods, but the criticism is then not about social criticism, but rather about the 
fact that the investigations make an epistemological difference that forces us 
to see social reality in a different way than previously.
Goffman’s way of conducting research can also be described in other 
ways, such as here in a review of one of Goffman’s books:
This set of essays shares in the virtues and the defects of Goffman’s other 
works. The well-turned, emotive language comprising the  Goffman 
style goes well with his ‘literary’ methodology and its results. We find 
here no theory, but a plausible, loosely-organized frame of reference; 
little concern with explanation, but masterful descriptions; no accumu-
lation of evidence, but illuminating allusions, impressions, anecdotes, 
and illustrations; few formulations of empirically testable hypotheses, 
but numerous provocative insights. We find, also, insufficient use of 
qualifications and reservations, so that the limits of generalizations are 
usually not explicitly indicated. (Meltzer, 1968)
Perhaps this might also be appropriate as a description of Goffman’s view 
on scholarship, even if he himself describes it in a completely different way, 
and the question is whether we should trust Goffman when, in an interview 
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(Verhoeven, 1993), he says that he believes himself to be, at bottom, a posi-
tivist. And what does it mean for him to be a positivist in this case? It appar-
ently does not mean being a principal proponent of any kind of ‘quantitative 
method’, because this is something Goffman distanced himself from, given 
the phenomena he studied; for instance, when he describes the advantages 
of ‘a naturalistic analysis’ in order to understand conversations and states 
that a ‘quantitative analysis’, with its focus on, among other things, aver-
ages, tends to ‘average out some of the significant realities of the interaction’ 
(Goffman, 1971, p. 148).
To Arlene Daniels, one of Goffman’s doctoral students, Goffman was a 
positivist in the sense that he, from an epistemological perspective, was a 
realist: ‘Throughout his work, an underlying belief in positivism appears. 
Not everything was socially constructed for Goffman. He showed his alle-
giance to Durkheim in his belief in social facts’ (Daniels, 1983, p. 2). But this 
is probably not the whole story, at least not if one reads the following lines 
from an epistemological perspective:
A cynical view of everyday performances can be as one-sided as the one 
that is sponsored by the performer. For many sociological issues it may 
not even be necessary to decide which is the more real, the fostered im-
pression or the one the performer attempts to prevent the audience from 
receiving. The crucial sociological consideration […] is merely that im-
pressions fostered in everyday performances are subject to disruption. 
We will want to know what kind of impression of reality can shatter the 
fostered impression of reality, and what reality really is can be left to 
other students. We will want to ask, ‘What are the ways in which a given 
impression can be discredited?’ and that is not quite the same as asking, 
‘What are the ways in which the given impression is false?’. (Goffman, 
1959, p. 65f)
There is thus no desire to participate in battles over truth or falsehood, and 
Goffman’s words about other people having to work out ‘what reality really 
is’ suggests that his potential positivism was of a more limited kind than 
what is otherwise referred to as positivism. I believe that to him, positiv-
ism meant having an empirical rather than a theoretical approach, approx-
imately in accordance with the division Hacking makes in his comparison 
of Foucault (whose way of working is described as top-down, because most 
things were seen in the light of comprehensive systems of thought) and 
 Goffman (whose research is designated as bottom-up, because he was ‘al-
ways concerned with individuals in specific locations entering into or de-
clining social relations with other people’) (Hacking, 2004). In an article 
Sharrock says that his motives for studying Goffman’s sociology as a young 
doctoral student were that it was a sociology everybody could recognise, not 
theoretically abstracted, but a sociology that concerns itself with a world 
that is visible to the actor (Sharrock, 1999, p. 121).
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Perhaps Goffman appointed himself a positivist in order to distance 
himself from a far-reaching social constructivism? In his interview with 
 Verhoeven he says that he differs from the constructivists in that he does not 
believe that individuals construct reality – something that is also true of the 
two sociologists so important for the social construction perspective, Berger 
and Luckmann (1967), who emphasised precisely the social in the social con-
struction of reality. In another context Goffman objects in a pragmatic or 
empirical way to what is usually called the Thomas theorem – ‘if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ – by pointing out that 
the theorem is valid on the condition that the definitions people make are 
anchored in reality (Goffman, 1971, p. 99). In the same breath that Goffman 
in the above-mentioned interview says that he believes that he is a positivist, 
he claims to have been inspired to a great extent by the ‘epistemological 
realism’ that Parsons gave expression to in The Structure of Social Action 
(1937). It is thus likely that Goffman’s positivism represented precisely an 
anchoring in reality and a sober, delimited (as opposed to limitless) social 
constructivism, similar to the one Hacking wants to capture in the book title 
The Social Construction of What? (Hacking, 1999). Seen in this way, Goff-
man combines positivism and constructivism through his view of reality 
as socially constructed but individually defined, and through his view that 
both social constructions and individual definitions can be studied empir-
ically with the aim of making statements that in a more or less valid way 
correspond to the reality that is being studied. Claiming to be positivist can 
then mean having the ambition to be able to make precisely such statements.
Claiming to be positivist, albeit in a limited sense, was probably very 
provocative during the politically left-wing radical period when Goffman 
was active, perhaps in particular if one, like Goffman, was a professor at 
 Berkeley around 1968. At the same time it must be emphasised that ‘positiv-
ism’ can be a very radical thing if placed in an Enlightenment tradition and, 
for example, used in order to point out injustices in society and how they are 
upheld by real social institutions. However, for all that, it was probably even 
more provocative than calling oneself a positivist to say, as Goffman did in 
the 1960s and 70s, that he did not put his sociology at the disposal of any 
social transformational force:
The analysis developed does not catch at the differences between the ad-
vantaged and disadvantaged classes and can be said to direct attention 
away from such matters. I think that is true. I can only suggest that he 
who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true 
interests has much to do, because the sleep is very deep. And I do not 
intend here to provide a lullaby but merely to sneak in and watch the 
way the people snore. (Goffman, 1974, p. 14)
That formulation annoyed quite a few people, and that was perhaps precisely 
what Goffman wanted, something that Collins implies when he writes that
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Goffman was never content to be a “conventional” individualist like 
everyone else. When everyone else was being a critic and a radical, he 
set himself up intellectually as a Durkheimian conservative – and yet 
managed to appear nevertheless as a more radical exposé-artist than 
almost anyone else. (Collins, 1986, p. 108)
Denzin’s reckoning with Goffman, furthermore, begins with a few appre-
ciative words:
He brought a literary sensibility to sociology. He drew on literary 
sources, and his was a gifted prose that was at once nuanced, ironic, and 
literary. And he offered a timeless naturalistic, taxonomic sociology; a 
sociology that seemed to turn human beings into Kafka-esque insects 
to be studied under a glass. He was the objective observer of human 
folly. (Denzin, 2002, p. 106f)
However, this essay then continues with what Denzin believes to be the prob-
lem itself: that Goffman does not take a stand, and Denzin then in a rather 
single-minded way supports himself on Becker’s article ‘Whose Side Are We 
On?’, published in 1967. Becker’s analysis of the problem of taking sides can, 
however, be understood in other ways than Denzin’s (see, e.g., Hammersley, 
2001). In his article, Becker uses as a point of departure the question, ‘When 
do we accuse ourselves and our fellow sociologists of bias?’ (Becker, 1967, 
p. 240), and the answer he provides is that such accusations are spoken when 
research supports the subordinated party in a hierarchical relationship. The 
reason for this lies in what Becker calls ‘the hierarchy of credibility’:
In any system of ranked groups, participants take it as given that mem-
bers of the highest group have the right to define the way things really 
are. In any organization, no matter what the rest of the organization 
chart shows, the arrows indicating the flow of information point up, thus 
demonstrating (at least formally) that those at the top have access to a 
more complete picture of what is going on than anyone else.  Members of 
lower groups will have incomplete information, and their view of reality 
will be partial and distorted in consequence. Therefore, from the point 
of view of a well socialized participant in the system, any tale told by 
those at the top intrinsically deserves to be regarded as the most credible 
account obtainable of the organizations’ workings. (Becker, 1967, p. 241)
That Goffman did not take a position based on the point of view of class, 
which was so popular in the 1960s and 70s, is obvious. However, as Becker 
(2003) shows almost forty years after his above-mentioned article, a so-
ciologist can avoid taking sides by developing analyses that break free of 
the simple perception of reality that is based on the idea that existence al-
ways has precisely the two sides that are reproduced in the one or the other 
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conflict – analyses, I would like to add, that furthermore, through the effect 
of contrast, can temporarily break down the ‘hierarchy of credibility’. Per-
haps it was because of such analyses that Goffman ended up outside the 
right/left scale: ‘To people who were radical, he appeared quite conserva-
tive. To people who were conservative he appeared to be some kind of radi-
cal rule breaker, an interpersonal anarchist’ (Cavan, 2011, p. 26f).
Popular and controversial
Erving Goffman is in many ways an accessible sociologist. Most of the time 
he wrote in a very appealing and comprehensible way. Among sociology 
books, some of his books have been virtual bestsellers. According to Ditton 
(1980), Goffman’s book Stigma had been printed in twenty-six editions up 
until the year 1980. The book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life had 
up until 1980 sold half a million copies after having been almost continu-
ously in print since it was first published in 1959, and in 1980 it was available 
in ten languages. Considering the interest in Goffman’s sociology, which 
has gradually increased since his death in 1982, his books are undoubtedly 
still distributed in large numbers. Goffman is thus a widely read sociologist, 
far outside the limited circle of professional sociologists – ‘a layman’s sociol-
ogist’, to quote Posner (1978, p. 68), who also maintains that this popularity 
partially explains the, at times, strong academic dislike of him.  Oromaner 
criticises this idea, and contends that Goffman has been given a great deal 
of attention in the scholarly community, and in spite of his colleagues hav-
ing produced critical analyses of his works ‘there are few contemporary 
 sociologists whose work has commanded more interest within the commu-
nity of social scientists’ (Oromaner, 1980, p. 290). As an indication of this, it 
can be mentioned that Goffman’s book Frame Analysis from 1974 up until 
at least 2006 was one of the most cited works of social science in the Social 
Science Citation Index, according to Scheff (2006).
But Goffman is not only popular but also controversial, something that 
Bourdieu captured in his obituary of Goffman:
The guardians of positivist dogmatism assigned Goffman to the ‘luna-
tic fringe’ of sociology, among the eccentrics who shunned the rigours 
of science and preferred the soft option of philosophical meditation or 
literary description; but he has now become one of the fundamental ref-
erences for sociologists, and also for psychologists, social psychologists 
and socio-linguists. (Bourdieu, 1983, p. 112)
With respect to content, Goffman seems to have left few people unaf-
fected, something that the following excerpt from the Oxford Dictionary of 
 Sociology illustrates:
Although Goffman has had many followers he remains unique in the 
annals of sociology. He broke almost all the rules of conventional 
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methodology: his sources were unclear; his fieldwork seems minimal, 
and he was happier with novels and biography, than with scientific ob-
servation; his style was not that of the scientific report but of the es-
sayist; and he was frustratingly unsystematic. Likewise, he is very hard 
to place in terms of social theory. Sometimes he is seen as developing 
a distinct school of symbolic interactionism, sometimes as a formalist 
following in the tradition of Georg Simmel, and sometimes even as a 
functionalist of the microorder, because of his concern with the func-
tions of rituals (especially talk) in everyday life. He appears to have had 
a notoriously difficult temperament, which adds to the popular view of 
him as an intellectual maverick. (Scott & Marshall, 2005, p. 252)
There is something in Goffman’s sociology that alarms people, which is il-
lustrated not least by the last sentence in the quote above. Who would get 
it into their head to write about the temper of Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony 
Giddens, or Talcott Parsons in a dictionary of sociology?
According to Posner, there was agreement about one thing in the  literature 
of commentary that she was able to survey at the end of the 1970s:
The picture which Goffman paints of mankind and society is not a very 
pretty one, nor is it an issue which seems to concern him. This fact alone 
makes him very unpopular among many of his colleagues, who believe 
that it is the obligation of sociologists to right the wrongs of the social 
system they study, or at least to pay lip service to the liberal egalitarian 
myth. (1978, p. 72)
Goffman’s style of research and presentation is also perspective- 
generating, something that can contribute to his readers’ beginning to 
think  differently about the phenomena in which Goffman chose to interest 
himself. According to one of Goffman’s students, he had an overarching 
 thesis: ‘Don’t take the world at face value’ (Marx, 1984), which could also 
 possibly be a description of Goffman’s style of doing research. At the same 
time, this thesis is a play on words, because life would be completely intol-
erable if people did not believe in and take some things for granted, and 
here there is a difference between social life as it is lived and as it is studied, 
something that has a certain importance if we want to understand Goff-
man and sociology. He goes rather far in his questioning of the world as it 
appears to be, which is clear from an interview with Goffman conducted by 
the Belgian sociologist Verhoeven in 1980. Verhoeven attempts in different 
ways to make Goffman characterise, position, and ideologically anchor 
his sociology, and eventually asks, ‘Can I say that in your approach the 
individual is the most important starting point for sociologists?’. Goffman 
then answers,
What an individual says he does, or what he likes that he does, has very 
little bearing very often on what he actually does. […] So I’m perfectly 
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prepared to give you my view on these matters, but I would like to cau-
tion you that there is no reason for taking them seriously. (Verhoeven, 
1993, p. 322)
Hannerz’s conclusion after having discussed different influences on 
 Goffman and Goffman’s relationship to different theoretical schools is a 
pretty good summary: ‘Above all, however, Goffman has been his own man’ 
(1980, p. 202).
Since the 1950s, the word ‘Goffmanesque’ has occasionally been used to 
characterise Goffman’s style of research and presentation, and sometimes 
the user has not provided the word with an explanation, probably in the 
conviction that such an explanation would be superfluous (one example is 
quoted by Burns (1992, p. 1)). In an article published in 2009, Louis Menand, 
Professor of English at Harvard University, writes the following:
Erving Goffman was a crossover writer. His work, even simply his name, 
had significance for people who worked in literature, in history, in media 
studies, in political science, in psychology, in law schools and business 
schools – and, of course, in anthropology and linguistics. If someone 
in those fields referred to a situation or an analysis as  ‘Goffmanesque,’ 
everyone knew what she meant. (Menand, 2009, p. 296)9
In spite of Goffman’s special style, each person seems to be able to read and 
use him in their own way. When someone for instance claims that Goffman’s 
sociology is existentialist (J. Lofland, 1980; MacCannell, 1983), it is possible 
to find another person who claims that ‘Goffman’s man shows no sorrow, 
no passion, no love, no hate, no anger. He lacks affect; shows no angst; there 
is no suffering in his soul. He has no soul’ (Psathas, 1977, p.  89). On the 
other hand, for another researcher this may be a basis for understanding 
the emotional control that people exercise within, e.g., service professions 
 (Hochschild, 1979). Politically speaking, Goffman in a corresponding way 
seems to be able to attract as well as repel most people: ‘Some view him as 
a political radical; others view him as a middle-class conservative; while 
 others […] view him as apolitical’, writes Posner (1978, p. 71). In this con-
text can also be mentioned Gouldner’s (1971, p. 381) characterisation of 
 Goffman’s dramaturgical theory:
The dramaturgical model reflects the new world […] In this new world 
there is a keen sense of the irrationality of the relationship between indi-
vidual achievement and the magnitude of reward, between actual con-
tribution and social reputation.
And when Jenny Diski rereads a few of Goffman’s books thirty years later, 
she writes, ‘Reading Goffman now is alarmingly claustrophobic. He pre-
sents a world where there is nowhere to run; a perpetual dinner party of 
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status seeking, jockeying for position and saving face’ (Diski, 2004, p. 10). 
Denzin expresses something similar:
He gave midcentury academic sociology exactly what it wanted, and 
what it needed: Men and women in gray flannel suits performing the rites 
and rituals of a postwar white collar society, a society on the move […] 
Goffman’s actors did not resist, they conformed to the requirements 
of a local and global capitalism that erased class, race, and gender in 
the name of a universal, circumspect human nature. Goffman’s moral 
selves knew their place in the order of things. (Denzin, 2002, p. 107)
However, Goffman himself seemed not to know his place in the interaction 
order, but challenged it, sometimes in such conspicuous ways that there is 
now a minor genre consisting of Goffman anecdotes about frame breaks, 
whereof quite a few can be accessed in the Erving Goffman Archives on the 
Internet. For instance, in an article in the Winnipeg Free Press Goffman’s 
behaviour is described in connection with his being appointed an honorary 
doctor at the University of Manitoba in Canada in 1976. He delivered a 
speech to the newly graduated students, which even today would probably 
be considered a severe breach of etiquette at such a function. It was reported 
under the heading ‘Aging idiots’ gloomy world forecast for grads’ (1976), 
and Goffman felt that students faced a dismal future, governed by ageing 
idiots in a society whose social forces nobody seemed to understand. On one 
occasion he stopped speaking to ‘shoo away a photographer’. According to 
the newspaper’s comments, he made ‘wry observations’ on, among other 
things, outrageous patriotism and recurrences of nationalism in Canada, 
and observed, ‘Not even today have we learned to make democracy safe for 
the world’. Goffman also encouraged the students ‘to remain clearheaded 
and curious’ and said that ‘the only worlds left free to you to explore are 
those of the mind’.
Finally, in the succession of descriptions of Goffman and his  sociology, 
Winkin and Leeds-Hurwitz (2013, p. 59) write about three different 
 Goffmans: the one who describes the world as ‘cynically manipulative’, the 
one who sides with the underdog, and the more technical Goffman. It is this 
last-mentioned Goffman that we will soon see in action in Frame Analysis. 
But first a few words about Goffman’s overarching perspective and interpre-
tational framework.
Notes
 1 Biographical information about Goffman has, if not stated otherwise, been 
taken from Winkin (1999), Fine and Smith (2000), Treviño (2003), Smith (2006), 
and Goffman’s CV from 1979, which can be found in the Erving Goffman ar-
chives at the University of Nevada in Las Vegas, http://www.unlv.edu/centers/
cdclv/ega/documents/eg_resume_79.pdf. 
 2 Supervisor for a number of dealers.
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 3 A complete bibliography can be found at the end of this book.
 4 According to an investigation conducted by Times Higher Education in 2009, 
Goffman was the sixth most quoted writer in the humanities, after Giddens and 
before Habermas: www.timeshighereducation.com/news/most-cited-authors-
of-books-in-the-humanities-2007/405956.article (accessed 28 September 2016).
 5 Quoted from the programme for the inaugural ceremony at the University of 
Chicago on 18 December 1979: http://cdclv.unlv.edu//ega/documents/uchonors.
pdf (accessed 30 September 2016).
 6 Cavan in e-mail to the present writer on 18 October 2011.
 7 Hannerz in e-mail to the present writer on 11 April 2012.
 8 For more on this, see Goffman (1989).
 9 Goffman was apparently so transgressive that Menand forgets to include 
 Goffman’s own subject, sociology, in his list.
Goffman’s object of study above all others was social interaction as an or-
dered activity, or, in other words, the interaction order, as he himself called 
it in his doctoral dissertation (Goffman, 1953) and in a posthumously pub-
lished speech written thirty years later in connection with his having been 
elected chairman of the American Sociological Association (Goffman, 
1983b). Goffman tried to understand social interaction using different met-
aphors, of which ritual is one of the most recurring, since it is found both at 
the beginning and at the end of his career. Inspired by Durkheim,  Goffman 
interpreted social interaction as rituals built on respect for the individual. 
What I call the politeness and respect theme in Goffman’s sociology is based 
on such an understanding. It means that individuals help each other main-
tain a kind of balance and stability in social interactions, thus contributing 
in a way that was not intended to maintain the social interaction order or 
the ritual order, as Goffman also called it (it could also be called a frame 
that regulates how social interaction should be performed). This is where 
individuals need and develop an ability to interact with others that can vary 
over time on the basis of person, gender, class, age, culture, society, and 
situation, but that, according to Goffman, retains certain traits common to 
these categories:
Societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their 
members as selfregulating participants in social encounters. One way of 
mobilizing the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught 
to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed 
through face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, 
to have tact and a certain amount of poise. These are some of the ele-
ments of behavior which must be built into the person if practical use is 
to be made of him as an interactant. (Goffman, 1955a, p. 231)
When this works, a kind of balance or equilibrium is created, which 
 Goffman describes as the result of unspoken agreements among the inter-
acting parties and which he calls a temporarily working consensus. But this 
consensus is vulnerable. A barely perceptible wink noticed by somebody 
3 the interaction order is in 
the balance: the dynamic 
relation between ritualisation, 
vulnerability, and working 
consensus
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other than the person for whom it was intended can, for instance, have dev-
astating consequences for the equilibrium of certain social interactions. It 
can be re-established, but sometimes it can also collapse completely.
The interaction order is thus characterised as a balancing act. Two 
‘forces’ are at work: on the one hand ritualisation; on the other vulnera-
bility, and the equilibrium between these two can be called a temporarily 
working consensus. Dichotomies, such as the one between ritualisation and 
vulnerability, are common sociological tools, and there are a number of 
classical ones  – Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, mechanical/organic solidarity, 
rationalisation/charisma, labour/capital – that have in one way or another 
inspired sociologists since the nineteenth century. It may be pertinent to 
mention that Everett Hughes in 1951 published an article where he devel-
oped a dichotomy that could be used in comparative studies of work: ‘To 
this end, we seek for the common themes in human work. One such theme is 
that of routine and emergency’ (Hughes, 1951, p. 320). According to Burns 
(1992,  p.  11) the most influential of Goffman’s teachers ‘was undoubt-
edly Everett Hughes’ and his article was published at the same time that 
 Goffman was finishing his doctoral dissertation. The distance between, on 
the one hand, routine and emergency and, on the other, between ritual and 
vulnerability is not particularly great, which is why Hughes’s ideas may 
have inspired Goffman. The difference is that Goffman, using  Durkheim’s 
sociology of religion, makes an interpretation of ‘routine’, which is trans-
formed into ‘ritual’, while at the same time ‘emergency’ is reinterpreted from 
a particular moment of crisis that occurs now and then into a constantly 
lurking ‘vulnerability’. But Goffman did not simply construct a dichoto-
mous tool of interpretation; he also took a step further to focus on the equi-
librium of social interaction between ritualisation and vulnerability, asking 
under what conditions this equilibrium is maintained, broken down, and 
re-established. Below I will represent how Goffman describes  ritualisation, 
vulnerability, and a temporarily working consensus, concluding by briefly 
describing the social interaction dynamic created by the interplay between 
these factors.
ritualisation
The literature on ritual and ritualisation is multifaceted and can be found in 
different disciplines; for instance, anthropology, religious studies, and soci-
ology, each of which in its turn contains several different interdisciplinary 
schools that use the concept of ritual in order to understand its relationship 
to, e.g., myth, religion, and society (see also Bell, 1997). The concept of ritual 
seems to be difficult to define in a comprehensive manner: ‘Defining the 
term “rituals” is a notoriously problematic task. The number of definitions 
proposed is endless, and no one seems to like the definitions proposed by 
 anyone else’ (Snoek, 2006, p. 3). For their part, Brosius and Hüsken (2010) 
feel that an unambiguous definition of ritual is neither possible nor  desirable, 
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because ritual quite simply means different things in different contexts. 
 Below I will mention a few definitions of importance for the understanding 
of Goffman’s use of the concept of ritual.
Defining ritual
Among the attempts to define the concept of ritual can be mentioned Firth’s 
(1972, p. 3) ‘symbolic action relating to the sacred’. Enfield’s (2009, p. 77f.) 
differentiation between three ways of using the concept of ritual is also 
important: (1) ‘ritualized communicative behavior’, which includes, e.g., 
 human symbolic behaviour and also animal mating behaviour; (2) ‘formal 
ritual’, which is defined with reference to the above-mentioned definition by 
Firth; and (3) ‘everyday ritual’, such as, for instance, greetings.
After having differentiated between ritual behaviour and ritual action, 
respectively, Bocock defines ritual as the ‘symbolic use of bodily move-
ment and gesture in a social situation to express and articulate meaning’ 
(Bocock, 1974, p. 37). Another definition can be found in Rappaport, 
who argues that ritual is ‘the performance of more or less invariant 
sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely coded by the per-
formers’  (Rappaport, 1999, p. 24). By ‘coded’ it is meant that the persons 
performing the action ‘follow, more or less punctiliously, orders estab-
lished or taken to have been established, by others’ (Rappaport, 1999, 
p. 32). Snoek reproduces the above definition as one of several classical 
ones, and then breaks these down, in an effort to avoid vagueness, into 
the following definition: ‘A ritual is a prescription (written or otherwise) 
for a particular ceremony’ (Snoek, 2006, p.  14). In this context should 
also be mentioned Grimes’s (2006b, p. 163) differentiation between rite: 
a sequence of actions given a special meaning because of its stylisation, 
condensation, or elevation; ritual: actions that are characterised with ref-
erence to ‘a certain “family” of qualities’, such as formalisation, pattern-
ing, and condensation, and by their being displayed in a kind of action 
that can be called performance; and ritualisation: activities that are not 
normally perceived as, but treated as if they are or could be, rituals; for 
instance, giving birth, cleaning, and watching TV. In this context can 
also be mentioned ethologist Eibl-Eibesfeldt, who argues that ‘human 
rituals are […] basically signals. They signal power, submission, friend-
ship and the like. A very important function of rituals is group cohesion’ 
 (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971, p. 54).
A completely different way of relating to rituals is to associate them with 
the tendency of modern social development to disenchant, through ration-
alisation, enlightenment, and commodification, many things that had pre-
viously been given a sacred meaning – i.e., among other things, rituals in the 
narrow sense given to them by Firth, but also rituals connected to secular 
institutions, such as marriage, birth, death, graduation, and the like. ‘Ritual 
has had something of a poor reputation in the contemporary world’, writes 
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Seligman et al., ‘relegated to a form of deviance […] or extirpated as an 
empty, external husk, lacking in ultimate spiritual significance, or again, 
condemned as a form of authoritarian control and dominance’ (Seligman, 
2008, p. 10). According to these writers, the determined struggle in modern 
society for sincerity and for establishing ‘how things really are’ pose a threat 
to rituals. But in spite of this, Seligman et al. argue that they have recently 
seen an increase in rituals – both religious and other, more everyday kinds. 
With reference to Goffman, they claim that social rituals, for instance greet-
ings, create a common social world. Goody, however, objects strongly to any 
attempt to extend the concept of ritual to include all possible areas, and asks 
what the point is in calling all manner of things rituals, because this does 
not actually add anything significant (Goody, 1977).
Thirty-five years later, Knottnerus (2011) claimed that the concept of 
ritual was underdeveloped and ignored in sociology because sociologists 
(with brilliant exceptions such as, for instance, Durkheim, Goffman, and 
Collins) feel that rituals belong in pre-modern societies and live on in mod-
ern societies only in the context of religious life. In addition, rituals are often 
seen as less real and significant than other social processes and structures. 
The theory developed by Knottnerus – structural ritualisation theory – is 
based on the idea that everyday life rests on individual and social rituals that 
contribute to stability in social life. Burke (2005, p. 41) argues that one can 
see a shift from research on ‘“ritual” as a separate category of human action 
to the examination of all human behavior as more or less “ritualized”’.
Grimes, too, rejected Goody’s idea that the concept of ritual is unneces-
sary, and would instead claim that ritual is a useful concept outside what 
some people see as its principal area, but the prerequisite for this is that the 
concept is defined and that researchers make clear what they want to use 
it for. This is because the concept swings between a very narrow usage – 
where ritual is seen as synonymous with religion and sacredness, something 
that makes its relationship to everyday life obscure – and a far too broad 
usage that means that ritual is placed on an equal footing with routine, pat-
terns, and formalisation, and that causes the difference between ritual and 
‘regular’ social interaction to disappear (Grimes, 2006b, p. 11). Against this 
background, Grimes reviews how the concept of ritual has been used over 
time. At the end of the nineteenth century the concept was used to answer 
questions about the origins of religion: ritual was seen as a kind of primal 
religious activity, and what was important then was that ritual was seen as 
action rather than thought. At the beginning of the twentieth century ques-
tions were asked about the functions of rituals, and among the answers men-
tioned by Grimes are social solidarity (Durkheim) and personal comfort 
(Freud). In the mid twentieth century rituals were linked to social change, 
and the interest among some researchers, for example Victor Turner, was 
focused on how rituals could mobilise forces that could lead to changes in 
individuals and hierarchies, and to a release of creativity. At present, ar-
gues Grimes, research on ritual deals to a great extent with the limits of 
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this phenomenon. Ritual is then seen, among other things, as an idealised, 
controlled, and delimited space – separated from everyday activities – and 
thus becomes a kind of image of how things should be. That is to say, rituals 
could show how things could be, and here, argues Grimes, performance, if 
defined as showing doing, is a kind of ritual tool.
When Schechner (2006, p. 28) asks what to perform means, he relates its 
different meanings to being, doing, showing doing, and explaining ‘showing 
doing’. Of these four, the ones that are usually related to ritual are doing 
and showing doing. Grimes demonstrates this through the claim that ‘when-
ever ritualists (“people who engage in ritual”) enact (“put into force”), they 
also perform (“show what they are doing”)’ (Grimes, 2006a, p. 380). It can 
thus be said that ritual action is not just any action, but an action that par-
ticularly underlines and is intended to show that it is being performed pre-
cisely in relation to the things the ritual includes. Repetition of sequences 
of actions, stylisation of the actions, and those actions symbolising some-
thing else are tools for showing doing. Goffman’s sociological perspective 
on social interaction emphasises precisely the difference between doing and 
showing doing, as well as the fact that the showing itself can be and tends to 
be ritualised. Goffman used the concept of performance in his first book, 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, in a considerably more narrow 
manner than it is used today, but the central distinction between doing and 
showing doing is the message of the book – indeed, it is its primary point. 
This distinction is perhaps the most important prerequisite for Goffman’s 
attempts to understand social illusions.
The concept and phenomenon of ritual in Goffman’s sociology
When it comes to Goffman’s use of the concept of ritual, references are 
usually given to the essays ‘On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Ele-
ments in Social Interaction’ (Goffman, 1955a) and ‘The Nature of Def-
erence and  Demeanor’ (Goffman, 1956). However, it must be said that 
Goffman refers to ritual throughout his entire body of works; the central 
distinction between doing and showing doing is, for instance, dealt with 
throughout. Most of Goffman’s sociology can be related to this distinc-
tion. However, I suspect that the early texts (from the 1950s and 60s) 
make use to a greater extent of religious analogies and metaphors (for 
instance, religious ceremonies and the sacredness of the self), while the 
later texts (from the 1970s and 80s) to a greater extent anchor rituals in 
the routinisation of social interaction. Seen from this perspective, the 
1971 book Relations in Public sits on the threshold between these two pe-
riods. This becomes apparent by the fact that at least two of its first chap-
ters provide more detailed explanations of earlier aspects of the theme 
of ritual (e.g., the territories of the self, rituals and ceremonies) and also 
that two of the later chapters deal more with the ritualisation/routi-
nisation of social interaction (e.g., ‘tie-signs’ as well as the oscillation 
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between ‘go about’ and ‘alarmed’ in social interaction in public places). 
Below I will relate in greater detail how Goffman uses the concept of 
ritual in his various texts.
The two above-mentioned essays from the mid 1950s have to do with the 
sacredness of the individual in modern society, and Goffman writes that our 
secularised world is still religious but in a different way than earlier, in that 
the individual him- or herself has become a kind of god whose honour is 
safeguarded through rituals (1956, p. 499). This view of the individual can be 
linked both to Durkheim (1965 [1912]), who argued that both society as well 
as the personality of the individual are the subjects of religious rituals, and 
that the individual has become a kind of sacred object in modern societies, 
and to Simmel, who argued that
an ideal sphere surrounds every human being, different in various di-
rections and toward different persons; a sphere varying in extent, into 
which one may not venture to penetrate without disturbing the personal 
value of the individual. Honor locates such an area. Language indi-
cates very nicely an invasion of this sort by such phrases as ‘coming too 
near’. The radius of that sphere, so to speak, marks the distance which a 
stranger may not cross without infringing upon another’s honor. (Sim-
mel, 1906, p. 453)
Goffman describes in detail how the sacredness, honour, and ideal sphere 
of an individual affect social interaction in the essay ‘On Face-Work’, in 
which the face of the individual, the image of him- or herself that the in-
dividual has created in interaction with other people, is studied via the 
face-work of that individual. Face-work has several aspects: maintaining 
face, avoiding losing face, saving face if it has been lost, and helping others 
maintain and/or save face. These are the traffic rules of social interaction, 
argues Goffman, and they contain what he later called impression manage-
ment, self-control, avoidance activities engaged in when a person’s own face 
risks being lost, and corrective measures when the rules of order have been 
transgressed. The latter two are made the subject of in-depth analysis in the 
book  Relations in Public. The order for managing the face of an individual is 
ritual, argues Goffman, and against this background he describes the ‘ritual 
roles of the self’. One role is, expressed freely, the role of the self as a sacred 
object. The other role is performed by the individual her- or himself in a 
ritual game controlled by respect for the individual and the rules of behav-
iour that control interaction with other people and that, in concrete terms, 
mean that others are treated in a polite and respectful manner. The first role 
of the self is thus a kind of abstract vision of the self as worth sanctifying, 
while the second role of the self is the actual ritual action that real individ-
uals perform. This doubleness can be expressed in the following manner:
When a person is responsible for introducing a threat to another’s face, 
he apparently has a right, within limits, to wriggle out of the difficulty 
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by means of self-abasement. When performed voluntarily these indigni-
ties do not seem to profane his own image. It is as if he had the right of 
insulation and could castigate himself qua actor without injuring him-
self qua object of ultimate worth. (Goffman, 1955a, p. 225)
Goffman creates two definitions of ritual in these early texts. The first one 
is developed against the backdrop of an argument about a disturbance in 
social interaction between individuals creating a ‘ritual disequilibrium or 
disgrace’, after which the ritual equilibrium must be re-established:
I use the term ritual because I am dealing with acts through whose sym-
bolic component the actor shows how worthy he is of respect or how 
worthy he feels others are of it. The imagery of equilibrium is apt here 
because the length and intensity of the corrective effort is nicely adapted 
to the persistence and intensity of the threat. One’s face, then, is a sacred 
thing, and the expressive order required to sustain it is therefore a ritual 
one. (Goffman, 1955a, p. 219)
The second definition of ritual is created in connection with an analysis 
of tokens of respect expressed in, for instance, greetings and apologies. 
 Goffman writes that he uses the term ritual because such secular tokens 
of respect represent ways in which the individual has to be attentive to and 
shape the symbolic meanings of his or her actions when she or he is in im-
mediate proximity to an object of particular value (Goffman, 1956, p. 478). 
Here Goffman views ritual in approximately the same way as does the pre-
viously mentioned Firth (1972) – i.e., as ‘symbolic action relating to the sa-
cred’, where the sacred object is the individual.
We can find many illustrations of this. Not least does it have to do with 
how we deal with dead people. The ritualised respect for dead people can be 
seen precisely as respect for the individual in a kind of abstract sense. The 
things we do in connection with death and the dead may seem hard to un-
derstand and even unnecessary from a rationalist perspective. The fact that 
forensic medical examiners continued to work for years with identifying the 
victims after the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 
can of course be seen as a waste of resources, but also as a politicisation of a 
national trauma, created with the ritualised sacredness of the individual as 
a central ingredient. Connected to this is of course the fact that certain indi-
viduals are more sacred than others, in death as in life, as when Israel in just 
such a ritualised way released 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in October 2011 
in exchange for the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. His name was mentioned 
in the media all around the world, while the freed Palestinians remained a 
faceless mass.
Goffman often exemplifies the sacredness of the individual with personal 
actions of respect in the form of greetings and politeness, and warns that 
these perhaps most often correspond to the interactions of the middle class. 
The idea of the sacredness of the individual can however also be linked to 
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what in sociology and other social sciences is usually called individualis-
ation. Democracy, human rights, and widespread individual choice of most 
things, all of which were almost unthinkable 200 or 100 years ago, can be 
seen as illustrations of the strong position held by the individual in late mod-
ern societies. When it comes to this, Goffman follows Durkheim’s interpre-
tations, based on the sociology of religion, of the position of the individual 
in secularised modern societies. But Goffman transcends Durkheim’s soci-
ology of religion when he demonstrates that social rituals expressing respect 
and esteem for an individual can be empty shells that only make up a dis-
play of respect and esteem for that individual. This can be illustrated by the 
fact that in parallel with the institutionalisation of the individual’s rights, 
choices, and the like, we can also see an institutionalisation of mechanisms 
that display just such an image of respect for the individual and that, among 
other things, are used to deceive the system.
As an example of this can be mentioned codes of ethics found in 
 profit-making businesses. Such codes often contain words of respect about 
the rights of the individual and these can be seen as just such an exam-
ple of the sacredness of the individual, until it is revealed that these codes 
are mostly applied in countries where companies are expected to have such 
codes, while the same company in other countries exploits child labourers, 
poisons the environment and conditions of life for individuals, and does not 
see the rights of their employees as an important issue. The ethics codes are 
thus displayed globally, but only applied locally. In a corresponding way we 
can say that where there are democratic institutions there is also a display 
of democracy. Similar examples can be found in public services, such as 
schools, where, for instance, it happens that people try to deceive the system 
by expressing respect for words in ordinances and curricula with regard to, 
for example, bullying or basic values, while at the same time students and/or 
personnel are treated disrespectfully.
In his book Relations in Public Goffman defines ritual as ‘a perfunctory, 
conventionalized act through which an individual portrays his respect 
and regard for some object of ultimate value’ (1971, p. 62). This definition 
 corresponds well to the ways of using the concept of ritual mentioned by 
 Enfield, and then in particular the previously mentioned definition by Firth – 
‘symbolic action relating to the sacred’ – as well as Goffman’s own analysis 
of the sacred individual in his early texts. At the same time Goffman de-
velops his perspective using Durkheim’s distinction between negative and 
positive rites, which can be defined as two different kinds of rules of behav-
iour in the interaction with sacred objects. Negative rites are prohibitions, 
regulations on how to avoid certain things, and the like, while positive rites 
regulate how to interact with sacred objects. Goffman discusses violations 
of the negative rites of social interaction under the designation ‘remedial 
interchanges’, and this has thus to do with how an individual who has vio-
lated rules of behaviour can apologise and again become a respected part of 
the social interaction order. Remedial interchanges, argues Goffman, are a 
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central part of social interaction in public places, an important tool in the 
organisation of the interaction order in these places. This is because vio-
lations of individual territories regularly occur in public places in modern 
societies (for example, because of crowding), violations that demand that an 
individual rehabilitate that part of the order that she or he has violated and 
thereby also him- or herself as a good interactor.
When a person disregards positive rites, that is to say rites that regulate 
how to interact with sacred objects, in this case the individual, the action is 
corrected through what Goffman calls supportive interchanges. This type of 
interchange is described as a gift order with reference to The Gift by Mauss 
(1954), a connection left out of the two essays from the 1950s but one that 
Goffman here develops further and modernises. The gift order is described 
as giving and taking with a display of gratitude. Against this background 
Goffman summarises as follows:
These two basic interchanges, the supportive and the remedial, are 
among the most conventionalized and perfunctory things we engage in 
and traditionally have been treated by students of modern society as 
part of the dust of social activity, empty and trivial. And yet […] almost 
all brief encounters between individuals consist precisely and entirely 
of one or the other of these two interchanges. In brief, whenever one 
individual rubs up against another, he is likely to say hello or excuse me. 
(Goffman, 1971, p. 64)
‘Hello’ is thus part of the ritual gift order, while ‘excuse me’ is a minimal 
remedial action used when that order is violated. Both are often pronounced 
in a strongly ritualised or routinised, almost automatic, way, and it is usu-
ally not until these three little words are left out that their existence becomes 
apparent as part of a much greater interaction order.
Here it seems to me as though Goffman embarks on a movement that 
leads in part away from an understanding of the interaction order based 
more on the sociology of religion: the routinisation of everyday existence 
is placed at the centre rather than the sacred individual. This becomes ap-
parent also when Goffman discusses the fact that it is possible to violate the 
basic rules that govern social interaction
as when individuals attack institutional authority by publicly perform-
ing obscene gestures. But even here conventions reign. A particular set 
of understandings is violated, but the means of violation are themselves 
necessarily drawn from a wider vocabulary of ritual that is common to 
all. Revolutionaries of decorum must rely on the same idiom as do those 
who would gently tiptoe through all their social occasions. (1971, p. 237)
The movement away from the sociology of religion continues in Forms of Talk, 
where Goffman complains about the fact that rituals at one and the same 
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time can be both too well-filled and empty, can both signal otherworldliness 
and automaticity. In this context he also tests various alternative terms that 
could perhaps replace ‘ritual’, and his selection is rather interesting: ‘cere-
monial’, ‘politeness’, and ‘expressive’. He immediately  rejects the first two 
of these, but the third he considers interesting, since those actions that are 
perceived as ritual actions are always expressive because an actor expresses 
his or her relationship to ‘objects of value in their own right’ (Goffman, 
1981a, p. 17).1 In the book Gender Advertisements, which is an analysis of 
more than 500 advertisements that depict women and women in relation to 
other women, children, men, and hierarchies, among other things, Goffman 
plays with the concepts of both frame and ritual in order to get a grasp of 
what he calls commercial realism: ‘the standard transformation employed in 
contemporary ads, in which the scene is conceivable in all detail as one that 
could in theory have occurred as pictured, providing us with a simulated 
slice of life’ (1979b, p. 15). The conclusion becomes, among other things, 
that the characteristic format of rituals – standardisation, exaggeration, and 
simplification – is developed further within the context of the ‘commercial 
realism’ of advertisements. Goffman calls this hyper- ritualisation, or, using 
another term, exaggerated ritualisation:
By and large, advertisers do not create the ritualized expressions they 
employ; they seem to draw upon the same corpus of displays, the same 
ritual idiom, that is the resource of all of us who participate in social sit-
uations, and to the same end: the rendering of glimpsed action readable. 
If anything, advertisers conventionalize our conventions, stylize what is 
already a stylization, make frivolous use of what is already something 
considerably cut off from contextual controls. Their hype is hyper- 
ritualization. (Goffman, 1979b, p. 84)
As I now conclude this survey of the use of the concept of ritual I would 
like to emphasise that my purpose in using the concept of ‘ritualisation’ to 
describe an important part of Goffman’s sociological perspective is that it 
will symbolise things in the social interaction that makes it more stable and 
predictable. This is not to say that the reality of social interaction is stable, 
but rather that it is based on certain rules that most people follow when 
they interact with other people, albeit not rules that have been put to a vote 
or that lead to incarceration if we violate them. These are vulnerable rules, 
fragile rules: ‘But it is to these flimsy rules, and not to the unshaking char-
acter of the external world, that we owe our unshaking sense of realities’, 
writes Goffman (1961b, p. 80f).
Vulnerability
Analytically it is possible to distinguish between ritualisation and vulnera-
bility, as I do in this chapter in order to show more clearly these two central 
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aspects of Goffman’s sociology, but in empirically observable social inter-
action they are connected. Vulnerability in the context of social interaction 
means, in principle, that social interaction is fragile and liable to collapse 
unless its different participants singly and together maintain the interaction 
order – consciously, by mistake, or because they cannot control the impres-
sions of other people well enough. In other words, the interaction order is in 
the balance and does not become ordered on its own. Concretely, vulnera-
bility means several different things in social interaction:
1  Human beings are vulnerable and can be hurt in their interactions with 
other people.
2  An individual’s own definitions of reality are vulnerable.
3  Shared definitions of reality are vulnerable because they depend on in-
teracting individuals defining reality in roughly the same way. 
Why, then, is order vulnerable? Perhaps the most important structural 
condition for Goffman’s studies of social interaction is that the interacting 
people are in immediate physical proximity to each other. This means that 
interaction occurs both with expressions given (e.g., verbal and non-verbal 
expressions over which an interacting individual has a relatively great degree 
of control) and expressions given off (e.g., verbal and non-verbal expressions 
over which an interacting person has a lesser degree of control). Because of 
this, the risk is greater that the interacting individuals transmit contradic-
tory expressions than if they were mainly to use expressions given, which for 
instance I do when I write this book: as a reader you have no opportunity 
to decipher my body language, trembling, perspiration, and the like; nor do 
you have access to all my earlier versions of this text. On the other hand, you 
as a reader can interpret my choice of expressions, formulations, and other 
linguistic choices as signs of who I am. During a discussion at a conference, 
Goffman called visible deficiencies in the self-presentations of individuals 
‘expressive leakage’ (Kelman et al., 1957, p. 429), and, in another context, a 
lack of ‘dramaturgical discipline’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 216ff).
Another aspect of the physical proximity between interacting individuals 
that contributes to vulnerability has to do with a fear of what another person 
might do; for example, use physical or other forms of violence. Goffman’s 
analysis of fear and the potential for violence in social interactions appears 
related to Sartre’s analysis of the gaze in Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 1966 
[1956]), and Sartre’s claim that ‘Hell is – other people!’ could just as well have 
been Goffman’s. This phrase is part of a line towards the end of Sartre’s 
play No Exit (Sartre, 1989 [1946]), a kind of conclusion if one sees the play 
as an investigation of what Hell is. There are several structural prerequisites 
for Hell as it is described in the play, for instance the absence of mirrors. In 
order to see their own reflections, people in Hell have to see their reflections 
in each other, and another subject thus comes between a person and her or 
his mirror image. And because they have been unable to choose the people 
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with whom they spend their time in Hell, another structural prerequisite, 
the mirror images often differ from the ones we provide for ourselves: false, 
distorted, honest, or far too honest. Hell is thus not only ‘Others’, if we are to 
believe Sartre, but the particular others that we are forced to spend our time 
with and reflect ourselves in. The individual is vulnerable in the presence of 
others, argues Goffman:
When persons come into one another’s immediate physical presence, 
they become accessible to each other in unique ways. There arise the 
possibilities of physical and sexual assault, of accosting and being 
dragged into unwanted states of talk, of offending and importuning 
through the use of words, of transgressing certain territories of the self 
of the other, of showing disregard and disrespect for the gathering pres-
ent and the social occasion under whose auspices the gathering is held. 
(Goffman, 1967, p. 147)2
At the same time, the interaction with others is also a stage where we per-
form in front of others, wash, make ourselves beautiful, try to smell good 
and dress up, think of how we express ourselves, try to show our best but not 
our only side, and show ourselves off in ways that allow us to gain advan-
tages. Hell may well be other people, but interacting with them often seems 
to make us better than had we not met them in the first place. The possibility 
exists that these efforts are deceptive, since vulnerability and social interac-
tion also include the making of social illusions, of which we are all capable 
through a greater or lesser degree of impression management. We see it in 
everything, from the small, manipulated everyday stories that allow us to 
appear in a better light, to swindlers who know how to take into account the 
gullibility of other people.
Vulnerability also has to do with the fact that individuals have different 
life situations that are connected to, for instance, age, gender, class, and 
culture. In this sense, individuals live in different worlds that can vary im-
mensely and that make it impossible for them to understand each other. 
Individuals also have different perceptions of reality that are based both 
on lived conditions of life – e.g., age, gender, culture, class – and on more 
subjective attitudes. For instance, the alternative facts that are mentioned so 
often as a consequence of Trump’s presidency profit by these differences and 
the informational uncertainty that through this can be exploited politically.
In this context, language should be mentioned as a creative and multifac-
eted instrument of communication, which for this precise reason also makes 
social interaction vulnerable. Everyday language has a rhetorical aspect, 
which means that the manner in which we express ourselves may sometimes 
be more important than what we mean, while at the same time we can very 
well understand the context behind vague turns of phrase. The issue is then 
not simply to be linguistically correct, but to be situationally correct to an 
equal degree. In an article with the ambiguous title ‘Felicity’s Condition’, 
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Goffman argues that narrow linguistic analyses or detailed transcriptions 
of sequences of conversation are not adequate tools for understanding con-
versations. Conversations are normatively and morally regulated, and this, 
too, controls what we feel is the proper expression and what is appropriately 
spoken.
Goffman demonstrates this with a simple example, which I summarise 
freely here. You have been to the cinema and seen a film. The next day you 
pass a person on the street who is unknown to you, but whom you recog-
nise from the cinema. Then you will probably ask what she or he thought 
about the film from the previous evening, won’t you? Hardly. But if the two 
of you on the other hand end up in a joint situation that gives reason for a 
conversation, you can direct the conversation to the point where you can 
ask that question. Goffman reviews different variations on this theme; for 
instance, your asking a friend whom you saw at the cinema, but who did not 
see you, how the film was, which is not simply a question about the film but 
also demands quite a bit of managing of the fact that you were both there 
without actually meeting each other (did he or she avoid you, or you her or 
him?). So the answer to the question of what he or she thought about the film 
can in that case turn into, ‘You were there? Why didn’t you say anything?’, 
and then you have to explain why you did not, which suddenly has acquired 
a moral dimension that has to do with the fact that it is inappropriate not 
to make one’s presence known if one sees a person one knows. A mutual 
nod at the cinema the evening before would have been enough for you to 
directly be able to ask, ‘What did you think of the film yesterday?’ This 
is because you are then in the same position with respect to information 
and can openly admit this – unless, Goffman writes mischievously, it was a 
porn film you had seen the evening before. For this reason, Goffman defines 
‘Felicity’s Condition’ – which means the prerequisite for the apt or correct 
expression – in the following way: ‘any arrangement which leads us to judge 
an individual’s verbal acts to be not a manifestation of strangeness. Behind 
Felicity’s Condition is our sense of what it is to be sane’ (Goffman, 1983a, 
p. 27). Conversations are thus both about what is said, about the situation in 
which it is said, and about normative regulations of conversations. Goffman 
summarises this in the following way:
Given that you have something that you want to utter to a particular 
other, how do you go about getting into the circumstances that will al-
low you appropriately to do so? (Goffman, 1983a, p. 32)3
Against this backdrop, our language use is surrounded by a certain degree 
of caution; to simultaneously have to be linguistically, situationally, and 
morally correct increases vulnerability in social interactions. We quite sim-
ply have multiple opportunities to make mistakes.
Finally, we have the vulnerability that has to do with individuals’ resist-
ance, deceptions, humour, mistakes, and actions that violate norms and 
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expectations in other ways. Goffman takes up quite a few of these things in 
his book Frame Analysis, in particular in the chapters about deception and 
about how to break the framings of situations, and, in the chapter on the 
vulnerability of experience, Goffman asks, ‘how could one go about disor-
ganizing the world?’ and answers,
If there is a cognitive organization to the world we are in such that cor-
rectives to error, deception, and delusion often emerge, how can these 
correctives be best offset? One answer, perhaps, is to be found by reex-
amining the issue of transformation. For, as urged already, the hardest 
reality is subject to systematic alteration. (1974, p. 493)
The point is that the more convinced we are about our common unity re-
garding how situations are to be understood, defined, framed, and man-
aged, the more vulnerable we are to the slightest disturbance.
Working consensus
I will finally focus my attention on the interaction itself, or the dynamic 
between ritualisation and vulnerability, the process in which the key is the 
relationship between ritualised action and everything that makes it vulner-
able, as well as the balance or equilibrium between them. Goffman calls this 
balance ‘temporarily working consensus’ (and similar terms), as well as, in 
the article ‘On Face-Work’, ‘ritual equilibrium’. It is important to underline 
that Goffman, when doing this, does not in principle give expression to a 
consensus perspective in contrast to a conflict perspective, which for in-
stance is made clear in his dissertation, where he describes social interaction 
‘not as a scene of harmony but as an arrangement for pursuing a cold war’ 
(Goffman, 1953, p. 40). A cold war is a particular kind of peace that is also 
called a ‘terror balance’. In the corresponding way, the temporarily work-
ing consensus of social interaction is a consensus for which the alternative 
is worse, which is why the interacting parties are prepared to go quite far 
in order to avoid that alternative. Furthermore, Goffman emphasises that 
the actual content of this consensus varies from situation to situation, and 
I would like to argue that there are two mechanisms that, to a great extent, 
create the preconditions for a temporarily working consensus: the already 
mentioned interaction order, which is based on respect for the individual, as 
well as the identity values of society – i.e., the normative and institutional 
regulation of, expectations concerning, and ideas about how individuals 
should be, act, and look, and what they should do (1963b, p. 128). These 
control the interaction order, and the identity values to a great extent also 
determine the content of the social interaction rituals:
Ordinarily the definitions of the situation projected by the several dif-
ferent participants are sufficiently attuned to one another so that open 
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contradiction will not occur. I do not mean that there will be the kind of 
consensus that arises when each individual present candidly expresses 
feelings of the others present. This kind of harmony is an optimistic 
ideal and in any case not necessary for the smooth working of society. 
Rather, each participant is expected to suppress his immediate heart-
felt feelings, conveying a view of the situation which he feels the others 
will be able to find at least temporarily acceptable. The maintenance 
of this surface of agreement, this veneer of consensus, is facilitated by 
each participant concealing his own wants behind statements which as-
sert values to which everyone present feels obliged to give lip service. 
 (Goffman, 1959, p. 9)4
As can be seen, it is the temporary and superficial unity in itself that is the 
central thing. This consensus is one of many conceivable social realities:
The whole machinery of self-production is cumbersome, of course, and 
sometimes breaks down, exposing its separate components: […] But, 
well-oiled, impressions will flow from it fast enough to put us in the 
grips of one of our types of reality – the performance will come off and 
the firm self accorded each performed character will appear to emanate 
intrinsically from its performer. (Goffman, 1959, p. 253)
In brief, this has to do with a functioning social interaction in the situation 
in question. The next time you meet a person who expresses a view that you 
do not agree with, and you suppress your view because you do not want to 
or do not have the strength to deal with, or are unable to handle a conflict 
in the situation in question, then you have experienced creating just such a 
temporarily working consensus.
But what compels the individual in this situation to want to reach this 
temporarily working consensus? What is the unity a deviation from? Here 
I believe we can make use of what Goffman describes as ritual equilibrium 
in his analysis of different kinds of face-work; for instance, the activities 
of an individual for maintaining his or her face as well as saving his or her 
own and other people’s faces in social interactions. Face is then defined as 
‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself’ (Goffman, 
1955a, p. 213).5 When face is threatened in social interactions, the individual 
attempts to save it, and is often helped by other people in order to restore 
the ritual equilibrium, and this sequence of actions is called ‘interchange’ 
(Goffman, 1955a, p. 219). A temporarily working consensus in a situation 
is the experience of the interacting individuals of a mutual exchange. The 
advantages to the individuals of the mutual exchange is that the faces of the 
individuals are not challenged, threatened, or lost. This equilibrium is de-
pendent on each participant and is based on a kind of collective non- decision 
to ‘put up with the situation’,6 and is for that reason vulnerable. Every ac-
tor can therefore, unconsciously or consciously, sabotage the equilibrium 
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of social interaction; for instance, by not doing what is expected according 
to the kind of etiquette that regulates the interaction, by making mistakes, 
by creatively going against the grain of what is taken for granted, by using 
humour to shine a different light on everything, or doing other things that 
disturb or reframe the interaction order.
The relationship between interaction and a temporarily working consen-
sus becomes, in a way, circular, because the temporarily working consensus 
is a kind of meaning that the interactors give to their mutual exchange, at 
the same time that this presupposes a temporarily working consensus. A 
functioning social interaction is, in other words, experienced as good just 
because it works. In a sense, it is an aim in and of itself. However, as has 
been said before, it is also vulnerable, and social interaction can therefore 
quickly turn into something completely different. Such rapid changes are, 
among other things, what Goffman’s concept of frame and framing is about, 
something that I will show in the following chapters.
Notes
 1 In this context can be mentioned that Album (2010) uses the concept 
 ‘expressive-symbolic’ instead of ‘ceremonial’ when he analyses interaction ritu-
als in an emergency room.
 2 In the original from 1964 there is a typo that changes the entire meaning of the 
long, quoted second sentence (Goffman, 1964a, p. 269). The sentence was cor-
rected when the text was republished in the book Interaction Ritual (1967).
 3 In this context should be mentioned that Goffman in this text is arguing for a 
sociological analysis of conversations, an analysis in which it is important to 
see that interactions between individuals happen both in a situation and in a 
society, something that is of decisive importance for how we understand and 
can understand what is being said. He contrasts such an analysis with narrow 
linguistic and philosophical analyses of conversations, as well as with far too 
micro-oriented conversational analyses within, e.g., sociology.
 4 See also a similar formulation in (Goffman, 1953, p. 350).
 5 According to this definition, face is anchored in what Goffman calls social iden-
tity, personal identity, and self-identity. In some sense, face is the individual’s 
own, but it is maintained and threatened in social interactions. Face is also a 
mask (a concept that Goffman, however, does not use), or the role that protects 
and sometimes hides aspects of the individual. In Ekman and Friesen (2003), 
face is a mask that can accentuate and hide, e.g., emotions. Knausgård makes 
an exciting reverse observation: ‘In the neck is collected or expressed the fear 
of everything we cannot see, and if it was once upon a time associated with 
concrete violence it is nowadays the transferred meaning that is most stressful, 
the one that is formulated socially, as in being ambushed from behind, covering 
one’s back, having eyes in the back of one’s neck, being stabbed in the back’ 
(Knausgård, 2014, p. 9).




The book Frame Analysis was published in 1974 as Goffman’s ninth of in to-
tal eleven books. It is both a remarkable book and an odd one. It is difficult 
to understand and a bit wooden, unlike several of Goffman’s other books 
and articles, but in spite of this it is the third most cited in Google Scholar of 
Goffman’s eleven books.1 After having read, e.g., Goffman’s book Stigma, 
one understands normality and deviance in quite a different way, one that 
is not simply about stigmatised people but also about our shared fear of 
becoming one of the stigmatised, whether because of appearance, aging, 
illness, clothes, opinions – anything that other people can refer to in their 
definitions of me. This fear is the driving force behind what Goffman called 
‘stigma management’, which means that individuals attempt to control their 
presentation of themselves so that the stigma is hidden or made to appear 
to define them to a lesser extent. This kind of generalisation can be found 
in several of Goffman’s texts, for instance in ‘On Cooling the Mark Out’, 
which is about con artists who, after completing their work, are not satisfied 
with the loot itself but also take pains to cool down their victim’s feelings 
to prevent the victim from reporting the con artist to the police and thus, 
in some respect, causing the victim to accept his or her own fate. When 
Goffman lifts his gaze he sees similar coolers in many places in society; 
e.g., psychotherapists: ‘His job is to pacify and reorient the disorganized 
person; […] the psychotherapist has the basic task of cooling the mark out’ 
 (Goffman, 1952, p. 461).
Frame Analysis does not at all have this heuristic character, and several 
readers of the book emphasise its tediousness and long-windedness; e.g., 
 Lemert (1997, p. xl): ‘Frame Analysis was one of Goffman’s  intellectually 
least successful efforts because, at the least, it was, even for him, so 
 extraordinarily messy’. Some readers put up with this because they, in spite 
of everything, appreciated some of the qualities of the content of the book:
For all its problems and prolixity, I recommend this book strongly. No 
sociologist since Simmel has tied together so wide a range of apparently 
disconnected events and activities within a single framework – from nat-
ural disasters (mine cave-ins) to verbal disasters (puns). He [Goffman] 
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has extended the sociological approach to realms seemingly immune to 
sociological penetration (hypnosis, possession, insanity, drunkenness, 
childishness). (Davis, 1975, p. 603)
Others had a completely different opinion:
What have I learned from reading this book: all of its 576 pages of text? 
Very little and, after the high promise of the opening chapters, I am as 
much surprised as disappointed. (Swanson, 1976, p. 218)
A present-day reader writes,
Everyone references this book, and I wonder how many have ever read 
the entire thing. I definitely skimmed a good deal of it and skipped a 
couple of chapters. This book is unnecessarily long. The point that 
Goffman makes is not that complex and could be explained in less than 
100 pages. I read it, because it’s one of those things that you’re supposed 
to read, I guess. However, I found it boring, repetitive, and not so en-
lightening. Perhaps if I had read this in the 1970s, I would have been 
more impressed. Who knows? (Kathleen, 2011)
In their article on Frame Analysis – seven years after the publication of the 
book – Denzin and Keller settle the score with, practically speaking, the 
totality of Goffman’s project, and spare no pains to differentiate it from 
symbolic interactionism – i.e., their own perspective.2 They describe Frame 
Analysis as ‘a structural analysis of selected and […] peripheral aspects of 
everyday experience’, and conclude that ‘his concept of reality is illusive and 
blurred. […] His frames catch events that are on the periphery of everyday 
life’ (Denzin & Keller, 1981, pp. 53, 59). We can find a similar description in 
Sharron, who in addition describes Goffman’s analysis with the expression 
‘frame paralysis’ (Sharron, 2000 [1981]). Zerubavel, who has been strongly 
inspired by Frame Analysis, does not share this view, and instead describes 
the book as ‘a masterful study of our experiential partitioning of reality’ 
(1991, p. xi).
There are, consequently, many ways of understanding Goffman’s sociol-
ogy, and when it comes to texts on Frame Analysis it is in many cases the 
writer’s expectations of what a Goffman text is supposed to contain that 
determines to a great extent her or his assessment of that text. For instance, 
Frame Analysis is much more tedious than earlier books – i.e., the reader in 
question had expected a book that was like the earlier, more stimulating, 
books. Frame Analysis is not symbolic interactionist but structuralist, or the 
other way around. Frame Analysis is not about common reality. It does not 
have a class perspective. All these assessments are quite possibly reasonable, 
but the energy of these claims does not come so much from Frame Analysis 
as from expectations that have been either disappointed or fulfilled.
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The reading of Frame Analysis is probably also influenced by the fact 
that the book has an object of study that differentiates it somewhat from 
 Goffman’s other books, which focus on the interaction order and thus on 
social interaction in many different contexts and forms, such as, e.g., insti-
tutions, public places, roles, norms, gender, everyday life, routines, rituals, 
and conversations. All these are usually experienced as central sociological 
areas. In Frame Analysis Goffman has two other goals in that he partly 
wants to illustrate what ‘frame analysis’ is, partly show that ‘reality’ can 
be made the subject of framing because it is not as solid as is sometimes 
claimed. Therefore, Goffman follows two tracks in Frame Analysis: a meth-
odological track (How does one conduct frame analysis), and an ontologi-
cal track (How can the fragility of reality be constituted?). The latter track 
causes the object of study in Frame Analysis, and thus the entire book, to be 
experienced as considerably more sociologically peripheral than Goffman’s 
earlier and later objects of study.
A general statement of what?
The reading of Frame Analysis also appears to vary in accordance with how 
the reader understands what Goffman means when he writes that Frame 
Analysis is ‘a general statement’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 14). The way I under-
stand it, ‘a general statement’ can mean two completely different things in 
light of the content of Frame Analysis. The question then becomes in what 
respect Frame Analysis is general and what it is that is being generalised. In 
the same paragraph in which we find the expression ‘a general statement’, 
Goffman writes, ‘I deal again in this book with what I have dealt with in 
others – another go at analyzing fraud, deceit, con games, shows of various 
kinds’. When I read this I get the impression that Frame Analysis aims to 
be ‘a general statement’ regarding precisely the above-mentioned parts of 
Goffman’s sociology. The following sentence contains, among other things, 
these words: ‘much repetition of other things I’ve written’. If we presume that 
it relates to the things Goffman enumerates in the previous sentence, then ‘a 
general statement’ refers to what he has written about fraud, con games, im-
pression management, shows, etc. and not to everything he has written. This 
is confirmed to some degree by the fact that Goffman in the same sentence 
mentions a list of his own books that he refers to in Frame Analysis and 
which contains six books (1961b, 1963a, 1963b, 1967, 1970 [1969], 1971) out 
of his eight previous ones (1974, unpaginated page after p. xviii).3 It is then 
interesting to note that the two books left out are his perhaps best-known 
books: The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) and Asylums (1961a). 
The former is probably Goffman’s most widely read book, and in it, as has 
been mentioned previously, is introduced a dramaturgical perspective on 
social interaction. For its part, Asylums gave Goffman a certain degree of 
notoriety in the United States, because the book was interpreted as a po-
litical contribution to the debate on total institutions, rather than merely a 
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series of studies of what coercion does to people when they attempt to cope 
in such institutions.4 I cannot fully assess the significance of these ‘exclu-
sions’ that Goffman made of his two best-known books (if  they indeed 
were exclusions), but if Frame Analysis is ‘a general statement’  regarding 
his entire oeuvre, surely the two excluded books should have been included. 
On the other hand, if Frame Analysis is ‘a general statement’ on fraud, con 
games, shows, etc., surely the two excluded books should also in this case 
have been included, since they to a great extent refer to these things through 
the  analysis of ‘impression management’ in The Presentation of Self and 
‘secondary adjustment’ in Asylums.
Apart from these conjectures, it is in reality con games, frauds, and shows 
that Goffman discusses in Frame Analysis and not his general sociologi-
cal perspective. Goffman makes general statements about his sociological 
perspective in his speech as the newly elected president of the American 
 Sociological Association, the speech he could not deliver because of his 
illness and that was published posthumously with the title ‘The Interaction 
Order’ (Goffman, 1983b), in which he talks about the social interaction  order. 
For this reason, I believe that this text is Goffman’s ‘general statement’ on 
his sociological project. In addition, it is perfectly possible to connect Frame 
Analysis to the general perspective on social interaction in Goffman’s soci-
ology that was presented in the preceding chapter: the dynamic relationship 
between ritualisation, vulnerability, and working consensus. Not least the 
vulnerability of social reality is frequently discussed in Frame Analysis.
If Goffman’s ‘general statement’ in Frame Analysis is interpreted as a gen-
eral statement on fraud etc., the idea presents itself immediately that he refers 
to Schütz’s enumeration of the many lifeworlds (or provinces of  meaning): 
‘All these worlds – the world of dreams, of imageries and  phantasms, es-
pecially the world of art, the world of religious experience, the world of 
scientific contemplation, the play world of the child, and the world of the 
insane’ (Schütz, 1945, p. 553). Goffman discusses Schütz in the introduction 
to Frame Analysis, and I believe that Goffman quite simply complements 
Schütz’s list with one additional lifeworld, which could be called the world 
of social illusion and social illusion-making.
What kind of book is Frame Analysis?
In addition to asking what kind of ‘general statement’ Frame Analysis repre-
sents, one should also ask what kind of book Frame Analysis is. Ergo: How 
should Frame Analysis be framed? Is it a research report? Or a theory book? 
Or a book on methodology? It is a little of each, but the understanding of 
it – at least my understanding – is simplified if it is recognised above all as 
a book on methodology. The method presented and practically illustrated 
in Frame Analysis is, then, frame analysis.5 Goffman himself writes the fol-
lowing about this: ‘My phrase “frame analysis” is a slogan to refer to the ex-
amination […] of the organization of experience’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 11). The 
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presentation is, at times, rather hard to understand and long-winded, but it 
is not particularly difficult to understand that frame analysis, considered as 
a method, has to do with understanding social interaction, partly by contex-
tualising it, partly by connecting it to the sets of norms, rules, conventions, 
etc. that define, control, and frame interaction. If Frame Analysis is framed 
as a book on methodology one can, in addition, lower one’s expectations 
with respect to its literary qualities – who would ever entertain the idea that 
a book on survey methods, conversational analysis, or multivariate analysis 
would have to be good literature? – and evaluate it in accordance with the 
standard usually employed for assessing books on methodology: its practi-
cal usefulness.
I thus believe that Goffman in Frame Analysis describes how he felt he 
was working when analysing social interaction. Frame analysis is sometimes 
described in such a way that the reader – at any rate the present reader – 
cannot completely put his or her finger on what it means; the description is, 
in a way, elusive. But at times Goffman concretises in a clarifying manner 
what frame analysis can be. For instance, he writes about ‘engrossables’, 
which means that an individual can be swept off his or her feet, become 
enraptured, or lose her or his head, and Goffman mentions the following 
three examples: ‘King Arthur has just unsheathed his sword and is about to 
defend Guenevere’, ‘The little otter is about to attack his mother’, and ‘His 
bishop is about to threaten my knight’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 46). Goffman 
writes that one way of relating to these three representations is to under-
stand them within the framework of the respective meaningful context of 
each one, but then continues to argue that one could also relate to them 
using a common-sense version of frame analysis: ‘In the Scott novel, the 
writer has the character Ivanhoe do all kinds of strange things’, ‘The otters 
are not really fighting’, and ‘The men seem to be playing some kind of board 
game’. In a way, one assumes a position outside the situations into which the 
three descriptions invite one, the situations that provide meaning and that 
take possession of one, and this step makes possible a kind of metareflec-
tion that can provide answers to the question Goffman claims that frame 
 analysis should answer: What is it that’s going on here? We understand what 
is  happening if we can contextualise the events and understand the norms 
and rules that control the interaction: a novel, a mock fight, and a game – 
three different frames.
Notes
 1 Frame Analysis had 23,285 citations, coming after Stigma with 29,313 and The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life with 49, 581 citations (accessed 19 July 2017).
 2 Which is something Goffman surely would not object to, not least because he 
seemed to be sceptical of dividing sociology into different schools (see, e.g., 
 Zerubavel, 2008). Placing Goffman in or outside symbolic interactionism of 
course also depends on how this is defined. Helle (1998) answers in the affirma-
tive to the question of whether Goffman was a symbolic interactionist, however 
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on condition that symbolic interactionism be defined in the very broad way 
that Rose (1962) does: a kind of sociology of understanding à la Weber, which 
has been given its primary American expression via George Herbert Mead. If, 
however, symbolic interactionism is defined in the manner of Blumer (1986), 
 Goffman is not a symbolic interactionist, according to Helle.
 3 I have, however, only found references in Frame Analysis to five of Goffman’s 
earlier books. He also refers once each to his Master’s thesis (1949) and his doc-
toral dissertation (1953). In Frame Analysis, the most frequently cited of his 
 earlier books is Relations in Public, with ten references.
 4 This politicisation of Asylums was probably the reason for the only two ‘polit-
ical’ commissions that Goffman, to my knowledge, received. The first was in 
1970, when he, together with Thomas Szasz and George Alexander, founded the 
organisation The American Association for the Abolition of Involuntary  Mental 
Hospitalization. The second came in 1971–75, when he was an expert on a commit-
tee of inquiry under the management of Senator Charles E. Goodell. The com-
mittee had the name The Committee for the Study of Incarceration and  presented 
a number of suggestions based on criticism of incarceration as punishment and 
argued for time limits on punishments. During the four years that the inquiry 
was active it had twenty working meetings, and Andrew von Hirsch summa-
rised the result of these in the book Doing Justice (Hirsch, 1976). In  Goffman’s 
obituary in the University of Pennsylvania journal Almanac (‘Deaths of Four 
Faculty Members: Dr. Erving Goffman,’ 1982, p. 1), this expert commission is 
emphasised. However, Goffman does not mention this commission in his CV 
and does not seem to have been particularly active in the committee work  itself; 
at least there is nothing written about this. In the committee report there are 
special statements from four of the fourteen specially appointed experts of the 
committee, but nothing by Goffman. Whereas von Hirsch’s book is frequently 
cited, one of the few references to the committee’s actual work can be found 
in a Spanish book on criminal policy and punishment systems: ‘Many of the 
disagreements within the committee, which are perhaps forgotten today, were 
reflections of different opinions and political-intellectual tensions that  existed 
among the members of the committee’ (Beiras & Almeda, 2005, p. 268). 
 5 Hazelrigg (1992, p. 241) argues in a similar vein in an article on Frame Analysis.
Goffman’s sociology derives its character from two existential  prerequisites: 
(1) individuals always share a social situation with other individuals, and (2) 
individuals lack fully reliable knowledge about the individuals with whom 
they share this social situation. Goffman transforms these existential pre-
requisites into two knowledge problems: defining the situation and gather 
social information about others respectively. The definition of the situation 
is a concept that has to do with how individuals try to understand and 
handle situations they share with other people, while gathering social in-
formation is a crucial tool when individuals, quickly and often based on 
a weak foundation of knowledge, need to ‘read’ both the situation and the 
individuals they are interacting with. These existential prerequisites form 
the basis of Goffman’s frame concept.
In Frame Analysis Goffman is primarily interested in the tacit understand-
ings of reality constructed by individuals in social interaction.  Goffman calls 
these ‘frames’. Inspired by William James (1950 [1890]),  Gregory  Bateson 
(2000 [1955]), and Alfred Schütz (1945), Goffman  developed the frame 
 concept further by emphasising its simultaneously cognitive, social inter-
active, and situational aspects. How these work together in an actual social 
interaction can be made visible by posing Goffman’s question, ‘What is it 
that’s going on here?’ in a social interaction context. The idea of posing pre-
cisely that question is that the answer is often not a given in situations where 
two or more individuals interact. The interaction has to be contextualised – 
seen in the light of its context – and what happens can then turn out to be 
something other than what appears to be happening, and can sometimes 
also quickly be transformed into something else, illustrating the vulnera-
bility of social interaction. This vulnerability, however, is difficult to under-
stand if we do not simultaneously understand the ritualised and routinised 
character of social interaction. The ritualisation makes the interaction fixed 
and repetitive in character by way of its being anchored in the interacting 
individuals’ experiences of social interaction. For this reason, social inter-
action is at one and the same time ritualised and vulnerable, and the frame 
concept captures precisely this doubleness.
5 the development of Goffman’s 
interactional and situational 
frame concept
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the frame concept
Goffman defines ‘frame’ as a situational definition that follows certain princi-
ples of organisation, and as such it controls both the events and the  subjective 
commitment of the individual within the situation in question (Goffman, 
1974, p. 10f). Frame is a context that can be something else depending on how 
we define what is included in this context. Most obviously, what is seemingly 
one and the same thing can be different depending on whether what happens 
is, for instance, in earnest or for fun, ‘for real’ or make-believe, if it happens 
when awake or in a dream, or if it is experienced in one’s memory or at the 
current point in time. Variations in the framing turn one thing into something 
else, a bit like when a terrified person is chased by a murderer, then wakes up 
to find with relief that it was a dream, even though not all transitions between 
frames are as dramatic as this one. Goffman illustrates this in his analysis of 
holding hands, which he sees as a tie sign. Because holding hands can also 
have other meanings; e.g., getting a manicure, Goffman uses the concept of 
frame in order to frame the differences between different meanings of  holding 
hands, and a frame is then described as ‘a different scheme of interpretation 
for the meaning of an act’ (1971, p. 231). This demonstrates that the concept 
of frame is not very useful if the definition of a phenomenon is more or less un-
ambiguous, but that it is the variations that make it useful – that is to say, when 
different actions and interactions appear to mean the same thing but do not.
In Goffman’s version, frames appear in two forms that can be called 
non-transforming and transforming, respectively. Goffman calls the former 
primary frameworks, and subdivides these into two categories: natural and 
social. These should be considered as inert background perceptions about 
human existence. Natural primary frameworks identify
occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, unguided, 
‘purely physical.’ Such unguided events are ones understood to be due 
totally […] to ‘natural’ determinants. It is seen that no willful agency 
causally and intentionally interferes, that no actor continuously guides 
the outcome. […] Full determinism and determinateness prevail. 
 (Goffman, 1974, p. 22)
On the other hand, social primary frameworks include mechanisms controlled 
by human volition, such as laws, rules, norms, habits, power, culture, institu-
tions, and organisations. Human volition is in control, but in a rather abstracted, 
mediated, and indirect way. In addition, control often occurs in a temporally 
dislocated way, in that individual human wills that are now active are controlled 
by those previously active, which have been crystallised as, among other things, 
the above-mentioned mechanisms. To take only two examples of social primary 
frameworks, we can think of how people in a relatively short time have been 
trained to envision space and time. For example, boundaries between nations 
or parts of cities are perceived as things that are practically independent of our 
wills. Or to put it in Zerubavel’s words (1991, p. 6),
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The perception of supposedly insular chunks of space is probably the 
most fundamental manifestation of how we divide reality into islands 
of meaning. Examining how we partition space, therefore, is an ideal 
way to start exploring how we partition our social world. […] Despite 
the fact that Egypt and Libya or Chinatown and Little Italy are actually 
contiguous, we nevertheless treat them as if they were discrete.
Time and how it is perceived by human subjects is another such institution 
that seems to control the will of individuals, to the degree that many of us 
experience hunger at socially appropriate times that are called breakfast, 
lunch, and dinner.
The concept of frame illustrates how people simultaneously create inertia 
and variability, and are capable of quickly shifting between these two. In 
Goffman’s texts this ability is sometimes transformed into a human per-
ception that presents human beings as principled when it suits them and 
indulgent towards deviations from principles when this is considered ap-
propriate. Under the headline ‘A Simultaneous Multiplicity of Selves’ in the 
essay ‘Role Distance’, Goffman writes,
It should be noted that face-to-face interaction provides an admirable 
context for executing a double stance – the individual’s task actions 
unrebelliously adhere to the official definition of the situation, while 
gestural activity that can be sustained simultaneously and yet noninter-
feringly shows that he has not agreed to having all of himself defined by 
what is officially in progress. (1961b, p. 133)
Goffman goes on to conclude the following, a few pages further on:
I have argued that the individual does not embrace the situated role 
that he finds available to him while holding all his other selves in abey-
ance. I have argued that a situated activity system provides an arena for 
conduct and that in this arena the individual constantly twists, turns, 
and squirms, even while allowing himself to be carried along by the 
controlling definition of the situation. The image that emerges of the 
individual is that of a juggler and synthesizer, an accommodator and 
appeaser, who fulfils one function while he is apparently engaged in 
 another; he stands guard at the door of the tent but lets all his friends 
and relatives crawl in under the flap. (1961b, p. 139)
In the terminology established in the preceding chapter, one could say that 
the individual described above is busy managing an interaction order that 
balances between ritualisation and vulnerability.
If natural and social primary frameworks are frames that to a lesser ex-
tent are subject to transformations in the form of human situational defi-
nitions, there are also frames that are characterised by being more or less 
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easily transformable. Such keys or nuances represent transformations of 
well-known action and interaction patterns, and Goffman assigns them to 
two different families: one where one or more of the people involved do not 
know the code controlling the interactions, and another where the actors 
involved are familiar with the code. The first category is called ‘fabrications’ 
and is characterised by asymmetry in the sense that at least one of the actors 
involved in the situation is unaware of the transformation. Examples of fab-
rications are practical jokes and cons. The second category is called ‘keyed 
frames’ and is characterised by the fact that all the actors involved in the se-
quence of activities are aware of the transformation it represents.  Examples 
of such keys are ‘make-believe’, ‘contests’, and ‘ceremonies’.  Keyings such 
as these can be imagined as horizontal transformations because they can, 
as it were, be placed side by side with one another. But keyings can also be 
 transformed vertically by new layers of transformations; e.g., ‘make- believe’, 
being added on top of the earlier ones, something that Goffman calls lami-
nations (see, e.g., 1974, pp. 156–157).
Keying thus describes a new nuance shift; for example, from ‘for real’ 
to ‘make-believe’, and means that something is transformed from some-
thing into something else. Goffman describes such transformations as 
‘the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaning-
ful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something 
patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something 
quite else’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 43f).1 The new nuance shift results in an 
established frame leading the action in another direction, and ‘per-
forms a  crucial role in determining what it is we think is really going on’ 
 (Goffman, 1974, p. 45).
the frame phenomenon and the spatiality of 
Goffman’s sociology
A frame demarcates something from something else. Within the frame ex-
ists or is created a certain meaning. One might think of the frame of a paint-
ing that frames and thus emphasises one thing and excludes other things. 
We become aware of this if we imagine an empty frame hanging on a white 
wall. In this case, the frame itself causes the white inside of it and the white 
outside of it to acquire different meanings, in spite of the whiteness being 
something that has the same appearance in both cases. 
A framed nothing             is more than nothing.2
If, on the other hand, the frame frames a canvas painted white and hung 
on a white wall in an exhibition, what is framed acquires a different meaning. 
We can then say that the artist has an intention with the framed whiteness, 
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which does not have to be the case with the empty frame that frames a part 
of a white wall. A painting can, incidentally, have two frames: the frame 
that the canvas is stretched across and that is not visible for a viewer at, for 
example, an exhibition, and the frame that frames the picture and is seen 
and makes visible the content inside the frame. One frame is the invisible 
skeleton that holds the painting. together, and the visible frame is intended 
to emphasise the work of art. One is functional and the other is expressive.
We can use this concrete concept of frame, which is thus only one aspect 
of the concept of frame, in order to actualise the spatiality that characterises 
Goffman’s sociology. The space, the place, the region, the framed space are 
both empirical observations and analytical tools for Goffman, which, among 
other things, delimit the objects of knowledge in which he is interested. Al-
ready in his doctoral dissertation (Goffman, 1953), his choice of studying the 
social life on an island, physically delimited as it is, seems to confirm this.3 In 
addition, we can see spatiality at work in The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life (1959) when it comes to the differentiation between front and back region 
as well as the outside. The perceptional barriers that constitute these regions 
are also spatial concepts. Furthermore, in Stigma Goffman (1963b) describes 
the world of the individual as being divided into different regions of impor-
tance for the management of social and personal identity. Similarly, a total 
institution is a place separated from other places, but the boundary between 
the total institution and its surroundings is considerably more coercive than 
the perceptual barriers that separate the front from the back regions. The 
mental hospital as a total institution is described in Asylums as a storage 
space for inmates, but the title of the book is, spatially speaking, ambiguous: 
asylum can mean both a care facility and a place of sanctuary. It is, however, 
not a place of sanctuary but nevertheless a space that Goffman describes in 
his article ‘The Insanity of Place’ when he says that mental hospitals are
hopeless storage dumps trimmed in psychiatric paper. They have served 
to remove the patient from the scene of his symptomatic behavior, which 
in itself can be constructive, but this function has been performed by 
fences, not doctors. (1969, p. 357)
In his analysis of the places of mental hospitals, Goffman distinguishes be-
tween ‘space out of bounds’, ‘surveillance space’ where the patient is subject 
to the control of the institution, and ‘free places’ (Goffman, 1961a, p. 227ff). 
Goffman often used a division into three categories, of which we have seen two 
examples here, when the character of a phenomenon was to be determined. 
Some things are immediately relevant, other things are different, and finally 
there are things that do not quite belong. Frames are also  determined in this 
way: frame, breaking frame, and out of frame. This spatiality is not simply a 
division of the world, but also a non-totalitarian attitude to human existence.
Goffman’s analysis of social interaction in public places is another exam-
ple of spatiality, and in his book Relations in Public he imports territorial 
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analysis from ethology and applies it to social interaction. Concepts such as 
reservation, territory, markers that designate territories (a coat placed over 
the back of a chair in a restaurant, for instance), respect and the lack of re-
spect for the territories of others, and the assertion of one’s own territory are 
examples of concepts that Goffman uses in his analysis of the preserves or 
territories of the self. Finally, the analysis of action in the essay ‘Where the 
Action Is’ (included in Goffman, 1967) is also based on spatial  delimitation – 
of Las Vegas, no less, where Goffman, in a letter to Everett Hughes, claimed to 
study ‘the frayed edges of American civilization’ (quoted in Pettit, 2011, p. 145). 
In the epilogue to this book (‘Framed boundlessness - Action and everyday 
life in Las Vegas’), I reflect on the framed boundlessness of Las Vegas and the 
special form of action for which this boundlessness creates the prerequisites.
However, a frame does not have to refer to a particular concrete context, 
but may be liberated from it and made able to frame another context, which 
is just exactly what we see in the transition from the above- mentioned con-
crete spatial concept to the more abstract frame concept.4 An example of 
this more abstract framing is bracketing, that is – to put something within 
parentheses and thus create a space in the text and in thought. Quotation 
marks are used in a similar way, both in texts, where they can express the 
fact that someone else has written what is being quoted and that it con-
sequently has been taken from another context, and in speech, where one 
can signal quotation marks in the air with one’s fingers while one is talking 
and thus indicate that one is quoting, is ironic, and will not quite stand by 
what one has said, distancing oneself, and similar things.5 In such cases, the 
frame is not as concrete as the frame of a painting, and its framing function 
is maintained in a different way. To begin with, we can illustrate this with 
reference to William James and the kind of frame he describes as an ‘image 
in the mind’ – surrounded by a ‘fringe – and with every such image goes’
the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it 
came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, 
the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds 
and escorts it, – or rather that is fused into one with it and has become 
bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image 
of the same thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing 
newly taken and freshly understood. (James, 1948 [1892], p. 165f)
‘Frame’ is here something that can define and redefine a context, and  Goffman 
further develops James’s cognitive concept of frame, strongly inspired by 
Gregory Bateson’s communicative concept of frame.  Metacommunication 
is central for Bateson, which in this particular case is manifested in the fact 
that animals and people can do things and at the same time communicate 
that what they are doing is to be understood in a different way than the 
literal interpretation that the action suggests. The point of departure is an 
observation Bateson made of monkeys play-fighting and his interpretation 
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of their play – i.e., that in order to be involved in this game the monkeys 
had to be able to metacommunicate the message that ‘this is play’ in or-
der to avoid a serious and dangerous fight (Bateson, 2000 [1955], p. 179). 
Play-fighting is a rather complex phenomenon communicatively speaking, 
because those who are involved in it must be able to communicate to each 
other that ‘these actions, in which we now engage, do not denote what would 
be denoted by those actions which these actions denote’, or in other words, 
more concretely, ‘The playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote 
what would be denoted by the bite’ (Bateson, 2000 [1955], p. 180). Play is, 
according to Bateson, a frame, which he defines as a context within which 
both communication and actions are given a particular meaning. As exam-
ples of frames he mentions, apart from play, also films, interviews, work, 
and several others. Bateson claims that play presupposes that one must be 
able to differentiate between the terrain and the map, between what he calls 
mood-signs and simulated mood-signs. Play is not the only activity where 
this differentiation is important; it is also a prerequisite for threats, betrayal, 
theatre performances, and for the social illusion-making that Goffman was 
often interested in.
The concept of frame is, in other words, connected to metacommunication. 
What characterises this communication is that it concerns the frame of refer-
ence, more precisely communication about the communication that is going 
on (Watzlawick, Bavelas, & Jackson, 2011 [1967]). Against this background 
it can be said that Goffman’s sociological project involves an investigation 
of metacommunication in social interaction. This is manifested in concepts 
such as impression management and his expressive concept of role (Goffman, 
1959), ritual (Goffman, 1967), role distance (Goffman, 1961b), secondary ad-
justment (Goffman, 1961a), and passing and information  control (Goffman, 
1963b). Also his analysis of the difference between the practices and the ad-
mirable aims of total institutions that deal with people is an example of a 
kind of communication regarding institutional practices at the metalevel.6 In 
this sense, the development and use of the frame concept entails a framing 
of his earlier sociology in a partially new light, and a general emphasis on 
the metalevel of social interaction that was not equally apparent earlier. This 
meta-activity is captured well by Czarniawska (2006, p. 1667) when she writes 
that Goffman ‘wanted to see what made social interactions happen, not what 
they meant; or rather, how did they mean what they meant’.
Frame as the social dynamics of the situation
Goffman’s account regarding frames, framing, and the analysis of frames 
has several aspects, and in what follows I will investigate three of them more 
closely: the cognitive, the interactive, and the situational aspects. Against 
this background, I will provide an interpretation of the frame concept that 
suggests that Goffman’s version of the frame concept intends to describe the 
social dynamics of the situation.
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The cognitive aspect: social information and  
the organisation of experience
An individual knows things about her- or himself that nobody else needs 
to find out, on condition that the individual him- or herself does not reveal 
these things (I disregard here coercive methods for making an individual 
involuntarily reveal things about her- or himself). This does not mean that 
the image the individual has of him- or herself is true and/or consistent, or 
that the individual is fully aware of how she or he appears to other people, 
but only that the individual knows or has the capacity to know things about 
him- or herself that no one else knows; for example, things that may be stig-
matising. This is a completely central existential prerequisite for interaction 
among people. On this prerequisite rests, in a way, also what sociological 
system theorists have called ‘double contingency’ (Parsons, 1966 [1951]) – i.e., 
the lack of certainty experienced by interacting actors because they know 
that the other actor knows that they could act differently than they actually 
do (Vanderstraeten, 2002). Goffman’s sociology is based on the idea that 
individuals not only know that a different course of action is possible, but 
that they actually act differently than they say they do, and talk about their 
interaction in ways that do not always correspond to what they are doing. 
This special, potentially socially illusory symbolic interaction is more than 
anything else Goffman’s province in sociology, and already in his disserta-
tion he compares social interaction with a model of social order (Goffman, 
1953, pp. 33–41) that is based in part on Parsons’s above-mentioned work 
and in part on Barnard (1938), and that I will describe in greater detail in 
the following chapter. One of his conclusions from this comparison goes as 
follows:
It is interesting to note that a desire to maintain a working acceptance 
is, paradoxically enough, one of the few general bases of real consen-
sus between persons. Individuals regularly act on the assumption that 
others are the sort of persons who would attempt to maintain a work-
ing acceptance, and this imputation of an attribute is usually justified 
by consequent behavior. Persons, on the whole, can be relied upon to 
make every effort to avoid a ‘scene.’ In this context it may be added that 
many so-called empty gestures seem to serve primarily as signs that 
the sender is ‘responsible’ and can be counted upon to play the social 
game of maintaining a surface agreement with and an acceptance of the 
others. The very general tendency for persons to maintain a  working 
acceptance during immediate communication must not lead us to make 
narrow assumptions concerning the motivation of this behavior. An 
actor may attempt to maintain the appearance of agreement in order 
to save the situation and minimize embarrassment, or in order to be 
genuinely indulgent to the offender, or in order to exploit the offender 
in some way. (Goffman, 1953, p. 40f)
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Goffman calls the set of facts about an individual that he or she can choose 
not to reveal to others the ‘individual information preserve’ (Goffman, 1971, 
p. 38f). The possibility of hiding things from other people and having con-
trol over what to show of oneself to other people is a central and recurring 
theme in Goffman’s sociology.
At the same time that the individual exists in an information preserve 
where she or he to a greater extent than outside this preserve can control 
information about him- or herself, cover up, and make her- or himself un-
available for others, the individual is most of the time in constant contact 
with, aware of, curious about, and interested in other people, which means 
that he or she finds out and will try to find out what other individuals do, be-
lieve, think, and feel. In this way the individual’s control over her or his own 
information preserve diminishes. This can be seen in a ritualised form when 
two strangers encounter each other in passing in a public place and employ 
what Goffman (1963a, p. 84) calls ‘civil inattention’. The individuals then 
give each other enough attention that the other one knows that he or she has 
been seen, and at the same time little enough attention that the other does 
not feel she or he is the subject of any particular interest. In most cases these 
are ritual gestures that signal a certain meaning, but the background for 
such a ritual having developed can be that strangers who have encountered 
one another have wanted (and sometimes and in some places still want) to 
find out whether the other is dangerous or deviates from what is perceived 
as normal in the situation in question, and if their attention therefore has 
to be intensified, which Goffman calls ‘becoming alarmed’, or if he or she 
can continue doing what he or she was doing prior to the  encounter – ‘going 
about his or her business’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 238). Against this background, 
individual normality can be defined: ‘normal’ individuals are people who 
allow us to continue with (go about) our business and do not force us to be 
on alert (be alarmed).
In his analysis of interacting individuals, Goffman (1959, p. 2) differenti-
ates between expressions given and expressions given off, where the former 
are described as communication in the traditional sense, while the latter 
rather have to do with the meaning that other people can give to an indi-
vidual’s actions on the basis of other information than, for example, the 
individual’s claims expressed about her- or himself. In the same way that 
the individual is interested in what other individuals are doing, she or he 
is interested in what really happens in situations that he or she shares with 
other people. In order to find out what happens in a situation, several infor-
mation strategies can be applied; one is to try and read expressions given 
off and other aspects of the situation that say something about its meaning. 
Goffman describes this in the following way:
Underlying all social interaction there seems to be a fundamental dia-
lectic. When one individual enters the presence of others, he will want to 
discover the facts of the situation. Were he to possess this information, 
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he could know, and make allowances for, what will come to happen 
and he could give the others present as much of their due as is con-
sistent with his enlightened self-interest. […] Full information of this 
order is rarely available; in its absence, the individual tends to employ 
 substitutes – cues, tests, hints, expressive gestures, status symbols, etc. – 
as predictive devices. In short, since the reality that the individual is 
concerned with is unperceivable at the moment, appearances must be 
relied upon in its stead. (Goffman, 1959, p. 249)
The information that is referred to here is social information and ‘it is con-
veyed by the very person it is about, and conveyed through bodily expression 
in the immediate presence of those who receive the expression’ (Goffman, 
1963b, p. 43).
In the article ‘The Interaction Order’ (1983b), Goffman describes two 
ways of identifying a person that both present analytically scientific as well 
as everyday aspects. A categorical identification of an individual means that 
the individual is understood in relation to social categories. Four such cat-
egories are particularly useful: age, sex, class, and race,7 and all individuals 
can be identified with reference to these. Individual identification, on the 
other hand, has to do with the special characteristics and the special combi-
nation of characteristics that an individual possesses. It can have to do with 
appearance, dialect, scent, etc.8 Categorical and individual identification 
are important features in urban environments, where the number of encoun-
ters with strangers is great and thus also the need for social information. In 
Frame Analysis Goffman takes social information as his point of departure 
by using the question ‘What is it that’s going on here?’, which the individual 
tries to answer when she or he enters a situation by reading the chain of 
events, who the other people are, and their actions. The information state 
of the individual, a concept Goffman takes from game theory, is crucial for 
how the situation can be handled, and refers to an individual’s knowledge 
of a chain of events, the intentions of the other people involved, probable 
outcomes of his or her own and other people’s actions, and other similar 
things (Goffman, 1974, p. 133f). When I am soon to leave for the vernissage 
of an exhibition, I believe that I know from experience roughly how this will 
turn out; I also know some things about the friends and acquaintances I 
will encounter there. On the other hand, I do not know how the individuals 
who attend but are unknown to me will behave and what the unique situa-
tion in itself holds in store. For the most part, such social interpretations of 
situations do not have to do with creating completely new definitions, but 
rather with transferring the things one knows from similar situations to the 
current situation. The perspective on social definition that Goffman uses 
in his book Frame Analysis is thus strongly anchored in the experiences of 
the individual, and here he supports himself to a great extent on  William 
James and Alfred Schütz. The subtitle of Goffman’s book, An Essay on 
the  Organization of Experience, points to the central role Goffman gives to 
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experience. He also emphasises that the book has to do with an organisa-
tion of experiences and not an organisation of society, with the structure 
of individual experiences and not social structure (Goffman, 1974, p. 13). 
Experience is ‘something that an individual actor can take into his mind’, 
writes Goffman, and thus demonstrates that the organisation of experiences 
is not simply about organising what is immediately experienced, but also 
about organising what has been experienced earlier. Here a very concrete 
temporal perspective with respect to the situation is thus introduced.
Goffman’s perspective is manifestly cognitive, and he does not enter 
deeply into the emotional aspects of social interaction. An uncontrolled 
emotional commitment is seen rather as something that can lead to indi-
viduals not acting in accordance with the framework that regulates actions 
in particular situations. This suggests that the emotional commitment also 
has its framework, which Goffman tries to demonstrate by pointing to the 
idea that a framing of activities not only has to do with creating meaning 
through actions but also with commitment. But the very degree of commit-
ment is framed:
All frames involve expectations of a normative kind as to how deeply 
and fully the individual is to be carried into the activity organized by 
the frames. Of course, frames differ quite widely in the involvement pre-
scribed for participants sustaining them. Some, like traffic systems, are 
properly sustained as an off-and-on focus of attention whose claim upon 
the participant is deep only when there is sudden trouble to avoid. Other 
frames, like that in which sexual intercourse is understood, prescribe 
involvement that is literally and figuratively embracing. In all cases, 
however, understood limits will be established, a definition concerning 
what is insufficient involvement and what is too much.  (Goffman, 1974, 
p. 345)
Against this backdrop, Goffman discusses in passing how we can partially 
unconsciously become both emotionally and cognitively absorbed by activi-
ties, and thus sometimes violate the frames that regulate actions.
The interactive aspect: definition of the situation  
and shared concept of reality
‘What is it that’s going on here?’ is thus the question that an individual at-
tempts to answer in order to be able to act in accordance with the framing of 
the situation. It can be answered wholly or partially by making an inventory 
of one’s own experiences, by reading how other people act in the situation 
in question, and by collecting the available social information about indi-
viduals on the basis of what they say and how they act, their appearances, 
clothes, dialects, and other things. These various bits of information can 
be used by an individual in order to define a situation, something that can 
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be decisive for action and thus for interaction with other people in that sit-
uation. Goffman therefore sees the individual as an everyday explorer of a 
world that is shared with other people.
According to Goffman, it is, in addition, in an individual’s interest to gain 
control of the actions of other people in situations that are shared, and this 
is done mainly by influencing other people’s definition of the situation (1959, 
p. 3f). This influencing is, to a great degree, accomplished through what is 
called impression management, which can be more or less conscious. Most 
of the time many people attempt to control impressions in order to present 
themselves in the best possible light on the basis of the norms, rules, con-
ventions, and institutions that regulate how we are expected to be as people 
and actors in situations. Sometimes impression management can also be a 
kind of exercise of power:
If one individual attempts to direct the activity of others by means of 
example, enlightenment, persuasion, exchange, manipulation, author-
ity, threat, punishment, or coercion, it will be necessary, regardless of 
his power position, to convey effectively what he wants done, what he is 
prepared to do to get it done and what he will do if it is not done. Power 
of any kind must be clothed in effective means of displaying it, and will 
have different effects depending upon how it is dramatized. […] Thus 
the most objective form of naked power, i.e., physical coercion, is often 
neither objective nor naked but rather functions as a display for per-
suading the audience; it is often a means of communication, not merely 
a means of action. (Goffman, 1959, p. 241)
According to Goffman, interacting individuals have, as has already been 
mentioned, an interest in creating a temporarily working consensus, which 
can consist of a kind of tacit agreement about how the shared situation 
should be defined. The driving impetus behind this is the interest of individu-
als in avoiding, for instance, open conflict, feelings of shame, and losing face.
In Frame Analysis Goffman takes as his point of departure the Thomas 
theorem when he discusses what a ‘definition of the situation’ is. The  theorem 
is as follows: ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their conse-
quences’ (Merton, 1968 [1949], 1995; Thomas, 1923; Thomas & Thomas, 1928), 
and Goffman’s comment is quite simply that the theorem is ‘true as it reads 
but false as it is taken’, which roughly means that the theorem can be spoken 
but hardly performed. Why is this? It quite simply has to do with whether the 
Thomas theorem is understood literally – i.e., that all situations always and 
by everyone can be defined however that person pleases, or in a more limited 
way. Goffman’s objections have to do precisely with the limitations of the the-
orem, and these objections are based on a  Durkheimian view. It is true that 
social facts, or with another word, institutions, of  different kinds do not pre-
vent us from imagining reality whichever way we please, but we cannot expect 
reality to become the way we want only on the basis of our conception of it.
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Goffman also objects that the individual most of the time does not create 
a definition of the situation, but rather reads and interprets the situation 
and what it requires. Furthermore, events that are ‘new’ are often inserted 
into everyday routines that are already applied, whereafter their news value 
is reduced. The course of events that produces a definition of the situation 
can thus hardly be described using a rational flowchart; instead, the timing 
is of a different kind:
True, we personally negotiate aspects of all the arrangements under 
which we live, but often once these are negotiated, we continue on me-
chanically as though the matter had always been settled. So, too, there 
are occasions when we must wait until things are almost over before 
discovering what has been occurring and occasions of our own activity 
when we can considerably put off deciding what to claim we have been 
doing. (Goffman, 1974, p. 2)
In a review of Frame Analysis, Davis (1975) points out that what Goffman, 
by means of this book, above all proves himself to be is a social construc-
tivist, and I can agree with this if it means that the societies and social 
worlds we inhabit are just that, socially constructed – not given by nature 
or individually constructed. Many aspects of our societies are historical 
and social constructions that today’s individuals have to relate to as though 
they were ‘social facts’, such as norms, laws, habits, languages, different 
forms of durable collective associations (for instance school) and other in-
stitutions, as well as Goffman’s ‘own’ institutions, the interaction order 
and the identity values of society. The institutions can be changed, but it 
often takes a long time, and for this reason they constitute constraints that 
limit the actions of individuals and can lead to resistance. Social construc-
tions are also an expression of the exercise of power, and depending on 
the differences in available resources, different individuals have  varying 
 opportunities for influencing how their existence is constructed; for in-
stance, through their or others’ choice of school, education, work, living 
arrangements, etc.
What Goffman does with his critical commentary on the Thomas the-
orem is to warn of a far too voluntaristic interpretation of the theorem. 
We can illustrate this by differentiating between three kinds of situational 
definitions whose individual construction processes differ in scope: (1) so-
cietal social constructions, or institutions that emerge gradually and that to 
a varying extent design how individuals should define situations and act 
within their framework, (2) individual social definitions, which are those that 
are described by a Thomas theorem interpreted literally, and (3) individual 
social interpretations of situations, of which individuals are active constitu-
ents. Goffman turns the first and third categories against the second in an 
attempt to show the limitations of the applicability of the Thomas theorem. 
In this respect his line of reasoning is similar to Hacking’s (1999) critical 
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scrutiny of boundless social construction perspectives that do not clarify 
what a social construction actually constructs.
Goffman also develops the concept of ‘definition of the situation’ by 
clarifying what the above-mentioned third kind of situational definition 
means. He does this by investigating the conditions for the vulnerability 
of frames, and finds, for instance, that they are vulnerable when informa-
tion is scarce and the interacting individuals become dependent on such 
information, that someone can make money from manipulating frames, 
and that con artists deliberately exploit frames in order to promote their 
own interests.  However, these special cases also say something about how 
individuals deal with frames in situations when fraud, a profit motive, or 
a scarcity of  information do not have a strong influence, in situations that 
are more  ‘normal’ but where ‘an individual’s notion of what is going on 
can become shaky, and, in reverse, what an individual can do to under-
mine the frame employed by another’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 486). This thus 
has to do with  situations where individuals, you or I, begin to doubt that 
what is going on actually should be defined in the way that it has hith-
erto been defined. In order for a frame to function, this doubt has to be 
removed, and by functioning is then meant that the frame enables several 
individuals to define the situation in approximately the same way, as in 
this example:
To be ‘natural’, then, is not merely to seem at ease, but to be acting in 
such a way as to convince others that the apparent frame is in fact the 
actual one. That is what is meant, functionally speaking, by sincerity 
and spontaneity. When we deal with an incompetent person and find it 
difficult not to smile, or deal with a mad one and find it difficult not to 
show fear, or deal with the police and find it difficult not to show guilt, 
what we are tending to give away is not a person, ourselves, but a frame, 
one that we had been maintaining. These affects and responses are only 
incidentally of persons; they are primarily about frames, and it is only 
in frame terms that one can make sense of the concern shown in regard 
to them. (Goffman, 1974, p. 487)
A frame is thus the situational definition or perception of reality we share 
with other people. It can be an answer to William James’s question:  ‘Under 
what circumstances do we think things are real?’ (James, 1950 [1890], p. 287). 
To Goffman, James’s ‘we’ literally means we because a social situation im-
plies co-presence.9 Frames can therefore also be types of social worlds, il-
lustrated for instance by Fine’s (1983) application of the frame concept in an 
analysis of different social worlds in role-playing games. Another example 
is Goffman’s play with the language of different social worlds when he lets 
British historian and writer of the book Diplomacy, Sir Harold Nicolson, 
advise a diplomat to exercise self-control in street language: ‘Baby, don’t 
blow your cool’ (Goffman, 1967, p. 227).
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The situational aspect: the situation as a shared frame  
and its social dynamics
The question ‘What is it that’s going on here?’ is, as previously stated, the 
point of departure for Goffman’s book Frame Analysis, and the answer to 
this question can claim to be a general theory about how individuals orient 
themselves in situations they share with other people. The answer is, in sum-
mary, that an individual through her or his experiences gains an interpreta-
tional competence on the basis of which he or she reads and gives meaning 
to the context of situations. Goffman calls the pattern of such contexts a 
‘frame’.
In a few texts that were published before Frame Analysis, Goffman defines 
the frame concept in different ways; e.g., as a ‘scheme of interpretation for the 
meaning of an act’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 231). In his essay ‘Fun in Games’,  Goffman 
writes the following about the frame concept as it was used by Bateson:
In Bateson’s apt term, games place a ‘frame’ around a spate of im-
mediate events, determining the type of ‘sense’ that will be accorded 
everything within the frame. (Goffman, 1961b, p. 20)
But the framing can also be seen as a kind of code, a linguistic code and/or 
a behavioural code:
Given a well-received, easily understandable message, what light is the 
message to be seen in, what systematic, word-by-word rereading is to be 
given it? Is the sender engaged in what he appears to be doing, namely, 
sending a serious, reliable message? Or is he merely practicing his send-
ing, or engaging in a joke, or sending a false message because he is now 
working for the other side, or sending a message at the point of a gun […]? 
(Goffman, 1970 [1969], p. 141)
It is, however, also possible to place additional emphasis on the contextual-
ising characteristic of the frame, and then the doubleness of the frame con-
cept will, in addition, appear: both a reading of the context of an act and an 
anchoring of an act in a context. Both Weick (1995) and Scheff (2005, 2006) 
define frame as ‘the structure of context’. Weick links the concept to the 
individual creation of meaning in the sense of sense-making, while Scheff 
deals instead with the analytical side of the frame concept when it has to do 
with understanding, as a researcher, situations within which an act takes 
place. The contextual structure can be attributed to both a subjective and 
an intersubjective (shared) context as well as to social facts (Scheff, 2006, 
p. 73), and can be compared with Aronsson’s description of frame as ‘the 
conditions of social interaction’  (Aronsson, 2002, p. 68). The definition of 
frame as ‘the structure of context’ has its merits, not least a concreteness 
that makes it easy to observe, empirically speaking. Goffman also gives 
context a central role when he writes,
64 Frame and framing
It is obvious that a given appearance can on different occasions have 
different meanings. He who cleans off his dinner plate can be seen as 
starved, polite, gluttonous, or frugal. But usually the context, as we 
say, rules out wrong interpretations and rules in the right one. (Indeed, 
 context can be defined as immediately available events which are com-
patible with one frame understanding and incompatible with others.) 
And when the context might not suffice, participants take care to act 
out requisite evidence, here, as it were, helping nature to be herself. 
 (Goffman, 1974, p. 440f)
The limitation of defining frame only as ‘the structure of context’ is thus 
not the strong emphasis on context, but the fact that the active, socially 
defining, information-gathering, and experience-organising individual ends 
up much too far in the background. Emphasis is thus placed on the result of 
the activity of the individual and not on the actual process and the dynamics 
of the chain of events, which I feel is a central trait in Goffman’s definition 
of frame – i.e., a situational definition that follows certain organisational 
 principles and that, as such, controls both the events and the subjective 
commitment of the individual in the situation in question (Goffman, 1974, 
p. 10f), and, it can be added, in Goffman’s sociology as a whole. There is 
reason to connect the frame to the situation, because the situation is a kind 
of linchpin of Goffman’s understanding of social interaction. He defined 
‘situation’ as a context in which two or more individuals are in each other’s 
immediate proximity and are accessible to each other’s influence (1964b, p. 
135), or as ‘any environment of mutual monitoring possibilities that lasts 
during the time two or more individuals find themselves in one another’s 
immediate physical presence’ (1967, p. 167), or, as in the article ‘Footing’, 
‘the full physical arena in which persons present are in sight and sound of 
one another’ (1981a, p. 136). In one of his last texts Goffman writes,
It is social situations that provide the natural theater in which all bodily 
displays are enacted and in which all bodily displays are read. Thus the 
warrant for employing the social situation as the basic working unit in 
the study of the interaction order. And thus, incidentally, a warrant for 
claiming that our experience of the world has a confrontational charac-
ter. (Goffman, 1983b, p. 4)
Goffman adds that this emphasis on social situations does not mean that 
what happens in situations are opening night performances, but that in the 
situation new experiences are mixed with things an individual brings with 
him or her from other contexts; for instance, experiences of social interac-
tion and cultural ideas and assumptions. In this way, Goffman merges situa-
tion and frame, and the situation then becomes a framing in an immediately 
interactive, cognitive, and social sense. Against this background, I want to 
capture the meaning of the frame concept through the expression ‘the social 
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dynamics of the situation’.10 In Frame Analysis, Goffman emphasises that 
his perspective is situational, and his analysis is focused on sequences of 
events (so-called ‘strips’) in situations that include one or more individuals. 
The situation is, in a manner of speaking, the spatially cohesive frame of 
social interaction, while the cognitive frame in the situation can be called 
‘code’ or ‘sense’. The interactions among individuals make up the dynamic 
element of the situation, and can result in frames being confirmed, ignored, 
changed, transgressed, or broken down. Situation, code, sense, and interac-
tion together make up the frame that creates the prerequisites for the social 
dynamics of the situation.
Even if the perspective is situational, society is constantly present in 
 Goffman’s analyses, and among other things it takes the form of a continuous 
pressure on the individual for adaptation, a social constraint that the indi-
vidual contributes to maintaining by adapting to it, but that he or she some-
times tries to resist and sometimes feigns having adapted to. It is precisely 
this multidimensionality that is characteristic of Goffman’s  perspective, 
and we can find many descriptions of this in his texts; for  example, where 
Goffman describes individuals as constantly actively  turning situational 
definitions to their advantage by ‘twists, turns, and squirms’  (Goffman, 
1961b, p. 139).
The situational dynamics have both a more objective aspect in the form 
of the contextual structure that characterises the situation and a more sub-
jective aspect in the form of the experiences of the individual acting in the 
situation, how he or she chooses to organise these in the given situation, and 
how she or he against the background of a situational definition chooses to 
orient his or her actions in the situation. Goffman calls the latter ‘footing’ 
(Goffman, 1981a). That is to say, a frame can be understood as a shared 
definition of a situation, while footing is instead the orientation or position-
ing of an individual (Davies & Harré, 1990) in the situation. The individual 
can change her or his orientation in a situation (e.g., resisting the shared 
definition of the situation) without the situation itself necessarily changing 
as a result. Against that background, the idea that the concept of frame is ei-
ther structural or interactionist (Gonos, 1977) appears less relevant. I would 
rather like to see the frame concept as both: structural in given situations, 
while it at the same time directs actions and interactions, which in their turn 
can influence the structure of the situation.
The Goffman frame concept is a development of the concept ‘definition of 
the situation’, which can be made visible by rephrasing  Goffman’s question 
‘What is it that’s going on here?’ into three questions: ‘How do I usually act 
in such a situation?’, ‘What do other people expect from me in this situa-
tion?’, and ‘How should one act in situations such as this?’ Thus, frame does 
not simply answer the question ‘What is it that’s going on here?’ but also 
the question ‘What applies here?’ and can be connected to what  Goffman 
in other contexts calls ‘situational proprieties’ (Goffman, 1963a, p.  24), 
which are defined as a code that is normative for the situation in question. 
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In this sense, frame corresponds both to the individual’s own experience, 
other people’s expectations, and the norms of society (and similar directors 
of actions, such as different kinds of institutions and cultures). Goffman 
also talks about the particular ‘sense’ that is ascribed to everything within 
a frame (Goffman, 1961b, p. 20). Furthermore, he describes a  fundamental 
dialectic that exists in all social interaction and that expresses itself in that 
the individual wants to know the purpose of the  interaction but is rarely 
 completely successful in doing so and therefore has to ‘employ substitutes – 
cues, tests, hints, expressive gestures, status symbols, etc. – as predictive 
devices’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 249). All this is embedded in the situation. The 
situations described by Goffman are therefore never static but in constant 
movement, or, with another word, dynamic. The movement is explained 
by different forces influencing each other; it can be individuals who try to 
realise different interests and end up in conflict with one another, or the 
exercise of power and resistance, or the interaction and tensions between 
ritualisation and vulnerability, which was illustrated earlier. The aim of my 
concept ‘the social dynamics of the situation’ is precisely to capture this 
interplay between forces within the social situation, and where the individu-
als’ own and their mutual framings of the situation are decisive.
Notes
 1 There could be a point in imagining Goffman’s presentation of the interaction 
between frames and keys in the light of what in physics is called states of aggre-
gation, which refers to the different states in which a substance can exist, such 
as in the case of water: gas, liquid, and solid state. Theoretically speaking it is 
the same substance, but in the different states of aggregation the substance in 
question varies when it comes to its retention of shape.
 2 The recently opened ”Dubai Frame” may exemplify this: http://www. thedubaiframe.
com/
 3 The island was the isolated Shetland isle of Unst, called Dixon in the dissertation.
 4 In his review of Frame Analysis, Jameson (1976) also discusses spatiality and, 
among other things, the transition from a more concrete to a more abstract 
 spatial concept in Goffman’s analyses.
 5 Many Swedish speakers erroneously say situationstecken (‘situation mark’) in-
stead of the correct citationstecken (‘citation mark’). This error is interesting in 
the context of frames, because it illustrates precisely that quotation marks some-
times can frame a situation.
 6 This is possibly a precursor of the concepts that, from the 1970s and onwards, 
came to be among the main concepts of institutional organisational theory: 
loose coupling (Weick, 1976) and decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012).
 7 ‘Race’ in its special American framing refers primarily to skin colour, which 
means that it can be read in close physical interactions between unknown peo-
ple. ‘Race’ is thus not the same thing as ethnicity, which also refers to cultural 
categories – e.g., religious and other customs, languages, food, and clothes – 
which in many cases, if the interacting person so desires, can be concealed in 
social interactions.
 8 When you describe a person to another person you can use these individual 
identifiers, but there are differences among them. Describing someone with 
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identifiers such as eye colour, height, and hair colour is probably perceived by 
most people as less highly charged than if a person’s scent is involved. Body 
odour seems to be perceived as a more intimate identifier, which probably has 
to do with the fact that in most cases one has to be physically close to a person 
in order to perceive their body odour, and if one does not, this also says some-
thing about that person. Another reason can be that body odour is sometimes 
perceived as a moral indicator: ‘Much of the moral symbolism relevant to inter-
action is expressed in terms of olfactory imagery. An untrustworthy person may 
be described as a “stinker”, a “stinkoe”, or a “stinkpot”’. In contrast, a holy or 
ritually pure person may be metaphorically described as emitting the ‘odor of 
sanctity’ (see Wright 1967, pp. 23–24). At the same time, groups may be termed 
‘“smelly and slovenly” or, on the other hand, “clean and orderly”’ (Largey & 
Watson, 1972, p. 1021f). Or to put it in a different way: ‘It is said “we are what we 
eat” – but it is also true that we are what we smell like: fragrant or foul, good or 
bad’ (Synnott, 1991, p. 446).
 9 ‘By definition, an individual’s activities must occur either in social situations or 
solitary’ (Goffman, 1967, p. 167).
 10 Incidentally, Collins (2004) describes his and Goffman’s analytical strategy in 
the study of interactional rituals with the words ‘the dynamics of situations’.
As has been shown above, Erving Goffman was simultaneously a contro-
versial and popular sociologist, and it is possible that the reason for this 
was the very way in which he presented his studies of social interaction. 
The studies are often written in an accessible manner, and they most of 
the time lack scholarly methodological and theoretical jargon. In addition, 
they take up topical subjects, among which can be mentioned social trust 
and illusion, which are always topical but were perhaps particularly so 
in the American Cold War society in which Goffman was active. Game 
theory, to which Goffman devoted a couple of texts, can be said to have 
been topical for the same reason. Other particularly topical themes to 
which Goffman devoted his time were; e.g., everyday life, roles, stigma, 
identity, the politics of identity, total institutions, diagnostics of mental 
illness, talk, and gender. Towards the end of 1960s his view on social inter-
action in  public places came to be influenced by increasing social tensions 
in  American society following the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, 
and the student revolt.
When it comes to the book Frame Analysis opinions differ greatly, as has 
already been made apparent. This could have to do with it being unclear 
what the book really is about. Therefore, it is of great importance how one 
as a reader chooses to frame Frame Analysis. I personally feel that Frame 
Analysis can be seen as a book on methodology, where frame analysis as 
a method is discussed and exemplified. The examples are often made with 
reference to social illusions – i.e., things that widen our register of social 
reality without for this reason changing our basic, scientifically based per-
ception of reality; e.g., ‘fraud, deceit, con games, shows of various kinds’ 
(Goffman, 1974, p. 14). Or, to put it differently: Goffman is using a social 
constructionist perspective that is aware of its own limits. It can thus pro-
vide a highly reasonable answer to Hacking’s (1999) question, ‘social con-
struction of what?’, that is to say, social construction at a level where human 
definitions of reality have a practical ontological meaning. Social illusions 
are based on both the belief of social actors that everything is normal and 
the vulnerability that arises when it turns out that normal can be something 
other than what it appears to be. It is here – in the social dynamics between 
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everyday ritual and vulnerability – that Goffman places his frame analytic 
method:
My aim is to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understand-
ing available in our society for making sense out of events and to ana-
lyze the special vulnerabilities to which these frames of reference are 
subject. I start with the fact that from an individual’s particular point of 
view, while one thing may momentarily appear to be what is really go-
ing on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly a joke, or a dream, 
or an accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or 
a theatrical performance, and so forth. And attention will be directed to 
what it is about our sense of what is going on that makes it so vulnerable 
to the need for these various rereadings. (Goffman, 1974, p. 10)
It is, however, also important for the understanding of Frame Analysis to 
see how the frame analytic method that is illustrated therein is related to 
Goffman’s entire oeuvre. In the present chapter I will therefore demonstrate 
both continuity and cracks in Goffman’s frame perspective.
Continuities
Goffman rarely helped his readers see the continuity in his own sociological 
research by himself representing it as accumulative. It is true that Goffman 
referred back to his own works, but at the same time he constantly defined 
new concepts that pointed to new aspects of often well-known phenomena. 
Usually, he did not relate his research other than superficially to sociolog-
ical or other schools. He rarely placed his work in any theoretical, meth-
odological or philosophy of science context. The metascientific reflections 
on his own work were thus poorly developed, and therefore one can also 
question its continuity, something that has also been done.
There are, however, exceptions, and two will be mentioned here. The 
 description of his research interests that Goffman provided in 1957 in an eleven- 
line ‘autobiographical sketch’ could be said to be valid for his entire project:
I have been interested in social encounters, in the moments during 
which people come into and remain in one another’s immediate pres-
ence, […] I am interested in how an individual must act to communicate 
that he is a member in good standing in a situation, in a conversation, or 
in an occupation, and I have been pursuing this interest for the past year 
as an observer in a State-type mental hospital. (Goffman, 1957a, p. 12)
The key point here is not that Goffman claims to be interested in social inter-
action, but that he at the same time applies a metaperspective that points to 
norms, rules, expectations, etc. that control an interacting individual or de-
fine any resistance to this control. This is still undeveloped frame thinking.
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Another exception is ‘The Interaction Order’, the address that his illness 
prevented him from delivering in 1982 as the new chairman of the American 
Sociological Association and which was published posthumously in 1983. 
There he emphasised the continuity of his own research.
The interaction order
Why do we try to control other people’s impressions of ourselves and attempt 
to make them accept our definition of situations we share? Why do we cre-
ate, using audience segregation, separate regions where we can act in quite 
varying and sometimes contradictory ways in front of different audiences? 
Why do we help other people save face when they risk losing it? Why are 
women and men displayed in gender stereotypical ways in advertisements? 
Goffman answers these and many other questions regarding social interac-
tion by referring to a kind of interaction order that in some sense controls 
how individuals act when they are in immediate proximity to each other. He 
only mentions this interaction order explicitly in his doctoral dissertation 
from 1953 and in the above-mentioned article ‘The Interaction Order’ from 
1983. One can, if one wishes, say that a long series of analyses of social in-
teraction over thirty years is framed by a number of more theoretical delib-
erations about an order that is sometimes presented as interindividual and 
sometimes as supraindividual and sometimes as both or as something else.1 
The existence of such an interaction order makes the interaction between 
individuals appear not completely random, and it can therefore, to a certain 
extent, be systematised, which Goffman may have been on his way to doing 
by using the over 900 concepts he created.
In one of the opening chapters in his doctoral dissertation,  ‘Communication 
Conduct in an Island Community’, Goffman describes the relationship be-
tween social order and social interaction. With the benefit of hindsight one 
can, if one wishes, see these ten pages as a framework for his thirty-year 
project that followed. In these pages, a model of the social order is con-
structed based on Parsons’s book The Social System (1951) and Barnard’s 
The  Functions of the Executive (1938), almost an ideal type that is used as 
an analytic tool in order to compare how ‘conversational interaction’, or the 
 interaction order, corresponds to and deviates from the model of social  order. 
This model says the following, according to Goffman (1953, pp. 33–41):
1  Social order is found where the differentiated activity of different actors 
is integrated to a single whole, allowing thereby for the conscious or 
unconscious realization of certain overall ends and functions.
2  The contribution of an actor is a legitimate expectation for other actors; 
they are able to know beforehand within what limits the actor is likely 
to behave, and they have a moral right to expect him to behave within 
these limits. Correspondingly, he ought to behave in the way that is ex-
pected of him because he feels that this is a morally desirable way of 
behaving and not merely an expeditious way of behaving.
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3  Proper contribution from participants is assured or ‘motivated’ by means 
of a set of positive sanctions or rewards and negative sanctions or punish-
ments. These sanctions grant or withdraw immediately expressed  social 
approval and goods of a more instrumental kind. These sanctions sup-
port and help to delineate social rules that are both prescriptive and pro-
scriptive, enjoining certain activity and forbidding other activity.
4  Any concrete social order must occur in a wider social context. […]
5  When the rules are not adhered to, or when no rules seem applicable, par-
ticipants cease to know how to behave or what to expect from others. […]
6  A person who breaks rules is an offender; his breaking of them is an 
offense. He who breaks rules continuously is a deviant.
7  When a rule is broken, the offender ought to feel guilty or remorseful, 
and the offended ought to feel righteously indignant.
8  An offense to or infraction of the social order calls forth emergency cor-
rectives which reestablish the threatened order, compensating for the 
damage done to it. […]
9  Given the rules of the social order, we find that individual participants 
develop ruses and tricks for achieving private ends that are proscribed 
by the rules, in such a way as not to break the rules.
This model contains both system and individual levels. On the former level 
the system is contrasted with chaos, while on the individual level morality 
is contrasted with anomie. Order can break down through development to-
wards chaos and anomie, and be built up through development towards a 
system and morality. The individual can manage the system and morality in 
different ways, through, among other things, adaptation and tricks.
In connection with each point in the model, Goffman describes how ‘con-
versational interaction’ corresponds to or deviates from the ideal type of 
social order. Some important anomalies concern point 3 about sanctions, 
where Goffman states that the sanctions that exist within the interaction 
 order are moral approval or disapproval rather than rewards and punish-
ments. When it comes to point 5 and the dissolution of rules, such things as 
embarrassment is experienced within the interaction order. With respect to 
point 7, guilt is experienced as shame in the interaction order. When it comes 
to breaking rules and restoring order after rules have been broken (point 8), 
attempts to re-establish the interaction order after the breaking of rules can 
lead to the breakdown of order, and for this reason interacting individuals 
often overlook breaches of rules or attempt to draw attention to them in tactful 
ways. In a large number of ways the interaction order or ‘conversational 
interaction’ thus deviates from a conventional sociological systems model 
of social order that was valid at the time. From this, Goffman concludes the 
following:
In conversational interaction, as opposed to many other kinds of social 
order, offense is quite common; hence, forbearance is almost a constant 
requirement. The dissensus that forbearance conceals, […] should be 
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considered as part of the model for conversational interaction and not 
as something which occurs as a deviation from the model. For example, 
the exercise of gain strategies is so common a thing that it is often better 
to conceive of interaction not as a scene of harmony but as an arrange-
ment for pursuing a cold war. A working acceptance may thus be lik-
ened to a temporary truce, a modus vivendi for carrying on negotiations 
and vital business. (Goffman, 1953, p. 40)
The result of a comparison of the interaction order with the conventional 
sociological model of social order is thus that the interaction order is or-
dered without having to consist of as much order as the model of the social 
order. As has been demonstrated earlier, the interaction order is vulnerable 
and breaches of norms are more common, as is pretended adaptation.
In the article ‘The Nature of Deference and Demeanor’ (1956) Goffman 
analyses social interaction as a kind of ritual, as was mentioned above. The 
point of departure is Durkheim’s (1965 [1912]) classic sociological analyses, 
where it is maintained that both society and the personality of the individual 
are the subject of religious rites and that the individual has become a kind of 
sacred object, or, as Durkheim expresses it in his study of suicide,
But today he [the individual] has acquired a kind of dignity which places 
him above himself as well as above society. So long as his conduct has 
not caused him to forfeit the title of man, he seems to us to share in some 
degree in that quality sui generis ascribed by every religion to its gods 
which renders them inviolable by everything mortal. He has become 
tinged with religious value; man has become a god for men. Therefore, 
any attempt against his life suggests sacrilege. Suicide is such an at-
tempt. No matter who strikes the blow, it causes scandal by violation of 
the sacrosanct quality within us which we must respect in ourselves as 
well as in others. (1952 [1897], p. 299)
In modernised societies with democratic states there is often strong, ju-
dicial protection for the integrity of the individual that can be seen as an 
 illustration of the sacredness of the individual, while at the same time these 
laws in reality can also regularly be circumvented by different actors, for 
instance when individuals end up in conflict or when power is exercised by 
authorities, businesses, and organisations. As was made clear in Chapter 3, 
Goffman claims that this sacredness of the individual is confirmed through 
symbolic actions in a social interaction where we show deference for the in-
dividual in an all but ritualised way with our behaviour. We can thus say 
that Goffman by ‘interaction order’ means the respect that individuals in 
part show each other in social interaction, in part show the order by allow-
ing their behaviour to be controlled by it. Included in the interaction order 
is also how we correct our own and other people’s behaviour when it lacks 
respect. Goffman sees this order in all interactions among people, even in 
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such microscopic interactions as when somebody asks a stranger for the time 
(1981a, p. 15ff). Goffman sometimes expresses himself in such a way that 
the concept of the interaction order can be interpreted to mean a kind of 
supraindividual ritual order that individuals follow unconsciously. But at 
the same time, Goffman’s previously mentioned discussion of alternative 
words for ‘ritual’ shows that he was dissatisfied with such interpretations: 
‘The term “ritual” is not particularly satisfactory because of connotations 
of otherworldliness and automaticity’ (Goffman, 1981a, p. 17). However, 
Goffman sometimes also expresses himself in ways that make it possible to 
interpret the interaction order as an interpersonal order, a kind of symbolic 
system of exchange where an individual, by respecting other people, can also 
expect to be respected by them. Goffman writes the following in his last text:
The modern nation state, almost as a means of defining itself into ex-
istence, claims final authority for the control of hazard and threat to 
life, limb, and property throughout its territorial jurisdiction. Always in 
 theory, and often in practice, the state provides stand-by arrangements 
for stepping in when local mechanisms of social control fail to keep 
breakdowns of interaction order within certain limits. Particularly in 
public places but not restricted thereto. To be sure, the interaction order 
prevailing even in the most public places is not a creation of the apparatus 
of a state. Certainly most of this order comes into being and is sustained 
from below as it were, in some cases in spite of overarching authority not 
because of it. Nonetheless the state has effectively established legitimacy 
and priority here, monopolizing the use of heavy arms and militarily dis-
ciplined cadres as an ultimate sanction. (Goffman, 1983b, p. 6)
Goffman chose to study the interaction order through the rules of behav-
iour that exist in society and that in different ways control how individuals 
interact with each other. He analysed the rules in detail and made three im-
portant distinctions. First, rules of behaviour are manifested in two different 
ways: as obligations, which through moral constraint establish how individ-
uals should behave, and as expectations, which express consideration for 
others. Second, Goffman differentiated between symmetric and asymmetric 
rules of behaviour: symmetric rules control behaviour by being applicable to 
everyone; asymmetric rules of behaviour regulate deviations from the general 
order (e.g., in hierarchical systems there can be different rules of behaviour 
 depending on where in the hierarchy individuals are placed). Third, Goffman 
differentiated between rules of content and ceremonial rules of behaviour; the 
former are laws, morals, and ethics, while the latter can be called etiquette.
Most rules of behaviour control us habitually without our usually 
 thinking about it, and often it is not until we have broken the rules that they 
make themselves known: as reprimands from the people around us and as 
feelings of guilt. In particular, feelings of guilt in connection with ‘making 
fools of ourselves’ are a very strong corrective force in social interactions. 
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However, it is not only the person who breaks the rules that risks being af-
fected by feelings of guilt and a loss of reputation or face in connection with 
breaking a rule, but also other people involved in the interaction: the person 
who broke the rules should have followed the rules, and the other people 
should not have allowed the rules to be broken in the first place.  According 
to  Goffman, we all have an interest in maintaining a  ‘temporarily working 
consensus’ in social interaction, or, in other words, in avoiding a ‘scene’ 
(Goffman, 1953, p. 40f). Conversely, this is confirmed when a disturbance or 
a ‘scene’ cannot be avoided and the façade cracks: feelings overflow and the 
conflict can then escalate to an unanticipated degree, independent of how 
trifling the source of the conflict may seem to be. This can concern feuds be-
tween neighbours about placing a fence 25 cm in one direction or the other, 
or ‘pointless’ quarrels between spouses about trifles. Conflicts in traffic can 
also develop into veritable social drama.
Five illustrations of frame analysis before Frame Analysis
By relating the interaction order to his earlier studies mentioned in his 1983 
article, Goffman emphasised the continuity of his sociological project and 
perspective. But how does this continuity relate to Goffman’s frame per-
spective? I will deal with this question below by studying Goffman’s meth-
ods of analysis in five different texts that precede Frame Analysis.
Goffman’s frame perspective is a metareflexive perspective. The  question 
‘What is it that’s going on here?’ requires reflection on one’s own experi-
ences, one’s own and other people’s interactions, and the social norms, 
rules, conventions, traditions, institutions, etc. that regulate the interactions 
of individuals in general as well as in specific situations. It can be rather dif-
ficult not to know what happens in a situation, both because strong social 
sanctions can be developed against the person who acts in the wrong way, 
and because of feelings of shame over not knowing what applies and/or not 
daring to ask. There is therefore reason to reflect on how an individual in 
fact and in practice finds out which frames govern a situation. Because it is 
difficult for many people, but not everyone, to ask straight out in front of 
other people what is happening in a situation, individuals can pose direct 
questions to other individuals, pose indirect questions whose answers can 
possibly say something about the situation, and observe the events in the 
situation to find out what is going on. But individuals can also make ‘moves’ 
in the situation in order to be able to read other people’s countermoves, and 
thus also possibly get an answer to the question ‘What is it that’s going on 
here?’. This interaction in order to obtain answers to what an interaction is 
about, and which frame (or frames) governs it, can be called metasociality.2
When a situation or the frame that controls the situation is difficult to un-
derstand, it can become filled with friction, something that can be illustrated 
by my experiences of a queuing system that is difficult to understand at the 
tyre company were I twice a year change the tyres on my car.3 The first time 
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I visited the company there were a fair number of people there for the same 
reason as I, and there was a room assigned for those waiting their turn. But 
there was no queuing system, no obvious queue, no queue number  tickets, 
and neither was there staff organising everything. For someone uninitiated 
it was a room filled with standing and sitting people, although everyone 
there knew that in spite of everything this was a kind of queue, something 
that was at least made visible when someone tried to jump the ‘queue’ or 
someone claimed that someone else was jumping the ‘queue’. Every time 
a new customer came into the room there was a certain amount of unrest 
and people’s alertness level was elevated, which it can be assumed had to do 
with the fact that the situation did not have a frame that was common for all 
those who waited. What is it that’s going on here?
At my second visit, six months later, I knew what to expect and was not 
in particularly good spirits. When I got there I decided to try and find out 
who was last in this difficult-to-define queue. I tactfully enquired of a few peo-
ple whether they were last in line, and finally one of them answered that she 
thought she was among the last because nobody had come into the waiting 
room between me and her. After that I kept my eyes on that person and made 
sure I got into the workshop immediately after her. Now I had, on the basis of 
my experiences from the previous visit, framed the situation in such a way that 
I could handle it fairly well. On my third visit I took additional steps and loudly 
enquired who was last in the queue when I got into the room, and then followed 
my routine from the second visit. Now I had contributed to a shared frame 
among the waiting. This way of organising a queue has also been described by 
other people when it comes to bank queues in Moscow, queues in Latvia, and 
taxi queues in Cuba. An interesting thing in this context is that the tyre com-
pany had previously had a queueing system with queue number tickets, and 
the manager told me that when an infringement of that system had resulted in 
a fight between two customers, the company decided to get rid of this queuing 
system and leave it to the customers themselves to organise their waiting.
As has been made clear, Goffman’s socially interactive frame perspective 
is based on William James’s cognitive and Gregory Bateson’s communicative 
frame concepts. Goffman’s frame concept is presented as an analytic tool 
through an emphasis on the question ‘What is it that’s going on here?’, which 
researchers as well as interacting individuals are understood to ask themselves 
when they attempt to find out which definition or definitions of the  situation 
apply. Here there is reason to differentiate between practical framing, which 
is applied by the people interacting in a situation, and  analytic framing, which 
is used by the researcher.4 Practical framing can advantageously make use of 
Vollmer’s definition: ‘Framing is the process during which participants come 
to terms with actual occasions through producing context for events and ac-
tivities’ (Vollmer, 2013, p. 67). Goffman’s analytic framing is presented below, 
and within its frame, albeit unspoken, appears the additional question, ‘Why 
do the things that are happening here happen?’, because Goffman also looked 
for the mechanisms that control the actions of individuals.
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Below I will illustrate analytic framing using five of Goffman’s studies of 
social interaction, which were all completed before the publication of Frame 
Analysis. The choice of texts includes one article, three books, and one es-
say, all central and well-known texts, and represents a distribution over time 
from 1955 to 1963, a period of high activity in Goffman’s authorship when 
he, among other things, published five of his eleven books. This selection is 
representative of Goffman’s texts published before Frame Analysis. It reflects 
two of the three themes I feel can be found in Goffman’s texts: the theme of 
politeness and respect, as well as the theme of social illusion.  Finally, they 
all reflect the social interaction dynamics between ritualisation, vulnerabil-
ity, and temporarily working consensus.
In the following five examples I emphasise in particular four recurring 
characteristics in Goffman’s analyses of social interaction in their different 
contexts:
1  governing mechanisms, which is here an umbrella term for rules, norms, nor-
mative expectations, conventions, routines, rituals, regularities,  institutions, 
orders, etc. that are or can be action- and interaction- regulating and that 
affect the degrees of liberty of the actions of individuals in situations where 
they interact with others,
2  the situation or, in other words, the spatial delimitation of the interaction,
3  the performance of the interaction, and
4  the dynamics of the interaction and the situation, and with ‘dynamics’ is 
then meant a kind of theory of force concerning how entities in a unified 
space influence each other in a number of different ways; e.g., cooperate, 
end up in tension and conflict, exist side by side but are indifferent to one 
another, are involved in coordinated cooperation that can give rise to 
both intended and unintended consequences, etc. The dynamics of the 
interactional context is the sense or, put differently, the actual frame that 
becomes a consequence of the meeting between governing mechanisms 
and the actual carrying out of the interaction in the situation at hand.
1 ‘On Face-Work’ (1955) – framing the expressive order 
of face activity
In the article ‘On Face-Work’ Goffman investigates the moral regulation of 
social interaction within whose frame the individual is made into a sacred 
object and the interaction assumes ritual traits. This means that society mo-
bilises its members as
self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of mobilizing 
the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be per-
ceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through 
face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, to have 
tact and a certain amount of poise. These are some of the elements of 
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behavior which must be built into the person if practical use is to be 
made of him as an interactant, and it is these elements that are referred 
to in part when one speaks of universal human nature. (Goffman, 
1955a, p. 231)
But, continues Goffman,
universal nature is not a very human thing. By acquiring it, the person 
becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propen-
sities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without.
The object of study in this text is the face and the face-work of interacting 
individuals. Goffman argues that when studying this, one studies ‘the traffic 
rules of social interaction’ (1955a, p. 216) or, in other words, the interaction 
order.
It is in the nature of things that face activity in social interaction presup-
poses face-to-face meetings. For this reason, Goffman does not make much 
of an effort to determine face activity spatially to a greater extent than this.
Face-work is the activity that is being investigated, and face is defined ‘as 
the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line 
others assume he has taken during a particular contact’ (Goffman, 1955a, 
p. 213). Face-work is everything the individual does in order to make sure that 
his or her own actions correspond with her or his face, but also with norms 
etc. that regulate his or her actions. The individual can maintain, lose, save, 
and give face.
Goffman describes the dynamics of face-work as a ‘viable system of in-
teraction’, which is at the same time individual, social, and societal, and is 
represented as follows:
While his social face can be his most personal possession and the center 
of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it 
will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy 
of it. Approved attributes and their relation to face make of every man 
his own jailer; this is a fundamental social constraint even though each 
man may like his cell. (Goffman, 1955a, p. 215)
The system of interaction makes up a special ritual expression order that 
regulates the individual maintenance of face, but also the cooperation be-
tween individuals that makes sure that most faces are saved and restored.
2 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) – framing 
expressive control and impression management
In this book Goffman develops a dramaturgical perspective on social in-
teraction and points to two sets of norms that are of great importance for 
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how individuals choose to interact with each other. The first set consists of 
norms of politeness and decency that regulate how individuals are expected 
to treat the people with whom they interact. These norms occur generally, 
with cultural and social variations, and individuals are expected to follow 
them if they want to be defined by others as individuals that are decent, etc. 
The second set of rules is a result of Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis, and 
is presented under the heading ‘The arts of impression management’ in the 
following way:
In order to prevent the occurrence of incidents and the embarrassment 
consequent upon them, it will be necessary for all the participants in 
the interaction, as well as those who do not participate, to possess cer-
tain attributes and to express these attributes in practices employed for 
saving the show. […] the defensive measures used by performers to save 
their own show; the protective measures used by audience and outsiders 
to assist the performers in saving the performers’ show; and, finally, the 
measures the performers must take in order to make it possible for the 
audience and outsiders to employ protective measures on the perform-
ers’ behalf. (Goffman, 1959, p. 212)
Goffman calls these three measures, whose purpose is to rescue a perfor-
mance, ‘dramaturgical loyalty’, ‘dramaturgical discipline’, and  ‘dramaturgical 
circumspection’. Goffman applies these primarily to group performance, 
but they can in principle also be applied to individual performance, with the 
additional note that dramaturgical loyalty then means being consistent with 
and loyal to one’s own performance. The art of managing impressions can be 
seen as an unusually clear description of framing social interaction.
The prerequisites for Goffman’s dramaturgical theory are, first, that indi-
viduals in some sense gain something by demonstrating that they  subordinate 
themselves to the norms of politeness and decency, and,  second, that this 
demonstration does not reflect how the individual always acts. For this rea-
son it here becomes central to imagine the movement of individuals between 
different spaces, or, as Goffman calls them, regions. In the front region the 
interaction with or performance in front of others takes place. Here it is im-
portant to maintain a front, but behind it – in the back region – the  individual 
can act in ways that do not at all correspond with the front displayed. In 
order to make this spatial determination of interaction complete, Goffman 
also talks about the outside, a residual category made up of places that are 
neither the front nor the back region at the time of the individual’s perfor-
mance. It should be emphasised that the three regions that Goffman invents 
are entirely relative to the ongoing social interaction and to each other.
When it comes to the performance of interaction framed in this way, this 
is to a great extent characterised by a risk of being exposed or found out 
when a person is the kind of person or does the kind of thing that does 
not correspond with the front that is being displayed. This characterises 
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Goffman’s entire analysis but comes to its most pregnant expression in the 
difference between expressions given and expressions given off. Expressions 
given are expressions the individual consciously transmits in order to con-
vey particular information determined by her- or himself. The individual 
has, relatively speaking, a great deal of control over expressions given. The 
opposite is true of expressions given off, and the reason for this is explained 
by Goffman in the following way: ‘Performers can stop giving expressions 
but cannot stop giving them off’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 108). The control over 
expressions given off lies to a greater extent with the people with whom the 
individual interacts, because they interpret the impressions transmitted by 
the individual and compare them with the expressions that are being sent 
out. A poignant literary illustration of the different expressions is provided 
by Pär Lagerkvist in his novel The Dwarf. Maestro Bernardo has arrived at 
the court in order to paint the Prince’s portrait, but also wants to depict the 
dwarf working at court naked in a full-length portrait. At first, the dwarf 
believes this concerns a portrait of his face, but not even then does he want 
to make himself the object of Bernardo’s gaze. Why not? asks Bernardo. The 
dwarf answers, ‘“I wish to possess my own face.” He [Bernardo] thought 
this strange, smiled somewhat, but then admitted that there was something 
in what I said. But, even when unreproduced, one’s face is the property of 
many, in fact of all who look upon it’ (Lagerkvist, 1958 [1944], p. 44).
The dynamics that characterise the interaction context when interpreted 
in a dramaturgical fashion can be called the dynamics of expression control 
and impression management. By trying to control the expressions given and 
given off, the interacting parties also try to control other people’s impres-
sions of themselves. In the context of such a perspective, interacting individ-
uals try to present themselves before other people as in the performance of 
a part on a stage, and, as on the theatre stage, the audience contributes to 
creating the performance.
The interacting parties are thus dependent on each other in a kind of 
mutual production of the self, a production that is very vulnerable if the 
interacting parties choose to violate or by mistake violate norms of polite-
ness and decency or stop observing dramaturgical loyalty, discipline, and 
circumspection.
3 ‘Fun in Games’ (1961) – framing out the irrelevant
In the essay ‘Fun in Games’, published in Encounters (Goffman, 1961b), so-
cial interaction in and in connection with games is investigated. The context 
of the game is spatially delimited and is called a gaming encounter, which 
encompasses the game – the specific rules of the game in question – and 
gaming – the concrete interaction context in which the gaming takes place. 
The game, writes Goffman, is ‘codifiable and clean’, while gaming is ‘very 
sticky’. There can thus be a significant difference between the game itself 
and the activity that develops during the gaming. It is the social interaction 
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among the players that makes the difference, in particular their human abil-
ity to spontaneously engage in interaction with other people:
By this spontaneous involvement in the joint activity, the individual be-
comes an integral part of the situation, lodged in it and exposed to it, 
infusing himself into the encounter in a manner quite different from 
the way an ideally rational player commits his side to a position in an 
ideally abstract game. As already considered, a game move is one thing; 
self-mobilization through which this move is executed during a gaming 
encounter is quite another. Game rules govern the one, the structure of 
gaming encounters governs the others. (Goffman, 1961b, p. 38)
Two sets of rules frame the interaction context in which the game is embed-
ded: the rules of the game, and the norms that regulate the interaction  itself; 
for instance, that respect should be shown to other people and that one 
should be available for interaction when together with people one knows.
But there is an additional set of rules: rules that ensure that the game can 
continue in spite of the above-mentioned interaction obligations. Goffman 
calls these rules ‘rules of irrelevance’, and they regulate spontaneous social 
interaction so that the game can continue in accordance with its rules:
The elegance and strength of this structure of inattention to most things 
of the world is a great tribute to the social organization of human pro-
pensities. Witness the fugue-like manner in which deeply engrossed 
chess players are willing to help each other reposition a piece that has 
been brushed aside by a sleeve, dissociating this event from relevant real-
ity and providing us with a clear example of a fundamental process, the 
sustaining of a subordinate side-encounter simultaneously with a main 
one that has been accorded the accent of reality. (Goffman, 1961b, p. 20)
Goffman then refers to Bateson’s frame concept in order to capture the kind 
of sense ‘that will be accorded everything within the frame’. Anything else 
is ‘out of frame’ because the gamers regard it as irrelevant. The things irrel-
evant to the game are placed out of the frame of the situation.
The dynamics in gaming encounters can be described as a show of force 
between, on the one hand, the gamers’ focus on the game, which makes 
everything else in the gaming encounter appear irrelevant, and on the other 
hand the tendency of the gamers to spontaneously engage in social interac-
tion that has nothing to do with the game itself. Goffman imagines that the 
participants in the gaming encounter manage this show of force by using 
‘transformation rules’ to separate things from ‘the world outside’ that are 
allowed to come into the gaming encounter from those that are to be kept 
outside. But these rules are not sufficient, and Goffman also imagines that 
things irrelevant for the game that, in spite of everything, come into the 
gaming encounter have to pass through a symbolic interaction membrane 
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that regulates how things that are allowed to come in from the world outside 
may be expressed inside the gaming encounter:
If we think of an encounter as having a metaphorical membrane around 
it, we can bring our concerns into focus. We can see that the  dynamics 
of an encounter will be tied to the functioning of the boundary- 
maintaining mechanisms that cut the encounter off selectively from 
wider worlds. (Goffman, 1961b, p. 66)
Here, Goffman thus uses a frame concept that emphasises the sense that 
characterises the situation, and he imagines a kind of framing filter that 
separates things relevant to the situation from things that are not. The 
sense that is particular to the gaming encounter has to be ensured by the 
interacting parties’ framing the social interaction in ways that will enable 
disturbances of the game to be kept outside the gaming encounter, and by 
disturbances that nevertheless come in also being reframed in order to fit the 
sense that determines the gaming encounter.
4 Behavior in Public Places (1963) – framing the management of 
personal front
In this book, Goffman studies social interaction in public places, and a 
number of different rules are described. First, moral norms that regulate 
how individuals are expected to behave in order to reach their goals; second, 
rules of behaviour that prescribe that individuals should strive to fit into 
the order that exists; and, third, social norms that individuals in close prox-
imity to one another are expected to respect. In addition, he also mentions 
situational proprieties, which are regulated by a moral code that in its mode 
of operation can be likened to, e.g., an honour code or a professional code.
Several spatial delimitations are made. Public places are defined as ‘any 
regions in a community freely accessible to members of that community’ 
(Goffman, 1963a, p. 9). Gatherings of people – Goffman’s specific object 
of study in this context – are defined as ‘any set of two or more individuals 
whose members include all and only those who are at the moment in one 
another’s immediate presence’. In connection with this, ‘situation’ is defined 
as ‘the full spatial environment anywhere within which an entering person 
becomes a member of the gathering that is (or does then become) present’. 
Finally, social occasions such as, e.g., a party, a day at work, or an opera 
visit, are defined as activities that
provides the structuring social context in which many situations and 
their gatherings are likely to form, dissolve, and re-form, while a pat-
tern of conduct tends to be recognized as the appropriate and (often) 
official or intended one. […] Each class of such occasions possesses a 
distinctive ethos, a spirit, an emotional structure, that must be properly 
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created, sustained, and laid to rest, the participant finding that he is 
obliged to become caught up in the occasion, whatever his personal 
feelings. (Goffman, 1963a, pp. 18–19)
The social interaction in public places is of a rather special kind because it 
consists of a mixture of what Goffman calls focused and unfocused inter-
action. The former is characterised by the interacting individuals having a 
mutual interactive focus, such as, for instance, in a conversation. The un-
focused type is characterised by fleeting, quickly emerging, and transitory 
encounters in places that are not shared because of, rather than in spite of, 
other people. At the same time, these forms of interaction can morph into 
one another when individuals meet acquaintances in a public place, and 
an island of focused interaction is then formed in the stream of unfocused 
interaction. It is the unfocused interaction in which Goffman is interested, 
and it is described by, among other things, the concept of ‘civil inattention’: 
‘that one gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one 
 appreciates that the other is present (and that one admits openly to  having 
seen him), while at the next moment withdrawing one’s attention from him 
so as to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or 
design’ (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84). Civil inattention, writes Lofland (1998, 
p. 30), ‘makes possible copresence without commingling, awareness without 
 engrossment, courtesy without conversation’.
The dynamics that are made visible in Goffman’s analysis of social in-
teraction in public places has to do with a mixture of, on one hand, fleeting 
encounters with unknown people, and, on the other, encounters with known 
others. It is here, as in other interaction contexts, Goffman argues, that in-
dividuals that are situationally present display themselves ‘through the dis-
ciplined management of […] “personal front”‘ (Goffman, 1963a, p. 25). This 
performance ensures a kind of superficial consensus, but at the same time 
many things happen under the surface that suggest the opposite:
Situational requirements are of a moral character: the individual is obliged 
to maintain them; he is expected to desire to do so; and if he fails, some 
kind of public cognizance is taken of his failure. But once this character of 
situational obligations is granted, we must see that a study of them leads 
off in many different directions. We may expect to find many different 
motives for complying with them, many different reasons for breaking 
them, many different ways of concealing or excusing infractions, many 
different ways of dealing with offenders. We may also expect to find that 
rules maintained or broken before one audience will not be handled in the 
same way by the same person when he is before another audience. And, of 
course, we find that an involvement ruling upheld in one community will 
not be honored in the next. One theme of this study, then, is that a moral 
rule is not something that can be used as a means of dichotomizing the 
world into upholders and offenders. (Goffman, 1963a, p. 240f)
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The soluble structure of moral obligations in interaction situations thus 
creates the prerequisites for a multiplicity of motives for adapting to and 
violating moral rules.
5 Stigma (1963) – framing the interaction between the identity 
values in society, the discredited, and the discreditable
The stigma phenomenon, the way Goffman describes it in the book Stigma, 
has to do with an individual’s lack of social recognition because of an inabil-
ity to conform to the identity values that are valued in society. The constant 
in this stigma concept is social recognition, because this is generally sought 
after, while the variables are the identity values and the opportunities indi-
viduals have to conform to and/or conceal their stigmas. This creates pre-
requisites for the social game that has to do with hiding one’s own stigma 
but also with not showing that one is aware of those of other people. The 
rules that are foregrounded in Goffman’s analysis of stigma are normative 
and institutional regulations for expectations concerning, and ideas about 
how individuals should be, behave, and appear, and what they should do. 
In this context, individuals in a society can be comprehensively defined as 
either discredited or discreditable. Their actual social identities can always 
be compared to virtual social identities that are anchored in identity values. 
Goffman emphasises that stigmatisation has nothing to do with character-
istics, but is about relations between, on the one hand, different types of 
collective patterns – perhaps we can call them norms – and, on the other 
hand, individuals.
Spatially, Goffman delimits the analysis of stigma to ‘mixed contacts’: 
‘[…] the moments when stigmatized and normal are in the same “social 
situation”, that is, in one another’s immediate physical presence, whether 
in a conversation-like encounter or in the mere co-presence of an unfo-
cused gathering’ (Goffman, 1963b, p. 12). Because the analyses of Goffman 
and other researchers have successively undermined the use of the word 
 ‘normal’, it is seldom used in current research on ‘stigma’. I therefore wish 
to emphasise that ‘normal’ in Goffman’s usage is not a concept describing 
a fixed state but one that should rather be understood to include the people 
who at the time are not discredited (but who, like everyone else, risk being 
discredited). Another spatial aspect of the analysis of stigma that Goffman 
draws attention to is the idea that the world of a stigmatised individual is 
divided into different regions – ‘forbidden, civil, and back places’ (Goffman, 
1963b, p. 82) – that require different ways of handling the stigma. Spatially 
speaking, the stigmatised individual thus reads his or her world differently 
than an individual who is not stigmatised.
The actions that Goffman foregrounds are called techniques of informa-
tion control and have to do with how individuals – discredited and discred-
itable ones – handle social information about themselves with the aim of 
passing. But here Goffman also assumes another position by pointing to 
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examples of people who no longer feel the need to hide their stigma, and 
they then reach a kind of turning point in their moral careers:
I want to suggest now that the stigmatized individual can come to feel 
that he should be above passing, that if he accepts himself and respects 
himself he will feel no need to conceal his failing. After laboriously 
learning to conceal, then, the individual may go on to unlearn this con-
cealment. It is here that voluntary disclosure fits into the moral career, 
a sign of one of its phases. It should be added that in the published 
 autobiographies of stigmatized individuals, this phase in the moral 
 career is typically described as the final, mature, well-adjusted one – a 
state of grace […] (Goffman, 1963b, p. 101f)
Goffman calls the dynamics into which the mechanisms, spaces, and actions 
can be incorporated ‘the dynamics of shameful differentness’ (Goffman, 
1963b, p. 140). These dynamics are, to a great extent, controlled by the 
individual’s feeling of being seen by other people, her or his will to take 
control of what should be displayed to other people, and the opportunities 
for passing as ‘normal’. This does not merely have to do with stigmatised 
people but with everyone in a society where social recognition is important: 
‘The general identity-values of a society may be fully entrenched nowhere, 
and yet they can cast some kind of shadow on the encounters encountered 
everywhere in daily living’ (Goffman, 1963b, p. 128f).
Metasociality
The pattern I see in the five analyses that have been presented here can be 
said to demonstrate how Goffman worked with frame analysis as a method 
of analysis long before publishing the book Frame Analysis.5 If we want an 
answer to the question ‘What is it that’s going on here?’ in social interaction 
contexts, we must thus make visible and systematically study mechanisms 
governing the interaction, the situation in which the interaction takes place, 
how the interaction is in fact performed, and the social interaction dynam-
ics that manifest themselves through this.
By this kind of analysis is constructed what can be called a metasocial 
perspective. The concept of metasociality has not been used much and only 
gets a handful of hits on Google (12 hits) and Google Scholar (3 hits),6 which 
is virtually nothing compared to the amount of hits one usually gets when 
searching the Internet. There are very few accounts of the concept in the 
research literature, but when used the concept has several different mean-
ings. In a biological study of bees, for example, the concept of metasociality 
means a higher level of sociality (Minckley, 1987), and in an anthropological 
study it means ‘a collective representation of a collective state’ (Schram, 
2009, p. 106). In a social psychology study, on the other hand, the researchers 
are trying to measure the difference between people who ‘have’ high and low 
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degrees of metasociality, the former meaning that they have rich friendships 
and are considered trustworthy by others (Ray, Mackie, Smith, & Terman, 
2012). In a study on mathematical problem-solving skills the author defines 
metasociality as ‘the individual’s awareness of their social skills, ability to 
regulate these social skills, perceptions and beliefs and emotions with re-
spect to another person, and the ways these beliefs and emotions affected 
social behavior in a dyadic problem-solving situation’ (Sherzer, 1995, p. 1).
The above-mentioned uses represent definitions of metasociality that 
 differ considerably from each other and from my way of using the  concept. 
There are, however, other ‘meta’ concepts: metacommunication, or, 
 communication about the ongoing communication (Watzlawick,  Bavelas, & 
 Jackson, 2011 [1967]); metacognition – i.e., thinking about thinking  (Beran, 
2013);  metareflection – i.e., reflection on reflection (for example, Clark, 2009)7; 
metamodernism, a ‘discourse, oscillating between a modern  enthusiasm and 
a postmodern irony’ (Vermeulen & van den Akker, 2010); and, not least, what 
Geertz in a concluding description of the function of the Balinese cockfight in 
Balinese culture calls ‘a metasocial commentary’, meaning ‘a Balinese reading 
of Balinese experience, a story they tell themselves about themselves’ (Geertz, 
2000 [1973], p. 448). By metasociality I mean a similar loop-like movement as 
those demonstrated above, but one that covers both the interacting actors’ 
reflections on the ongoing social interaction and social interactive moves that 
represent ways of illuminating and/or examining the frame or framing of the 
ongoing social interaction. The latter meaning signifies that an actor does 
something that receives an answer or perhaps rather a consequence that can 
possibly say something about what happens in the shared situation. In this 
context, making moves in social situations then means doing this in order to 
acquire more information through other people’s countermoves.
During the conference ‘Strategic Interaction and Conflict’, where 
 Goffman, incidentally, sat on the planning committee, a session was devoted 
to ‘The vocabulary of basic moves’, which was opened by Thomas Schelling 
and in which Goffman during the discussions said,
Communication and move-making, I would argue, are two quite differ-
ent things, and the whole virtue of the game theory for the sociologist is 
that it drives a wedge between communication and strategic interaction. 
What is going on in the game is not communication, but an exchange 
where each move alters the objective, environmental, concrete, existen-
tial situation of the other player, whether he knows it or not. (Goffman, 
1966, p. 161)
Goffman investigates this game theoretical effort in greater detail in the 
essay ‘Expression Games’, and provides an analysis of moves within intel-
ligence activities that does not need to be outlined here. The point is that 
move-making is not only based on one’s own definition of the situation, 
but can be used in order to acquire information about the situation that is 
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shared with other people. The reason why such moves are made seems to be 
that to many individuals it seems more difficult to ask straight out what is 
going on here than to elicit countermoves that can be read in the belief that 
they will provide information about what is going on in the situation.
Metasociality can thus make itself known on the level of interaction in the 
form of the actors’ practical investigation of what is going on in a situation, 
which consequently allows them to find out which frame(s) governs the sit-
uation. Different methods can then be used, for instance observation of the 
events and also conversations (‘interviews’) with the other people involved. 
A third method for finding an answer to the question ‘What is it that’s going 
on here?’ can be active actions within the situation with the aim of acquiring 
information about it by making moves and reading countermoves.
Cracks
Goffman claimed that there was continuity in his sociology because it dealt 
with the interaction order and its different aspects. But here, as in everything 
else, there are cracks. One of these cracks can be linked to Frame Analysis 
and is expressed, depending on how it is framed, in the question ‘What is 
it that’s going on here?’. If we frame the question on a ‘microsocial’ level 
it rather smoothly ties in with Goffman’s interaction order and can be an-
swered through the kind of analysis that I have demonstrated in the five ex-
amples above, which also show that Goffman worked in a frame analytic 
manner long before Frame Analysis. In addition, Frame Analysis can then be 
seen as a methodology book in which Goffman tries to describe – in the dry, 
technical way that is characteristic of many books on methodology – what 
he himself believed he was doing and how a frame analysis can be  conducted. 
On the other hand, if the question ‘What is it that’s going on here?’ is framed 
on a ‘macrosocial’ level, cracks appear in Goffman’s perspective. In the fol-
lowing, I will demonstrate this by complementing  Goffman’s frame analysis 
with a temporal perspective and reflecting on the crisis in the interaction or-
der that can be discerned in Goffman’s texts from the beginning of the 1970s.
Frame as space, framing as time and space
Goffman’s account in Frame Analysis – and in general – has, as has been 
previously stated, a very strongly spatial or situational character. Space 
is a central analytic category in Goffman’s sociology. Below I will show 
that, in addition, it has a weak temporal character. The situationality that 
 characterises Goffman’s sociology does this to such a great extent that when 
he occasionally brings up time, it is also described as a kind of situation, 
something that is illustrated by this often-quoted expression where ‘mo-
ments’ appear to mean points in time rather than a flow of time, or perhaps a 
‘juncture’, which means both a point in time and a situation: ‘Not, then, men 
and their moments. Rather moments and their men’ (Goffman, 1967, p. 3).
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This statement can be interpreted in different ways, and Emirbayer 
(1997, p. 296) describes its meaning as follows: ‘The study of face-to-face 
encounters thereupon becomes a matter of locating regularities across such 
transactional processes, of specifying recurrent mechanisms, patterns, and 
sequences in meso-level “occasions”‘.8 Another interpretation of Goffman’s 
statement can be found in Donati (2013, p. 150):
In this statement, engagement effectively comes to be a pure event 
“without a subject”, in the sense that the event defines the Self and not 
vice versa. Having the human person depend on the “situational mo-
ment” is tantamount to dissolving him or her.
Emirbayer thus sees Goffman’s words as an epistemological statement 
about how to study an individual in a particular situation, while Donati 
interprets the statement ontologically in that he thinks it implies, above all, 
a certain idea about the relationship between an individual and his or her 
surroundings. With the exception of Donati’s rather extreme final point I 
believe that both interpretations are correct, even if I would rather summa-
rise Goffman’s statement in one word: contextualisation, which can be seen 
clearly in action in the articles ‘The Neglected Situation’ (Goffman, 1964b) 
and ‘Footing’ (Goffman, 1979a), and which in Frame Analysis is described 
as an ‘anchoring of activity’:
Given their understanding of what it is that is going on, individuals fit 
their actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing 
world supports this fitting. These organizational premises – sustained 
both in the mind and in activity – I call the frame of the activity. (Goff-
man, 1974, p. 247)
This definition of frame emphasises the correspondence between experience 
and ongoing activity. The role of the temporal dimension has been down-
played, and it appears in part in terms of experience and in part in terms 
of so-called ‘strips’. The experiences of individuals are more or less taken 
for granted, seem stable, and are not problematised, but appear in Frame 
 Analysis as a kind of individual depository of knowledge that can be organ-
ised in order to suit the action in situations that vary according to the frame. 
Temporality therefore exists only prior to a situation, not during it; nor do 
frames appear to be situationally transgressive in Goffman’s version other 
than in the form of experiences stored by individuals. The brief interaction 
sequences – strips – do have a temporal dimension, but this dimension does 
not transgress a situation either, but instead constitutes it.9
Experience is defined extremely briefly as ‘something that an individual 
actor can take into his mind’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 13). Is experience really 
everything that is taken into one’s mind? Even, for instance, things that are 
forgotten? Does experience not have to be processed in some way other than 
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taking it in for it to become an experience? Experiences are hardly constant 
simply because they have been taken into the mind, because memory is not 
always a reliable companion. Whatever the case, experience to Goffman 
consists of such things that an individual, consciously or unconsciously, has 
assimilated from outside the situation in question. That is to say,  experience 
has to be organised during exchanges of situations. In a situation, experi-
ences are organised in order to answer the question ‘What is it that’s going 
on here?’ and thereby link themselves to the strips, the brief interaction se-
quences. On the whole, this is all that Goffman has to say when it comes 
to the temporal dimension, and it works because he is interested in frame 
analysis as a method. For the researcher the key element of the method 
is, as I have shown previously, to connect the actions and interactions of 
 individuals inside a situation to different governing mechanisms; for exam-
ple, norms and rules. Against this backdrop, frame becomes a kind of snap-
shot, unlike framing, which can be understood as a process where frames 
are continuously adjusted and transformed.
If one wants to study framing as this more dynamic chain of events in sit-
uations, a somewhat more developed temporal dimension is necessary. Such 
a more developed dimension is offered by German historian of  concepts 
 Reinhart Koselleck through his metahistorical temporal categories, and 
below I will attempt to complement Goffman’s frame perspective with 
 Koselleck’s temporal perspective. At the same time, this attempt reveals, it 
will turn out, a crack in Goffman’s sociological perspective.
Experience is a completely central category in Goffman’s frame perspec-
tive, but it only means something that exists inside the heads of individuals. 
For his part, Koselleck transforms both experience and expectations into 
analytic categories and calls them the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon 
of expectation’, respectively. The purpose of these is
the outlining and establishment of the conditions of possible histories, 
and not this history itself. This then is a matter of epistemological cate-
gories which assist in the foundation of the possibility of a history. Put 
differently, there is no history which could be constituted independently 
of the experiences and expectations of active human agents. With this, 
however, nothing is yet said about a given concrete past, present, or 
future history. (Koselleck, 2004 [1979], p. 256)
If we connect the concepts of space of experience and horizon of expecta-
tion to Goffman’s frame concept, a kind of situational time is created. This 
time concerns both the interacting individuals and their shared situation. 
If we imagine that the individuals enter the situation and ask ‘What is it 
that’s going on here?’, they can answer this question by, as Goffman writes, 
 organising their experiences. The question is then reformulated as ‘What 
happened in similar situations that I have experienced?’, and the answer 
to that question then constitutes the space of experience where possible 
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previous events and interpretations of them can be replayed and compared 
with the situation at hand. Because future events are always more or less 
uncertain, individuals reasonably also have to reflect on questions such as 
these: ‘What might happen here?’, ‘What do I want to happen here?’, ‘What 
do other people want to happen here?’, ‘What mustn’t happen here?’, and 
similar questions that thus constitute the horizon of expectation for the sit-
uation. This creates an extension in time of the situation, not only back-
wards with reference to experiences but also forwards with reference to 
expectations. Goffman touches on expectations mainly in passing, such as, 
for  example, when he in his analysis of ‘the theatrical frame’ with reference 
to game theory defines what he calls an ‘information state’, but he does this 
using the same words as Koselleck:
By an ‘information state’ I mean the knowledge an individual has of 
why events have happened as they have, what the current forces are, 
what the properties and intents of the relevant persons are, and what 
the outcome is likely to be. In brief, each character at each moment is 
accorded an orientation, a temporal perspective, a ‘horizon’. (Goffman, 
1974, p. 133f)
The purpose of Koselleck’s use of the concepts of space of experience and 
 horizon of expectation is to allow the past and the future to connect with each 
other in order to thus ‘thematise historical time’ (Koselleck, 1979, p. 353)10 and 
create temporal connections that are ‘beyond mere  chronology’  (Koselleck, 
2004 [1979], p. 258). When these two concepts are linked,  experience is 
 defined in part as something that has happened, in part as something that 
can be taken out and, e.g., be narrated. One might imagine that Goffman’s 
‘organisation of experiences’ corresponds to these two  aspects of experience.
But Koselleck also uses the two concepts as metahistorical categories for 
investigating the relationship between experience and expectation in the de-
velopment of history, and here there is another and, in my opinion, exciting 
link to be made to Goffman’s sociology. Koselleck’s thesis is that the dis-
tance between experience and expectation becomes ever greater during the 
Modern period (Neuzeit), which is characterised by enlightenment, revolu-
tion, and faith in progress. He speaks of ‘a potential utopian surplus’, and 
writes that ‘[expectation] no longer can […] be satisfactorily deduced from 
previous experience’ (Koselleck, 2004 [1979], p. 268). This undeniably puts 
a finger on a problem in Goffman’s frame perspective, and the question is 
whether this shaky relationship between experience and expectations that 
Koselleck imagines does not better describe Goffman’s frame concept than 
Goffman’s continual reference to the organisation of experiences in order to 
understand what is happening in a situation. Goffman’s question ‘What is 
it that’s going on here?’, the answer to which interacting actors always seem 
to have in their experiences, can with Koselleck’s help be made to reflect the 
kind of contingency that in many ways otherwise characterises Goffman’s 
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analysis and which I have previously described as the dynamic relationship 
between ritualisation and vulnerability. This relationship can most often 
be found at a ‘micro-level’ in Goffman’s sociology, and vulnerability can 
be contingency at the interaction level, on condition that the interacting in-
dividuals are aware of it/have experienced it. When it comes to Goffman’s 
later analyses of social interaction in public places, however, connections 
are also made to contingency at a societal level.
Contingency: the social climate of public places and the 
transformation of the gaze
Contingency, certainty, ontological uncertainty, security, fear, risk, and trust 
are all frequent themes in late modern sociology and are usually  connected 
to the modernisation of society and, in its wake, to, for example, individualis-
ation, globalisation, rationalisation, commodification (see, e.g., Bauman, 1989, 
2006, 2007; Beck, 1992 [1986]; Giddens, 1990). Goffman did not contribute to 
this particular sociological theorising – he died before the above-mentioned 
sociologists came to dominate the stage. But at the beginning of the 1970s a 
kind of contingency theme appears in his texts, e.g., in the chapter ‘Normal 
Appearances’ in his book Relations in Public, and then as a problematisation 
of the atmosphere of interaction in public places that connects ‘micro’- and 
‘macro’-sociological perspectives. In this chapter, vulnerability is made up of a 
contingency at the ‘micro-level’ that is charged by chains of events from differ-
ent places in society, such as plane hijackings, gang wars, and street violence, 
and that affects interaction – not least eye work – in public places.
The gaze has a special role when it comes to interaction in public places 
or places where strangers meet. One of the best-known historical works that 
deals with this theme is Norbert Elias’s study of the gradual civilising pro-
cess of Western society during the most recent half millennium, where he 
argues that what has determined the civilising development of the West is 
people’s growing mutual dependence on each other combined with violence 
being largely removed from everyday social interplay. The growing mutual 
dependence, then, refers precisely to individuals who do not have close rela-
tionships with one another. When it comes to violence, argues Elias (1982, 
p. 238), this has been confined to barracks and only intervenes in the life of 
the individual in emergency situations. A social mechanism thus comes into 
existence, he writes, ‘in which the constraints between people are lastingly 
transformed into self-constraints’ (Elias, 1982, p. 242f). The mechanism is 
portrayed as more coercive than human will or reason, but Elias does not 
quite explain what happens when mutual dependence results in social inter-
action free of violence, and violence in the form of self-discipline is trans-
ferred inside human beings. Is this a mechanism in a person’s psychological 
equipment or in the social structure or both?
Those familiar with Elias’s descriptions of how sociological research 
should be conducted may find reason to answer that the civilising process is 
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an order in both directions. This is because Elias considered the sociological 
object of study to be the mutual dependence between individual and society, 
while he at the same time criticised both structuralist sociology for reifying 
the social structure, and individualist sociology as naïvely egocentric (Elias, 
1978). However, when it comes to the study of the civilising process, Elias is 
not always faithful to his sociological ideal, and he cannot quite hold onto 
a description of the civilising process as a slowly progressing anonymous 
change of the form taken by the mutual dependence between individual and 
society. In part, this has to do with Elias’s capturing his object of study with 
a psychoanalytically tinged conceptual apparatus, and portraying the civ-
ilising process as a kind of psychological change. This change is supposed 
to be a result of coercive changes in social structure. For instance, Elias 
argues that the state’s monopolisation of violence forces individuals to be 
self-controlled, and speaks of a ‘superego’ that represses affect in the spirit 
of social structure. It is therefore possible, without being far too unfaith-
ful to Elias’s account, to interpret the civilising process as a psychological 
change brought about by changes in social structure – a kind of psycholog-
ical process of evolution.
Duerr has based his in many ways convincing criticism of Elias’s work 
on such a reading, and he has tried to find deviations from the pattern Elias 
calls ‘the raising of the shame threshold’. Duerr tries to show empirically 
that the shame threshold in certain respects has been lowered, and he there-
fore writes about ‘the myth of the civilising process’. He summarises his 
criticism in the following way: ‘I have not claimed that nothing has changed 
in history, but that these changes – when taking a long view – cannot be 
described using an evolutionary curve’ (Duerr, 1996, p. 17). Furthermore, 
Duerr claims that modernisation means a weakening or even a dissolution 
of social control that increases the opportunities for acting with impunity in 
an uncivilised manner:
It is difficult to see why the levelling of power relations should lead to 
shame thresholds being raised and not lowered. Because before whom 
should people feel ashamed when there no longer tends to be anyone 
controlling them or exercising power over them? (Duerr 1998, p. 13f)
With reference to the widespread anonymity and alienation in modern 
 society he also claims that ‘“the eye of the village” is a much more perfect 
instrument of surveillance than the “thousand eyes” of the great anonymous 
society’ (Duerr, 1998, p. 20f). In summary, it can be said that Elias and  Duerr 
each emphasises his own aspect of the two that Durkheim (1964) argued 
were linked to the increasing differentiation in the modern development of 
society: simultaneous social solidarity and anomie. Elias argues that the or-
ganic solidarity following from differentiation has a civilising effect, while 
Duerr rather is of the opinion that differentiation leads to a kind of anomie 
and moral laxness which makes the individual invisible as a moral subject.
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Here there is reason to refer to Goffman’s studies of social interaction 
in public places, and above all to the ‘eye work’ of civil inattention and to 
changes of this in times of contingency. In a public place strangers meet in 
passing, which is the central characteristic of this kind of encounter, and in 
general these people are going somewhere else and have different aims than 
meeting strangers in that public place. Because all the others are, in some 
sense, obstacles in one another’s paths, interaction in a public place has to 
do with avoiding others in a smooth and easy way and, in general, avoiding 
ending up in a conflict with someone.
At the same time one has to ask what it means to see others. If we are to 
believe Sartre, it means primarily seeing the Other as an object and then 
becoming aware of that Other as a subject because the Other also sees me 
(Sartre, 1966[1956], p. 340ff). The gaze that, according to Goffman, is at 
work in public places both sees the other person in order to show that he 
or she exists, and does not see her or him out of respect. Civil inattention is 
the concept Goffman uses in order to describe how we act when we simul-
taneously see and do not see another person. When I, for instance, pass a 
stranger on the pavement I show him or her civil inattention by first quickly 
scanning her or him with my gaze to show the other person that he or she 
has been seen, only to thereafter look down, thus showing the other person 
that she or he is not the subject of any special interest (Goffman, 1963a, p. 
84f). In the book Relations in Public the analysis of the interaction  order of 
civil inattention is developed further by linking it to the normality of one’s 
behaviour in public places, and the other person’s normal performance 
means ‘that it is safe and sound to continue on with the activity at hand with 
only peripheral attention given to checking up on the stability of the envi-
ronment’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 239). Civil inattention is thus both something 
one can expect from other people if one behaves normally, and something 
oneself gives to other people that behave normally. It thus has the character 
of a kind of symbolic gift exchange. On the other hand, a person who be-
haves abnormally can expect other people to either stare intently or become 
temporarily blind.
Goffman defines normality in public places with reference to individual 
activity consisting of two simultaneous aspects: ‘going about one’s business’ 
and ‘becoming alarmed’. Depending on the situation and the situational 
definition, ‘going about one’s business’ or ‘becoming alarmed’ come to the 
fore. When individuals go about doing something, they simultaneously sur-
vey their surroundings using their senses in order to reassure themselves that 
there is no reason to be alarmed. Other unknown people in the  surroundings 
are always an element of uncertainty, and an individual’s surveillance of 
other people has to do with assuring her- or himself that anything other than 
initial attention is superfluous. Consequently, normality consists of things 
to which we have no reason to give other than fleeting attention. This is an 
extremely elastic definition of normality which in its actual content varies 
over time, between different cultures, societies, generations, people, and in 
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other ways. Civil inattention can also be expressed in the kind of actions 
that Goffman captures with the words, ‘when bodies are naked, glances are 
clothed’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 46), and in this lies a kind of respect towards the, 
at least for the moment, deviant,11 but also a mutual work to maintain order 
in interaction. This mutual work can also include different remedial activ-
ities after the interaction order has been violated. This consists of things 
such as apologies, exclamations (‘Whoops!’), and attempts to save the situ-
ation and thus the face of the violator of the norm: ‘When an interactional 
offense occurs, everyone directly involved may be ready to assume guilt and 
to offer reparation’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 108).
This far, Goffman’s analysis stays within the frame of the theme of po-
liteness and respect that characterised especially his texts from the 1950s on 
face-work and respectful behaviour. But in Relations in Public Goffman is 
nevertheless more interested than previously in deviations from the  social 
interaction of civil inattention. He begins by stating that interaction in 
 public places is a neglected area when it comes to research, but that at the 
end of the 1960s it was given attention because of the ‘unsafety and incivil-
ity of our city streets’, and, furthermore, that these streets have developed 
from being an exemplary area for social interaction into a battlefield. From 
this Goffman draws the following conclusion: ‘It would seem a good time 
to develop the interaction ethology needed if we are to study this domain 
naturalistically’ (Goffman, 1971, p. xii). The driving force here seems to be a 
lack of recognition, and the description of the decline of public places is not 
difficult to recognise today:
The vulnerability of public life is what we are coming more and more 
to see, if only because we are becoming more aware of the areas and 
intricacies of mutual trust presupposed in public order. Certainly cir-
cumstances can arise which undermine the ease that individuals have 
within their Umwelt. Some of these circumstances are currently found 
in the semi-public places within slum housing developments and slum 
neighborhoods, and there is no intrinsic reason why some of these 
sources of alarm (as well as some additional ones) cannot come to be 
found in the residential community of the respectable classes, caus-
ing the fragile character of domestic settings to be evident there, too. 
 Certainly the great public forums of our society, the downtown areas 
of our cities, can come to be uneasy places. Militantly sustained an-
tagonisms  between diffusely intermingled major population segments – 
young and old, male and female, white and black, impoverished and 
well-off – can cause those in public gatherings to distrust (and to fear 
they are distrusted by) the persons standing next to them. The forms 
of civil inattention, of persons circumspectly treating one another with 
polite and glancing concern while each goes about his own separate 
business, may be maintained, but behind these normal appearances in-
dividuals can come to be at the ready, poised to flee or to fight back if 
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necessary. And in place of unconcern there can be alarm – until, that is, 
the streets are redefined as naturally precarious places, and a high level 
of risk becomes routine. (Goffman, 1971, p. 331f)
The mechanisms that create social unrest and contingency may very well be 
events on a completely different level than the interaction order, which is, as 
it were, charged at a distance and creates prerequisites for different trans-
formations of and departures from the order. Much later Bauman described 
how the state, as an answer to the increasingly risky western societies, is try-
ing to legitimise its existence by phasing out the welfare state and replacing 
it with a kind of ‘personal safety state’ (Bauman, 2007, p. 15).
Goffman also refers to changes in the public interaction order that have 
led to ‘citizens at large having learned the sociological lesson that their 
easefulness had been dependent all along on the self-restraint sustained by 
 potential offenders’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 290). Civil inattention could thus be 
exploited by people who no longer feel the pressure or need to submit to the 
self-discipline that the public interaction order presumes. Civil inattention 
is then transformed into something that replaces interventions or escape, 
and becomes the shell within which fearful individuals can continue to con-
tribute to the maintenance of the interaction order. The politely downcast 
eyes change their meaning: I am here but I do not present a challenge. The 
interaction order is suddenly more akin to the one Elijah Anderson calls ‘the 
code of the street’ than to Goffman’s:
Many people, particularly those who see themselves as more economi-
cally privileged than others in the community, are careful not to let their 
eyes stray, in order to avoid an uncomfortable situation. As they walk 
down the street they pretend not to see other pedestrians. (Anderson, 
1990, p. 220)
Consequently, the gaze of which Sartre spoke changes meaning: the reluc-
tance to be seen as a subject makes me blind to the Other, and turns that 
Other and thus myself into objects. Because it is as a subject that I might end 
up in situations where I am challenged or threatened, and through a kind of 
self-objectification I can avoid such situations and at the same time be pres-
ent. Civil inattention is thereby framed as fearful inattention. Obviously, 
counter-forces arise, and Elijah Anderson has described how in an ever more 
hostile social climate in certain public places – charged with  ‘macrosocial’ 
events such as unemployment, social exclusion, increasing competition in 
every possible area, increasing violence among hostile groups, and public 
places being abandoned by individuals who could serve as counter-forces – 
the kind of islands that Anderson calls ‘cosmopolitan canopies’ are created 
amongst the contingency. His most prominent empirical illustration is the 
Reading Terminal in Philadelphia: ‘This is a calm environment of equiva-
lent, symmetrical relationships – a respite from the streets outside’. And he 
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describes its social atmosphere: ‘The mass of pedestrians moves about, see-
ing but not seeing, paying what Erving Goffman called “civil inattention”‘ 
(Anderson, 2011, pp. 33, 11). Moreover, I like to add, framing the Reading 
Terminal as a peaceful place.
Frame and framing
The feeling of contingency that we find in Relations in Public from 1971 (and 
to which Goffman later refers in ‘The Interaction Order’ from 1983) also 
characterises Frame Analysis. It is true that the key question of the book, 
‘What is it that’s going on here?’, is reserved for individuals’ readings of 
interaction situations, but it can also be seen as a reflection of contingency 
on the eve of current changes in society and the interaction order that affect 
interaction situations.12 It is worth repeating Koselleck’s words: ‘no longer 
can expectation be satisfactorily deduced from previous experience’. If this 
is the case, which subsequently has been indicated by the strong emphasis 
in sociological research on the contingency in late modern societies, there 
is reason to downplay ‘frame’ somewhat as the organisation of experiences, 
because it is not quite sufficient for capturing the sense of contemporary 
times, and to instead emphasise ‘framing’. The less frames can be connected 
to experience, the more need for framing. Framing then means the active, 
socially interactive doing of temporary situational frames that govern social 
interaction, and thus the framing of social interaction can reflect changes 
in society. Due to lack of space, I can here only point to some general simi-
larities between Goffman’s frame perspective and Latour’s Actor-Network- 
Theory in his book Reassembling the Social. (This fascinating title could 
in some ways work as a description of framing.) Both claim that the social 
(Latour) and social interaction (Goffman) can be studied in its own right. 
Moreover, Latour criticises sharply, and sometimes kind of rigidly, some 
sociologists’ tendency to reduce the social to the societal and writes:
If connections are established between sites, it should be done through 
more descriptions, not by suddenly taking a free ride through all- terrain 
entities like Society, Capitalism, Empire, Norms, Individualism, Fields, 
and so on. […]The name of the game is not reduction, but irreduction. 
(Latour, 2007 [2005], p. 137)
Goffman probably wouldn’t completely agree with Latour, but as a newly 
elected chair of the American Sociological Association, he pointed out 
that his colleagues hadn’t been enthusiastic of his claim of a ‘face-to-face 
domain’ as an empirical category that could be studied in its own right 
 (Goffman, 1983b, p. 2).
One reason why Frame Analysis has not elicited and does not elicit as 
much fascination as several other books by Goffman may be that it is, to a 
rather great extent, expressed in terms of nouns rather than verbs; in other 
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words, it focuses more on frame than on framing, more on conditions than 
on processes in the making. Several of Goffman’s other books often deal 
with and strongly emphasise something that is just about to happen.  Several 
of the concepts he invented mirror that: e.g., impression management 
 (Goffman, 1959), primary and secondary adjustments (Goffman, 1961a), 
gaming  (Goffman, 1961b), stigma management, fitting in (Goffman, 1963b), 
social gathering (Goffman, 1963a), action (Goffman, 1967), going about 
one’s business and becoming alarmed (Goffman, 1971), gender displays 
(Goffman, 1979b), and footing (Goffman, 1979a). Goffman was perhaps 
aware of this difference when he in the opening chapter of Frame Analysis 
ironically, but no less fairly, criticises his own book:
There are lots of good grounds for doubting the kind of analysis about 
to be presented. I would do so myself if it weren’t my own. It is too 
bookish, too general, too removed from fieldwork to have a good 
chance of being anything more than another mentalistic adumbration. 
[…]  Nonetheless, some of the things in this world seem to urge the anal-
ysis I am here attempting, and the compulsion is strong to try to outline 
the framework that will perform this job, even if this means some other 
tasks get handled badly. (Goffman, 1974, p. 13)
In this context there is a point in also emphasising the difference between 
analysis and the object of the analysis – i.e., frame analysis and frame. 
 Presented in this manner, the book Frame Analysis, as has already been men-
tioned, deals with the actual form of analysis that makes apparent the frame 
or frames that govern situations in which individuals interact with each 
other. There are, however, exceptions: in particular Chapter 10,  ‘Breaking 
Frame’, and Chapter 11, ‘The Vulnerabilities of Experience’, which are more 
about framing. It is true that the question that is completely central in Frame 
Analysis – What is it that’s going on here? – can be answered with reference 
to one or another frame, but the very dynamics of the situation shared by the 
actors are lost if we do not simultaneously imagine how the actors construct 
and reconstruct the situation by defining it in relation to their experiences 
and to other people, make tacit agreements, adapt to the moment, withhold 
their own opinions in order to save the situation, leave it in protest, and 
many, many other things. In some sense they construct the frame when they 
apply it in agreement with other people, but then the frame simultaneously 
develops and is transformed by being adapted to the situation. Again, it is of 
great importance how a reader chooses to frame Frame Analysis.
Some of the stilted impressions given by Frame Analysis would possibly 
disappear if one in parallel to frame were to speak about framing, in a way 
similar to that in which Goffman differentiates between game and gaming, 
where the former represents the rules of the game and the latter playing the 
game in its social context. In Frame Analysis Goffman talks about keying in 
approximately the way I here argue that one could talk about framing, but 
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the problem is that Goffman reserves the concept of keying for what can be 
called an open code shift of the situation, and thereby differentiates it from 
so-called fabrications, where one or more people are unaware of the code 
shift. This differentiation is probably important in the systematising phase 
of an analysis – and Goffman was very systematic in his analyses13 – but 
when the concept of keying refers exclusively to a single aspect of the trans-
formation of frames it cannot replace framing.
Framing has to do with transforming social situations or preventing them 
from being transformed, and could be exemplified with several of  Goffman’s 
own more process-related and dynamic concepts. Remedial work is such 
a concept, and this can form a model for framing. This concept describes 
the remedial work that interacting individuals perform when norms have 
been violated: ‘The function of remedial work is to change the meaning that 
otherwise might be given to an act, transforming what could be seen as of-
fensive into what can be seen as acceptable’ (Goffman, 1971, p. 109). This 
description captures the very idea of framing. In Frame Analysis the dynam-
ics of framing can also be glimpsed occasionally; for instance, here, in the 
chapter ‘Breaking Frame’:
when an individual misframes events, his subsequent action will break 
the frame […]. He cannot rely on an unmanaged relationship between 
his own behavior and the scene in which it occurs, since the mutual con-
sistency which ordinarily comes without apparent effort must now be 
consciously achieved and consciously sustained. (1974, p. 348)
I want to get at and emphasise the process-oriented in Goffman’s frame 
 perspective, where frame is transformed into framing – as in the quote 
above. In the following three chapters I present three of my own studies, 
where I  attempt in different ways to apply framing in analyses of social me-
dia, online chess, and the exercise of power.
Notes
 1 Kim (2003) provides an overview of these different positions.
 2 Metareflection and metasociality can be seen as two different methods for find-
ing out what is happening in a situation. Metasociality is related to Garfinkel’s 
ideas about how to consciously violate the sense of the situation for the purpose 
of ‘making commonplace scenes visible’ (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36f).
 3 The reason for this is the Swedish law that says that between 1 December and 
31 March and whenever there are wintry conditions on the roads, your car must 
be equipped with winter tyres. This creates a certain yearly rhythm in changing 
wheels and tyres and in the flow to and from the workshops that perform this 
work.
 4 This distinction is reminiscent of the one that Lemert (C. C. Lemert, 1997) makes 
between, on the one hand, a layperson’s sociology that deals with an actual and 
practised ability to interact, and, on the other hand, a professional sociology 
that scientifically describes, analyses, reflects on, and interprets the ability to 
interact socially.
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 5 When it comes to continuity in Goffman’s sociology, researchers have often tried 
to subsume it under some earlier great sociologist and/or theoretical school. The 
most recent study of Goffman’s sociological perspective up to now, Deciphering 
Goffman by Ramon Vargas Maseda (2017), is partly doing that by connecting 
Goffman’s work to pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, but principally 
also shares the same ambition as I have here: to show continuity in Goffman’s 
work.
 6 The searches were made on 11 July 2017.
 7 Here one can also mention Bourdieu’s (1990, p. 382) argument about scholastic 
fallacies, which means that researchers do not assume a metaperspective with 
respect to their own activities or to scientific activities in general (but they do to 
other people’s activities if these are the object of study). Bourdieu called these 
epistemic doxa: ‘thinkers leave in a state of unthought […] the presuppositions 
of their thought […] which are acquired through an academic or scholastic expe-
rience, often inscribed in prolongation of an originary (bourgeois) experience of 
distance from the world and from the urgency of necessity’.
 8 Incidentally, Emirbayer writes in his article ‘Manifesto for a Relational  Sociology’ 
(1997, p. 296) that Goffman’s statement ‘could well serve as an epigraph for this 
entire manifesto’.
 9 There are exciting exceptions to this relative timelessness in what Goffman calls 
social sabotage (1974, p. 426ff), which he describes with reference to the crea-
tive sabotages carried out by activist Abbie Hoffman, surrealist André Breton, 
the Female Moral Reform Society, and theatre director and professor Richard 
Schechner’s ‘The Performance Group’, the aim of whom was both cognitive 
and social transgression. Calling their acts sabotage seems to define them as 
exceptions. 
 10 This expression cannot be found in the English edition and has therefore been 
translated into English by the present author from the German original edition.
 11 Here there is again reason to actualise the lack of – or possibly only the implicit-
ness of – a temporal perspective in Goffman’s analysis. If one were to ask, ‘How 
long are glances clothed when bodies are naked?’, the drawback of exclusively 
applying a spatial perspective – which is what Goffman does here by focusing on 
the corporeal encounter – is made apparent.
 12 Goffman was good at linking his sociology to the spirit of the times, and when 
it comes to the above-mentioned question it had been posed in popular culture 
by, among others, Bob Dylan in ‘Ballad of a Thin Man’ from 1965 (‘Something 
is happening here but you don’t know what it is. Do you, Mr. Jones?’), and by 
Stephen Stills in ‘For What It’s Worth’ from 1966 (‘There’s something happening 
here, but what it is ain’t exactly clear’).
 13 When Denzin and Keller (1981, p. 56), with reference to systematics and classifi-
cation, call Goffman ‘a Linnaean structural biologist’, Goffman answers (1981c, 
p. 67) that this is nothing to be ashamed of. 
Part III
Framing social media, online 
chess, and power

I have just checkmated my opponent in a game of online chess and get the 
following message via chat: ‘I will rape your mom ok?’, and three seconds 
later a mail: ‘hey my friend – I will rape your mom and after that, kill her!’.1 
This does not happen very often because most people on Lichess are mainly 
interested in chess, but when it does happen I always think a bit dramat-
ically that on the Internet there are no obstacles to a kind of ‘dark force’ 
that lies in wait to spread its crude message. On the chess site the players 
are anonymous, and it ‘costs’ them very little to threaten my mother’s life 
(who  incidentally has been dead for twenty years). However, on a closed site 
with around 15,000 members where higher education is discussed by, in many 
cases, named  individuals who work in universities and university colleges, 
this dark force also lies in wait. When things go south there, the tone is not as 
rough as at the chess site, but it is very often destructive, conspiratorial, and 
impossible to, even with the best of wills, perceive as a bad joke. There always 
seem to be people here who cannot stomach constructive conversations and 
who lie in wait with negative comments, often without having any other basis 
for their statements than their own experiences. In connection with one of 
the doctoral students at my department defending his thesis, the contents of 
the thesis were presented in a press release from the University and shared 
on this higher education site. The thesis, existing on the borderland between 
the humanities and social sciences and, among other things, based on a sig-
nificant amount of archival material, with articles from newspapers and pe-
riodicals whose discourse is analysed, was immediately dragged through the 
mud, with comments, mainly from men, coming thick and fast in a kind of 
self-generating downward spiral. Far-reaching conclusions about the thesis 
were presented, and most of the comments were loose and evasive – of the 
kind that do not need substantiation. There seemed to be no constructive 
intention, nor any curiosity:  someone has written a thesis I haven’t read but 
for some unclear reason don’t like, come on guys let’s destroy the damn thing!
Because the thesis was available in full text online, and a link was pro-
vided in the press release that had been shared, I could not help asking 
whether any of those who commented on the thesis also had read it. There 
was silence and the atmosphere soured in spite of it already being at the bot-
tom, but then one person answered that he had read very little of the thesis. 
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Another had skimmed it and added that nobody does anything else today – 
not even the people in the examination committee. I asked, ‘So you mean 
that skimming is enough of a basis for your claim that the thesis is “a dyed-
in-the-wool pseudo analysis in the spirit of post-modernism?”‘. ‘Yes,’ an-
swered the named man, who claimed to be a professor of a technical subject 
and who completely lacks the expertise in the subject required to act as a 
member of the examination committee.
These are only two recent examples that I have experienced myself, but it 
seems that one could make an almost endless list of examples like these if 
one listens to the ongoing public conversation about harassment and per-
sonal integrity in social media. The scope of and reasons for this phenom-
enon are under discussion. What is, for example, the driving force of men 
who in groups attack women online? Many have themselves experienced 
harassment online, but how serious should this be in order for us to be able 
to talk about trolling? In Sweden a 650-page public enquiry has suggested 
a number of new penalties in order to increase protection for people’s in-
tegrity online and counteract harassment, illicit threats, and defamation 
 (Integritet och straffskydd (SOU 2016:7) [Integrity and Protection Provided 
by Criminal Law], 2016). Quite a lot of research is being done on this topic, 
and one of the latest articles is summarised as follows by the researchers:
In online communities, antisocial behavior such as trolling disrupts 
constructive discussion. While prior work suggests that trolling behav-
ior is confined to a vocal and antisocial minority, we demonstrate that 
ordinary people can engage in such behavior as well. We propose two 
primary trigger mechanisms: the individual’s mood, and the surround-
ing context of a discussion (e.g., exposure to prior trolling behavior). 
(Cheng, Bernstein, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, & Leskovec, 2017)
In The Wall Street Journal the results of these researchers were presented un-
der the heading, ‘We’re All Internet Trolls (Sometimes)’ (Mims, 2017). The 
researchers undeniably have a point in that it is not exclusively an ‘antisocial 
minority’ but also ‘ordinary people’ who engage in harassment  online. That 
everyone at some time or another is an Internet troll is, however, a significant 
overstatement that will have to be attributed to the media. Perhaps the writer 
of the headline meant that everyone could become Internet trolls under the 
right circumstances? In any case, that is what this chapter is about: the in-
teractive frame that seems to create prerequisites for a new interaction order 
on the Internet. In this and in the following chapter I will compare social 
interaction face-to-face with interaction in social media based in part on my 
own participant observations and in part on Goffman’s frame perspective.
Broad and narrow transmission of expressions
Goffman’s studies focus on interaction among people who are in immedi-
ate physical proximity to one another, so close that they can see, hear, and 
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touch each other and smell each other’s scents. Along with speech, a per-
son’s face is the single most important element in such interactions. It is 
our faces we turn towards the person we interact and communicate with, in 
order to be able to perceive the other person and assure ourselves that the 
other person also perceives us. To Goffman the face-work of the individual 
is therefore of vital importance, and he defines it as ‘the actions taken by a 
person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face’ (1955a, p. 216).
The social information that an individual can acquire about another 
individual in face-to-face encounters is conveyed, as has been mentioned 
earlier, through two different kinds of expressions. Expressions given are 
verbal and symbolic, which the individual controls to a rather high degree 
and uses in order to express information. Expressions given off are verbal 
and symbolic, which can be interpreted and to a greater extent controlled 
by other people precisely as symptomatic or non-symptomatic expressions 
of the individual who transmits them. Expressions given off can be a dia-
lect, the choice of words, slips of the tongue, and quite a few of the things 
that the body does – perspires, laughs, shakes, cries, rumbles, farts, blushes, 
and looks – sometimes against our will, and that we for that precise reason 
try to control. These expressions can in a particular interaction be inter-
preted by others as symptomatic of one thing or another. We can probably 
all recall when we, for instance, have been unable to avoid bursting out into 
uncontrolled laughter or have tried to ‘correct’ our dialects.
Goffman writes that the very acts of existence produce expressions: 
 ‘Individuals […] exude expressions’ (1970 [1969], p. 5) and in another context 
he writes: ‘Performers can stop giving expressions but cannot stop giving 
them off’ (1959, p. 108). Even silence can be an expression given off in cases 
where choosing between speaking and silence is essential. The richest interac-
tion in terms of expressions given off is interaction face-to-face (f2f), since all 
the senses are (or can be) acted upon during the interaction. This is one frame 
for social interaction and in what follows I will compare the f2f frame with in-
teraction in social media, which I call interaction persona-to-persona (p2p).2
In his article ‘Replies and Responses’ Goffman offers a detailed analysis 
of the conditions that prevail in a face-to-face conversation, which I will 
use as an instrument to compare interaction face-to-face with persona-to- 
persona. He chooses to view the conversation as a system whose function 
requires that the following conditions be met:
1  A two-way capability for transceiving acoustically adequate and readily 
interpretable messages.
2  Back-channel feedback capabilities for informing on reception while it 
is occurring.
3  Contact signals: means of announcing the seeking of a channeled 
 connection, means of ratifying that the sought-for channel is now 
open, means of closing off a theretofore open channel. Included here, 
 identification-authentication signs.
104 Framing social media, online chess, and power
4  Turnover signals: means to indicate ending of a message and the taking 
over of the sending role by next speaker. […]
5  Preemption signals: means of inducing a rerun, holding off channel 
 requests, interrupting a talker in progress.
6  Framing capabilities: cues distinguishing special readings to apply across 
strips of bracketed communication, recasting otherwise conventional 
sense, as in making ironic asides, quoting another, joking, and so forth; 
and hearer signals that the resulting transformation has been followed.
7  Norms obliging respondents to reply honestly with whatever they know 
that is relevant and no more.
8  Non-participant constraints regarding eavesdropping, competing 
noises, and the blocking of pathways for eye-to-eye signals. (Goffman, 
1976, pp. 264 – 265)
Goffman describes the conversation here in a highly technical manner,3 
which is done for analytical purposes so that we can see the component 
elements as clearly as possible. We can use this description as a coarse tool 
to compare face-to-face-interaction (f2f) on the one hand and persona-to- 
persona interaction (p2p) as it occurs in social media on the other:
Table 7.1  Comparison of f2f and p2p
System requirements for talk as a 
communication system
F2F P2P (as it occurs in social media)
1 two-way transceiving 
capability
Yes Yes
2 back-channel feedback 
capabilities
Yes Limited, since the interacting 
individuals are not in one another’s 
physical presence.
3 contact signals Yes Yes
4 turnover signals Yes Yes, but the turn-taking will work 
mechanically due to technical 
limitations.
5 preemption signals Yes Yes, but it is not, for instance, possible 
to interrupt anyone in the middle 
of their ‘speech’, and interruptions 
can occur only after the post has 
been completed. The character of 
the interruption is different because 
it has to be indicated by a change in 
subject or the interactant actually 
states that there is going to be an 
interruption. 
6 framing capabilities Yes Limited, but present with the help of 
emoticons and emojis.
7 norms obliging honesty Yes Yes, but more difficult to monitor 
compliance, given the minimal social 
information.
8 non-participant constraints Yes Yes, with the help of various technical 
solutions.
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Both f2f and p2p correspond to the system requirements formulated by 
Goffman with regard to conversation as a communication system, although 
p2p is limited in various respects.
The overall differences can generally be reflected using two metaphors: 
f2f may be described as an encounter between two flows of different types 
of expressions – given and given off – while p2p can be likened to a ping-
pong communication model in which the technical limitations on the flows 
of expression make the transitions in terms of turn-taking, framing, and 
back-channel cues highly distinct and mechanical. The flow from one per-
son to another in f2f actually consists of two parallel streams that can have 
the same or contradictory messages. Metacommunication (communication 
about the ongoing communication) is also possible in that one person in-
volved in f2f can, so to speak, comment on one stream of expression with 
the help of the other stream. To conclude: f2f and p2p are very different 
communicative situations – they are two different frames for interaction. 
In conversations between people who are in physical proximity to one an-
other, everything flows into each other and is held together by the situation 
being shared by the conversationalists. Take, for instance, the apparently 
trivial question ‘What’s the time?’ and the answer ‘Five’. This conversational 
 sequence requires a specific context, a particular situation that is shared 
by the actors. To illustrate this, I posted the question ‘What’s the time?’ on 
Twitter and Facebook and did not get the implicied response, but rather 
mostly silence and in some cases, reflections on how we organise time, such 
as ‘It’s five o’clock here, don’t know what time it is by you’ or ‘As I read 
your e-mail the time is six o’clock, but I see that you sent it at five’ (see also 
Castells, 1996, ch. 7). Also the seemingly trivial question of what time it 
is presupposes a mutual spatial framing in order to be meaningful. Like 
everything else, the framing must thus be re-created linguistically in p2p 
interactions.
Differences between f2f and p2p in terms of the capacity to send and 
transmit expressions have a major impact on the communicative situation 
of the interacting individuals. We can speak of two interaction frames: first 
broad transmission, in the sense that, face-to-face, we share the situation and 
thus transmit a large volume of expressions to one another, and second the 
less expression-rich interactions in social media: narrow transmission, which 
is narrow in the sense that it consists to a greater extent of expressions given 
and to a lesser extent of expressions given off.
Oversharing: connecting backstage regions frontstage
In an earlier study I have shown that the boundary between the private 
and the public – in other words front- and backstage – tends to be drawn 
in a different way in p2p than in f2f (Persson, 2012a). The communica-
tive situation in social media might be likened to a situation in which 
individuals in an apartment complex sit inside their own apartments and 
communicate with one another by calling out through windows that are 
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open onto a common area. Any location can serve as a node in a social 
online network, given the technical options. The node is often located 
in the user’s home, and that very circumstance should have a bearing on 
how the user communicates, specifically in that the user is often present 
in a private backstage area, communicating with others in the same sit-
uation. However, the communication may also be experienced by others 
in a manner akin to the situation in the apartment complex above, and in 
that sense the user is frontstage. One might say that social media often 
connect back regions in the front region. But there are ways to prevent 
transgression of the boundary between private and public in some social 
media; e.g. Facebook, where there are possibilities to exclude and include 
persons from your flow.
The interaction order – at least in its polite and respectful Goffman 
 version – is being subjected to a change pressure in social media. In f2f in-
teraction, the interactors can transmit information to one another through 
body language, and such information can enforce norms and make it 
known that certain behaviours are inappropriate; for example, through 
glances, facial expressions, and bodily movements, and this can occur at 
the same time as verbal expressions are being sent. The ping-pong model 
of interaction in the context of social media entails the interactor writ-
ing something (give expressions) before other interactors can in turn write 
back. There is, as shown, very little opportunity for the parallel sending 
and transmission of expressions, and thus little or no opportunity for 
back-channel cues. First of all, this means that the one party must send 
out (write) too much before it becomes possible to make adjustments, and 
it may be that the boundary between front- and backstage has already been 
overstepped. In other words there are no mechanisms in social media to 
correct  wrongdoings while doing them. Second, the efforts of others to 
make adjustments cannot occur until after the limits of what is deemed 
proper have already been overstepped, with the result that the person over-
stepping the border will likely lose face, and thus must choose between 
apology and defence, rather than between ‘will I say/write this?’ and ‘will 
I not?’. In the context of this discussion, the forms of interaction that are 
peculiar to social media lead, in theory, to a rapid escalation of conflict, 
thereby creating special conditions for civil inattention. Such interactions 
are wordless and require physical proximity, and it remains to be deter-
mined whether civil inattention can be exercised in social media and, if 
so, how. I would imagine that some form of civil inattention occurs in so-
cial media through ‘silence’ – that is, one interactor choosing not to try to 
rectify transgressions of the boundary between front- and backstage. It 
is, however, possible that such an attempt at informative silence could be 
interpreted as approval of the transgression. This may be due in part to the 
fact that informative silence in f2f is never just silence, because the verbal 
silence is instead supported by expressions given off. The body is thus not 
silent when it is in physical proximity to other bodies. Nor is the body 
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silent in social media, but there is no one else who can ‘hear’ or scan it, with 
the result that silence in p2p interaction is probably not an informative but 
an actual silence.
Unsignificant others and ratified participants
Like the rest of society, social media can be divided into places that are 
more private or more public, where people thus meet known and unknown 
others. Like so many other things in late modern societies, the individual 
chooses whether he or she wants to participate in social media communi-
cation or not. It is possible to remain outside, but others can choose to, 
e.g., publish a picture on Instagram of a person who has chosen to remain 
outside – but social media is, in spite of this, more selective than f2f in-
teractions. Social media that are more private can be likened to families, 
associations, and organisations, to which access is more or less regulated. 
For instance,  Facebook has a number of choices that its users can make that 
regulate who has access to the user’s own Facebook space. Social media 
can also be  completely open, and can then be likened to public places, to 
which ‘everyone’ has access. There are intermediate forms, such as, e.g., a 
closed group with 20,000 members where all of the users are naturally not 
acquainted with one another. It thus appears to be just as complicated to 
comprehensively define what a public or private place is in f2f as in p2p, 
because there are intermediate forms with regard to the relationships of the 
individuals involved. As Goffman was studying social interaction in public 
places, his results – concepts and definitions – can be used to some extent in 
order to understand social interaction in social media, in spite of his studies 
being conducted forty to seventy years ago.
When Goffman in the chapter ‘Normal Appearances’ describes interac-
tion in public places, he says that George Herbert Mead ‘must be our guide’, 
and continues,
What the individual is for himself is not something that he invented. It 
is what his significant others have come to see he should be, what they 
have come to treat him as being, and what, in consequence, he must 
treat himself as being if he is to deal with their dealings with him. Mead 
was wrong only in thinking that the only relevant others are ones who 
are concerned to give sustained and pointed attention to the individual. 
There are other others, namely, those who are concerned to find in him 
someone unalarming whom they can disattend in order to be free to get 
on with other matters. So what the individual in part must come to be 
for himself is someone whose appearances are ones his others can see as 
normal. (Goffman, 1971, p. 279)
What kind of people are these other others that Goffman mentions? They 
are people we encounter in public places, and to whom we have an objective 
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relationship, because we equate them with things such as bicycles, lamp 
posts, and other things over which we have to have a certain degree of con-
trol when we move about in such places. In a way, they are a kind of non- 
persons, because we generally do not want anything with respect to them 
other than fleetingly and in passing noticing them, and they generally do 
not want anything else with respect to us either. In this sense there is an 
unspoken mutuality that expresses itself in civil inattention, avoidance, and 
non-seeing. At the same time, this objective relationship in a public place 
can be turned into social interaction.
We can determine the individuals in public places on the basis of Mead’s 
differentiation between the significant other and the generalised other. 
 Significant others are people who have a particular significance to us in our 
role-taking, as positive and/or negative role models. Mead describes the 
generalised other, on the other hand, as ‘the attitude of the whole commu-
nity’, in which an individual also has to mirror her- or himself, and it is 
‘in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining 
factor into the individual’s thinking’ (Mead, 1962 [1934], pp. 154, 155). The 
difference between significant and generalised other is, to put it simply, like 
the difference between a model and a set of norms. What Goffman says in 
the quote above is that there is an additional other that we relate to, very 
fleetingly and in passing in public places. He does not give these persons any 
other name than ‘other others’, but I believe that she or he can be called the 
unsignificant other.
What characterises the unsignificant other is that he or she is a per-
son who most of the time does not appear as a person to us but who 
can do so – a potential – which is the reason why I have not chosen the 
 designation insignificant but instead call this figure, who can oscillate 
between unimportant and important, unsignificant. Unsignificant oth-
ers are part of the flow of people we meet in public places. According 
to Goffman (1971, p. 154), these strangers appear indifferent, but can 
be transformed into an audience and are then also transformed into a 
kind of significant others, before which there is reason to mould one’s 
behaviour in accordance with the general norms that are captured pre-
cisely by the concept of the generalised other. The unsignificant other is 
an outsider – the one who in the interactional context neither performs 
nor is the audience. The interaction with unsignificant others has, to a 
great extent, to do with body-to-body interaction, rather than face-to-
face interaction. The unsignificant other is a person without a face and 
a personality, a body we perhaps bump into when we get on the bus or 
whose body heat we can sense when we sit in the free seat recently aban-
doned by the other. Unsignificant others affect us, just as we affect them, 
through their presence in a mutual space or a mutual situation, where we 
are in each other’s immediate physical proximity. They are individuals 
oscillating between being non-persons and persons, with whom one can 
develop some sort of relationship.
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As has been mentioned previously, Goffman uses the concepts focused 
and unfocused interaction in order to describe the difference between var-
ious degrees of commitment in interactions; e.g., in a public place where 
 unfocused interaction implies dealing with a shared presence, a non- 
encounter. Focused interaction, on the other hand, is an f2f meeting be-
tween people. This is developed further in the article ‘Footing’, where 
Goffman, among other things, analyses the difference between ratified par-
ticipants in conversations and bystanders, and how the latter can participate 
in  conversations – that, e.g., take place in a public place – by eavesdropping 
or happening to overhear what is being said. Here p2p differs from f2f, be-
cause in social media either everyone is a ratified participant (in open social 
media), or there are no bystanders (in closed social media). The somewhat 
mechanical character of conversations in social media is thereby confirmed.
Framing social media
In Chapter 6 I pointed to four common elements in Goffman’s frame anal-
ysis, and here I will by way of summary structure the interaction order in 
social media using these elements.
Governing mechanisms are rules and norms etc. that are action-directing 
in social interactions. Interaction f2f and p2p can be seen as two different 
frames that differ in part with respect to governing mechanisms. In social 
media, rules and norms etc. that the people interacting have learned in f2f 
are mixed with special norms and rules that apply to p2p. Among the latter 
can be mentioned ethical rules and netiquette; e.g., Facebook’s community 
standards:
People use Facebook to share their experiences and to raise awareness 
about issues that are important to them. This means that you may en-
counter opinions that are different from yours, which we believe can 
lead to important conversations about difficult topics. To help balance 
the needs, safety, and interests of a diverse community, however, we 
may remove certain kinds of sensitive content or limit the audience that 
sees it. (Facebook community standards, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards, accessed 30 July 2017)
Sensitive content is, e.g., nudity, hate speech, bullying, harassment, threats, 
depictions of violence, etc. In closed groups there are, in addition, regula-
tions. For instance, in the closed Swedish Facebook group ‘Högskoleläckan’ 
[‘University leaks’], the following rules of behaviour apply:
1  We stick to the subject – issues relating to university and university col-
lege activities.
2  We strive to maintain a good tone and show good manners towards 
other debaters. This means that we (a) stick to the subject of the thread 
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of the original poster, (b) are allowed to criticise severely, but in a civi-
lised and objective fashion, (c) do not discriminate among people – it is 
what is written, not who does it, that counts.
3  We do not publicly shame individual people or incite hatred against 
groups.
4  We respect other research orientations by not categorically dismissing 
things we do not agree with or creating insinuating posts without clear 
issues.
5  We do not distribute commercial advertisements even if they are on 
topic.
6  We respect the decisions of the moderators. Report posts that violate 
any of the rules. All members can report posts that deviate from the 
rules of behaviour. Moderators give reprimands and delete inappropri-
ate posts. (accessed 30 July 2017)
As in f2f interaction, rules are rarely completely effective when it comes to 
preventing harassment etc. in p2p interaction. However, the situation within 
which the interaction takes place in f2f differs quite a lot from that in p2p. 
In f2f the interacting parties are in a shared situation at the same time, while 
the situation in p2p to a great extent is influenced by the fact that the par-
ties are in a shared computer network in which the time can vary, because 
the interacting parties may be in any conceivable location while they are 
interacting. Because users in p2p are physically found in locations that to a 
great extent are backstage (enclosed in themselves with a computer or mo-
bile phone) while at the same time they are connected to a network which is 
frontstage to a considerably greater degree, this can lead to oversharing of 
information that would not have been shared f2f.
The performance of the interaction is, largely, affected by the conditions 
for expression transmission in f2f and p2p. In the former, interaction fram-
ing, mainly verbal language and body language are used, and thus there 
is a broad transmission of expressions given and expressions given off. In p2p 
interaction the interaction is performed using written language and symbols – 
i.e., a narrow transmission mainly of expressions given. A wholly central dif-
ference is also that the interaction f2f to a great extent takes place  between 
individuals known to one another, while the interaction p2p consists to a 
greater extent of a mixture of known others and unsignificant others.
The dynamics of the interaction and the situation in p2p interaction have, 
as has been shown by way of comparing Goffman’s description of conver-
sations f2f as a communication system to p2p interaction, the character of a 
ping-pong interaction model that appears mechanical with respect to taking 
turns, reframing the interaction, and feedback hints.
To conclude, the communicative situation of the user in social media is 
paradoxical compared to f2f interaction. On the one hand, the user has 
much greater opportunity to edit the expressions he or she sends out, 
 because of the physical separation of the interactors, thereby enabling 
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highly controlled self-presentations that are – if illusory – hard for the other 
to control. In the physically proximate face-to-face interactions, it is pos-
sible to compare other people’s self-presentations against the highly body-
language-based social information that can be gathered about the person 
with whom one is interacting. Self-presentations are thus less vulnerable in 
p2p, as the interactors are separated in space. On the other hand, the risk 
appears to be greater that the user will send out overly unconsidered ex-
pressions, think out loud, say too much, and become indiscreet because he 
or she is unable to benefit from the expressions given off that we constantly 
receive from (and give to) the others involved in f2f interaction. The amount 
of regulating social feedback decreases markedly in social media, thereby 
increasing the tendency to overshare information and make ill- considered 
comments.
The difference between the communicative situation in interaction face-
to-face and social media is a difference in the way expressions given and 
expressions given off have to be combined. Face-to-face, these different 
kinds of expressions are intertwined because of the physical proximity of 
the interactors, while interaction p2p, in comparison, is characterised by 
oversharing of expressions given and undersharing of expressions given off. 
This tends to create a special information state4 in p2p that differs in certain 
ways from that in f2f and can be likened to intelligence activities, which 
Goffman refers to as a frame described as follows:
Given a well-received, easily understandable message, what light is the 
message to be seen in, what systematic, word-by-word rereading is to be 
given it? Is the sender engaged in what he appears to be doing, namely, 
sending a serious, reliable message. Or is he merely practicing his send-
ing, or engaging in a joke, or sending a false message because he is now 
working for the other side, or sending a message at the point of a gun. 
(Goffman, 1970 [1969], p. 141)
The comparison made in this chapter points to the communicative frame 
that is applied in social media being in several ways similar to intelligence 
activities, and the reason for this is that it is based on a narrow transmis-
sion of impressions. Further, and less dramatic, this frame also resembles 
Goffman’s description, in his doctoral dissertation, of classroom behaviour, 
which:
seems a useful area for study because in a classroom children can be 
observed who have not yet learned to keep themselves in control or re-
spect others and yet are sensitive to the fact that they ought to conduct 
themselves in a mannerly way. (Goffman, 1953, p. 361)
The knowledge among the users of social media is unevenly distributed and, 
consequently, also the possibilities to frame the interaction correctly.
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Notes
 1 Chat and mails at the chess site Lichess, 15 July 2017.
 2 Persona is here defined as a created or an assigned representation of an individ-
ual; e.g., a username, a chosen identity, a picture etc.
 3 He writes: ‘We would thus be dealing with talk as a communications engineer 
might, someone optimistic about the possibility of culture-free formulations’ 
(Goffman, 1976, p. 264).
 4 Goffman (1974, p. 133f) defines ‘information state’ as ‘[…] the knowledge an in-
dividual has of why events have happened as they have, what the current forces 
are, what the properties and intents of the relevant persons are, and what the 
outcome is likely to be’.
Chess is frequently perceived to be a silent and courteous, even chival-
rous, game. The emergence of the game of chess stretches back at least to 
seventh-century India and it is considered to have been known through-
out  Europe since the eleventh century.1 Its diffusion in Europe therefore 
 coincided with the emergence of feudal society after the fall of the Western 
Roman Empire, and the game indeed reflects – in many ways – the class 
and power structure of early feudal society with its three estates: nobility, 
priesthood, and peasantry, together with its royal power. Chess shows great 
stability over time when it comes to rules, moves, and pieces, but does it 
also stay stable when played online? In this chapter I will answer this ques-
tion based on results from several years of playing at two different online 
chess sites. During this time I’ve made participant observations focusing on 
differences between face-to-face chess and online chess, and I draw on the 
same basic differences between face-to-face and persona-to-persona inter-
action that was established in the previous chapter.
In order to grasp different aspects of the game, I have used Goffman’s 
(1961) concept of gaming encounter and, within this concept, the differ-
ence between gaming and game respectively. Goffman describes, as already 
 mentioned, the difference between these two in terms of gaming being 
sticky, whereas game is clean and possible to subject to rules. Goffman’s 
view, based on game theory, is thus only rationalistic in respect of the game 
itself, but not in respect of the playing of the game and it is precisely here that 
questions can be asked where online chess is concerned. The game chess – 
with all its rules – is the same when it is played face-to-face and online. But 
does this apply also to the actual playing of chess?
the identity of chess
Chess has a firm identity but has also changed over time and been sensitive 
to cultural and societal influences. No one has interpreted its many-sided 
character more inspiring than Stefan Zweig:
ancient and yet eternally new, mechanically constituted and yet an ac-
tivity of the imagination alone, limited to a fixed geometric area but 
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unlimited in its permutations, constantly evolving and yet sterile, a 
cogitation producing nothing, a mathematics calculating nothing, an 
art without an artwork, an architecture without substance and yet de-
monstrably more durable in its essence and actual form than all books 
and works, the only game that belongs to all peoples and all eras. (2005 
[1942], p. 15)
As an example can be mentioned the development of the queen. That piece 
was from the beginning called the ‘vizier’2 and was a weak piece, but during 
the period from the year 1,000 to the end of the fifteenth century it became 
the most powerful piece of the game and was called the ‘queen’. The chain of 
events that made this transformation possible have been discussed in a few 
texts: a bit fancifully on psychoanalytic grounds by Colby (1953), and with 
reference to many different sequences of events that enabled this change, 
among other things gender struggles, by Yalom (2004). But during the latest 
two centuries chess has, in the view of Eales (1985, p. 195), demonstrated an 
extraordinary stability. The rules of the game and the pieces have remained 
unchanged since the nineteenth century and, since then the game has come 
to be institutionalised with clubs, competitions, ranking systems, and na-
tional and world championships. In the 1970s the chess world went through 
a transformation, according to Swedish chess journalist and player Lars 
Grahn. In his book on the World Championship qualification game in 1968 
between Russian grandmaster and later world champion Boris Spasskij and 
Danish grandmaster Bent Larsen, he writes about the modest conditions 
that were offered on site in Malmö in Sweden:
No one had got the idea to cover the shabby table with a cloth. It stood 
there naked in all its frailness and since long stripped of the varnish. It 
was the kind of table where you fold out the rickety legs and fasten them 
with wing nuts. It was four years before Spasskij and Fischer played in 
Reykjavik at a specially designed mahogany table with padded arm-
rests of leather and a chessboard sunken in the table top. Four years 
before the revolution in the chess world. (Grahn, 2014, p. 20)
The entry of the computer into the world of chess was one of the twentieth 
century’s great innovations so far as the game was concerned. When the 
chess computer Deep Blue, after three trials, defeated the then world cham-
pion Garry Kasparov in 1997, a possible peak in the rationalisation process 
of chess was achieved. Quite possibly the chess world has still not recovered, 
even if it has been said that chess has been reenchanted again with the victory 
of  Magnus Carlsen, the young Norwegian with his special creative and less ra-
tionalistic playing style, in the World Chess Championship in 2013 (Hall, 2014).
Chess, regarded as a game, is commonly described as being wholly 
 dependent on the skill of the players and as lacking the luck element that ex-
ists in many other games. Chess, in fact, is strictly governed by rules and the 
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rules cannot be influenced by the players, either through negotiation or by 
them bending the rules; all such behaviour is regarded as cheating. A kind 
of respectful silence is also associated with the game. Everyone who has 
played chess knows that it is expected that one is silent during the course of 
the game, since chess is played with the players’ complete concentration and 
any talk can thus be disturbing. There are, in fact, just a few occasions when 
the players may break this silence; for instance, when one of the players 
threatens the other’s king and is then expected to utter a warning by saying 
‘check!’ and when a player offers a draw or resigns. Thus talking, like the 
game itself, is strictly regulated.
For the last fifteen years I have played online chess on occasions, mostly 
under the cloak of anonymity, and I have, therefore, had good reason to 
think about similarities and differences between chess played face-to-face 
(f2f) and chess played persona-to-persona (p2p). In comparing the two I 
use the same instrument that was used in the previous chapter, based on 
 Goffman’s article ‘Replies and Responses’; namely, the two interaction 
frames called broad and narrow transmission of expressions. How is, then, 
the social interaction in online chess framed compared to chess being played 
face-to-face?
Framing social interaction in chess face-to-face and 
persona-to-persona
F2f and p2p represents, as shown, very different communicative situations: 
on the one hand a more or less undifferentiated flow of expressions, and on 
the other hand a ping-pong like way of interaction. What form do these dif-
ferences take when firstly the game of chess is concerned, and secondly the 
playing of chess is focused? In general terms, one could assume that since f2f 
chess is a case of f2f interaction and p2p chess a case of p2p interaction, the 
differences between them are the same as those presented above, but that 
does not appear to be the case.
As mentioned, Goffman differentiates between, on the one hand, 
 gaming – the interactive context that exists in playing and which is described 
as sticky – and, on the other hand, game, the game itself, which is pure and is 
possible to make into a regular activity that does not differ in playing terms 
from one occasion to another. The similarities between chess f2f and p2p 
considered as game are great: the board is the same, the moves are the same, 
the pieces and the game rules likewise.
Chess etiquette and frame disputes
Studying social interaction in online chess is, among other things, studying 
frame disputes.3 The disputes have to do with the different ways that chess 
can be played f2f and p2p and, also, how players frame online chess: some 
players frame online chess as if it is the same as chess face-to-face, while 
116 Framing social media, online chess, and power
others are developing a different kind of chess online. One of the online 
chess sites where I have played had three pre-composed text messages which 
were used when a player wants to offer and accept a draw, to abort the game 
right at the opening, and resign respectively. Superficially, these correspond 
to f2f chess equivalences but the offer of a draw may be used to impose 
stress on the opponent through the text message being sent again and again; 
indeed, twenty times is not uncommon. The equivalent in f2f chess would 
be the opponent saying ‘shall we agree on a draw?’ twenty times, one after 
another! It is almost inconceivable. Likewise in another online chess site 
where you have the possibility to ask your opponent to allow you to do a 
takeback, a possibility unfamiliar to formal f2f chess but not in more infor-
mal situations. Here the frame dispute is very obvious because the wish to 
do a takeback can have several different meanings; e.g., when a grown-up 
helping a child to play chess, chess practice, psyching the opponent (in cases 
where the takeback question is being asked over and over again), and when 
the takeback question is asked after a fatal mistake that would end the game 
and means ‘it would be nice/interesting to continue playing with you’.
Another characteristic in p2p chess is that it appears to be easier to 
continue playing in hopeless situations. It also happens that when a player 
is subject to this, he or she quite simply gives up, despite having won, 
and thus feels sure that the time-wasting opponent learns the lesson that 
 respect for the other player is more important than a match won or lost. 
In a chat on a chess site there is a line of reasoning as follows concerning 
when one should really give up in a chess game online when one has al-
ready lost:
A  ‘I was just wondering, is it generally considered rude to drag out a losing 
online game instead of resigning? I’ ve been getting a lot of that lately. I 
think it’s kind of rude. […]’
B  ‘[…] I never resign no matter what. […]’
C  ‘Perhaps they are simply hoping for a miracle :] And to answer your 
question: Yes, it is a bit rude. But you need to be aware that some people 
don’t know the etiquette … and others just prefer to give their opponents 
as hard of a time as possible.’ (‘Resignation Etiquette, ‘2012)
Chess as a game may thus undergo change somewhat when it is played p2p; 
the moves are the same but the manner of handling offers of a draw, take-
backs, and not resigning respectively, differ from f2f.
As mentioned already, the game of chess f2f has a very clear identity 
and, moreover, in overall terms an indisputable etiquette. The World Chess 
 Federation (FIDE), in particular, gives expression to this in its ‘Laws of 
Chess’. Everything concerning chess as a game is regulated there in a highly 
rationalistic way. Under the heading ‘Basic rules of play’ it is stated, for ex-
ample, ‘The objective of each player is to place the opponent’s king “under 
attack” in such a way that the opponent has no legal move’ (FIDE, 2014). 
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As has already been evident and will be illustrated further, this goal for 
the game of chess is not always shared by all players who play online. At 
the same time, FIDE’s laws of chess state that there is awareness that not 
everything can be regulated beforehand. Nevertheless, the laws of chess do 
not contain any chess etiquette; the only thing that is said on this matter 
is as follows: ‘The players shall take no action that will bring the game of 
chess into disrepute’ (FIDE, 2014). This may be due to the fact that chess 
etiquette mainly regulates the chess gaming itself, since the moves and rules 
of chess are undisputed and strongly institutionalised. The etiquette mainly 
concerns the social interaction that gaming necessarily comprises and is 
embedded in, and which may be harder to rationalise in the same way as 
the game.
Chess organisations which are closer to club level than FIDE nev-
ertheless publish texts that describe chess etiquette. The Illinois Chess 
 Association in the US has, for example, produced a text on etiquette that 
is directed at chess-playing children and their parents. This describes just 
how the game of chess is embedded in social interaction, which must be 
regulated in different ways in order not to interfere negatively in the game 
itself; here, once more, there is reason to mention Goffman’s description 
of the game as clean and gaming as sticky. Another example is Clatskanie 
Chess Club in the US, which has a setup of rules and norms which are also 
directed at children, but which have a slightly more general character and 
emphasise honesty, consideration, and humility in a chess milieu (‘Chess 
Etiquette,’ 2014).
In professional f2f chess, psyching may occur in the form of, e.g., intensive 
staring at the opposing player, grimacing, and slamming the pieces down 
when they are moved, writes King, and continues:
The board shaker may be […] irritating. It’s hard to concentrate prop-
erly when the chess pieces are vibrating! Tigran Petrosian used this tac-
tic against Viktor Korchnoi in 1977. Korchnoi asked him to stop, but 
Petrosian’s riposte was to switch off his hearing aid. Then Korchnoi 
retaliated with a fast kick under the table. For the next game a partition 
was set up under the table. (King, 2002, p. 50)
In these circumstances, the efforts, honour, and prizes that are at stake are 
relatively high, and chess, in such cases, is therefore less play and more se-
rious. The presence of so-called skittles, meaning disorderly and nonsense 
chess, at major chess tournaments also confirms this. In the breaks from the 
serious matter of the tournament, and in forms that deviate sharply from the 
‘normal’ chess game and playing of the game, the playfulness of the game 
is recaptured: ‘All forms of skittles are symbolically “noisy” in contrast to 
the rule of silence during serious play […], and all of them suspend one or 
more rules of standard chess to define their non-serious status’  (Aycock, 
1988, p. 132).
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Comparison of the gaming conditions in f2f and p2p chess
To continue now to similarities and differences between the gaming 
 conditions in chess played face-to-face (f2f) and persona-to-persona (p2p) 
 including chat – I will start with a general comparison in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1  Game and gaming conditions in f2f and p2p chess
f2f chess p2p chess + chat
the other’s presence As a human being. As text and persona. 
Communication forms The game as such, speech, 
body language, all strictly 
regulated by rules and 
etiquette.
The game as such, 
automated text 
messages related to the 
game, chat.
Meeting place Often neutral ground (chess 
club). Can also be played 
more informally in the 
home or school.
Often the players own 
territory; e.g., at home 
and own computer. 
Definition of the 
other’s playing 
strength
Can most often be carried 
out in advance when 
the players play in the 
same club or competition 
through ranking system.
Private game: playing 
strength can only be 
assessed after the game.
The player can choose if 
he/she wishes to show 
his/her ranking, given 
that the chess site 
permits this possibility.
Offer of draw Oral, ritualised. Text message.
End of game (apart 
from draw)
Checkmate, resignation, loss 
on time.
Checkmate, resignation 
through automated text 
message, loss on time, 
loss through one of the 
players stopping play 
without resigning, loss 
through logging out of 
the chess site.
When to continue to 
play and when to 
resign 
Dependent on the game but 
adjusted through norms 
for when and how players 
are expected to resign.
Easy to resign and easy 





concentrated focus on 
the game, very limited 
possibilities for side 
activities.
May differ from the 
same as f2f chess to 
the opposite: noisy 
chat, attention divided 
between game and 
other activities.
relation between game 
and gaming
Gaming is often close to game 
and therefore the activity 
can often be described 
solely with reference to the 
game as such.
Gaming may deviate 
strongly from game.
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While one plays p2p chess on the sites I refer to here, one can chat at the 
same time as the game is in progress, which is kind of foreign to the charac-
ter of chess as we know it in the f2f version, since the chatting would corre-
spond to conversation during the chess game and such activity is not part of 
the conditions of f2f play. There are different chat possibilities depending on 
what kind of subscription one has. When playing for free on one of the sites, 
several years ago, there was a rudimentary chat with fixed lines. During the 
time I used the site the lines were as follows:
 1 Hello 11 Good game
 2 Let’s go for another 12 Are you still there?
 3 OK for a last game 13 Yes 
 4 No thanks 14 No
 5 :-) 15 Thanks 
 6 :-( 16 Played well!
 7 You play very well 17 Another game?
 8 Bye 18 Have a nice day (added April 2013)
 9  I can’t answer you, I’m still in 7 
days trying period
19 Oooops! (removed April 2013)
10 Good evening 20 Ouch! (removed April 2013)
Compared to a chat where the words flow freely, this type of chat with 
fixed lines seemed a bit vapid. On the other hand, the actual use of such 
vapid chat illustrates that even a minimal interaction situation can be re-
framed to something quite different, as shown below.
Most of the chat lines are friendly or neutral. Indeed, the selection of just 
such lines as the site’s organiser has carried out metacommunicate that the 
players are supposed to uphold a friendly tone. However, symbolic interaction 
often does not allow itself to be enclosed in such neat frames, and consequently 
different reframings of the recommended frame can be made and were actu-
ally made. Some of the lines may therefore be used in wholly different ways 
than intended. Situation, context, and timing, in combination with the cre-
ativity of human actors, may alter the meaning of the lines, as set out below.
Line no. 5 – an emoticon that represents a smiling face – may express pleas-
ure over an opponent’s good play but it may also express malicious pleasure 
where it is used after the opponent has made a poor move. Line no. 4 – No 
thanks – may be used wholly without charge like a confirmation that the 
player concerned does not wish – or is not able – to play more, but when the 
player, on the other hand, has lost a game because of very poor play and 
wishes to play a new one, then the line may be perceived as a kind of review of 
the previous game. Lines no. 7, 11, and 16 may be used in a friendly way, as in-
tended, but also ironically and sardonically, whereas line no. 17 may be used 
as an encouragement to the opponent to resign. Line no. 12 may be a way of 
attempting to hasten the opponent’s moves and sometimes leads to the op-
ponent making a move or terminating the game, especially where the player 
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has taken a long time since the last move and has possibly spent time doing 
something else – maybe writing email, answering the phone, fetching coffee. 
The question: ‘Are you still there?’ – with a kind of situational emphasis on 
you as a consequence of the long waiting time – seems to be framing the other 
player as a responsible actor. Oooops! and Ouch! may be used to indicate that 
one’s own bad move does not meet one’s own expectation; the lines set the 
bad move within a form of brackets and separates it from what the opponent 
may believe to be his/her normal playing strength. But these two lines can 
also be used to regret the other’s mistakes. They may also, nevertheless, be 
used sardonically/scornfully; for example, if one of the players is superior 
in the game and puts the other player in situations where he/she is forced to 
make bad moves and the superior player comments on each move with an 
Oooops!
In the conversation on social media, attention is often given to  unpleasant 
comments and, e.g., oversharing of personal, often intimate information, 
which is not really in accord either with the interaction order that,  according 
to Goffman, frames social interaction, or indeed accepted  etiquette. Also 
the tone of social interaction may, as we can see, be changed when the re-
spectful and silent chess game is played online. Here it becomes evident 
that we are not always being helpful in upholding a friendly and smooth 
interaction order and in this connection it can be mentioned that Billig 
(2005) states that we are not always friendly and considerate in social in-
teraction but sometimes rather cruel and criticises what he calls Goffman’s 
‘nice guy view’.
In the examples above – where friendly chat lines are sometimes reframed 
into malevolence – I believe that differences in the framing of social inter-
action in f2f and p2p chess respectively can explain this transformation. In 
particular, the anonymity in p2p chess means that players can set aside re-
spect for the other person, transform him/her into an object for whom there 
exists no relation of responsibility. One can neither hold oneself nor any-
one else responsible. This can break down the self-censorship of individuals 
where malevolence is concerned. This is, nevertheless, only one difference 
between f2f and p2p chess. There are also other differences that influence 
the game itself and the gaming conditions.
Engrossment and distance
Social interaction is being enacted under different levels of involvement, 
and typologically we can imagine a continuum that may be described as 
follows:
Table 8.2   Engrossment and distance
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Engrossment or intense involvement means that individuals are en-
gaged to such an extent that the sense of distance may be wholly lost, 
whereas distance may be difficult to reconcile with an engrossing com-
mitment. An intermediate stage may also be envisaged where alternation 
take place between engrossment and distance. An analytical and strongly 
simplified  figure, as above, cannot accurately capture the fact that transi-
tions between the different positions take place gradually. Nonetheless, 
the figure can tell us a lot about social interaction in principle.
When it comes to the alternation between engrossment and distance, this 
accords fairly well with what Goffman imagined people do when they go in 
and out of situations which they share with others: they attempt to find out 
about and define or interactionally construct the frame which organises the 
activities within the situation and, in order to do this, they may ask a distanc-
ing question: ‘What is it that’s going on here?’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 8). Framing 
often – probably always – consists of alternating between engrossment and 
distance, between involvement in the interaction and, at the same time, reflec-
tion upon it. Against this background I will continue the  comparison between 
f2f and p2p chess and also ask three questions to f2f and p2p chess respec-
tively: Who am I interacting and playing with?; What is allowed to disturb a 
game?; and, How can a player tell what the actions of the other player mean?
Who am I nteracting and playing with?
As mentioned, social interaction according to Goffman (1961b, p. 7, 
1963a, p. 24) may be of two different kinds: unfocused and focused. Unfo-
cused interaction occurs as soon as individuals are in one another’s proximity 
and in some way influence one another; for example, two strangers who share 
a seat in a bus and control their respective behaviour in order not to touch 
the other person in an inappropriate way. Focused interaction means instead 
that two or more individuals have a shared focus; for instance, when they 
converse or play chess. Unfocused interaction is about presence in shared sit-
uations, while focused interaction is about a mutual and shared involvement.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between f2f and p2p chess is 
that in the latter case one cannot be sure whom one is playing with and, 
consequently, whom one is sharing the situation and the involvement with. 
Behind the persona ‘guestmaeb’, which the chess site generated randomly 
when I just logged in, there may be found a chess amateur like myself, a 
world champion, or a chess computer, a man or woman, Swede or Ken-
yan, old or young, but as a player on the site, I cannot find this out. If one 
wishes to try to read one’s opponent one has to satisfy oneself with the game 
itself and the chat. In the article ‘On the Internet nobody knows if you’re 
Bobby Fischer’, there is a tale of how Nigel Short, a grandmaster in chess 
who in 1988–89 was ranked number three in the world, made public how 
he believed that he was playing chess online with the former grandmaster 
Bobby Fischer as late as the year 2000, when Fischer had, in fact, long re-
tired. The player who Short actually met was anonymous, and he and many 
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others could only attempt to find out who it was by analysing the game itself 
and chat conversations. One of the designers of the chess programme Fritz, 
Frederic Friedel, did just this and his attempt is described thus:
Next, Friedel dissected ‘Fischer’s’ approach to the game. The Bobby 
Fischer of lore, Friedel suggested, would never use the ridiculous open-
ings Short had described – they were sick, rude, uncouth maneuvers that 
any top-level player would find odious; Fischer, by contrast, had always 
been a courtly player. On this point, many disagree. […] grandmaster 
Fischer always did what he had to to win. He didn’t have a  signature 
style so much as a will, a ferocity, and fresh ideas that could seem like 
mistakes until he proved them otherwise. (Wieners, 2002, p. 75)
In the discussion that followed on Friedel’s website, a certain ‘Jason L.’, a 
person who posed as a chess cheater, wrote as follows:
Hi I’d just like to say that I guarantee Bobby is not on the internet play-
ing chess. Why? Cuz I am the best chess cheat on the internet and the 
situation is very familiar to me. In the last year, I have played thousands 
of games cheating and have yet to ever come close to losing even one 
game. […] I have written an autoplayer program […] I just start up a 
one min[ute] game and sit back and watch my program play by itself […] 
No, I am not the Fischer character in the web. Yes, cheating is fun. I get 
so much satisfaction laying a GM [grandmaster] in a 2 min game and 
watching him resign after 25 moves, and then urging him to take up 
checkers. (Wieners, 2002, p. 75)
Then somebody who called her- or himself Bobby Fischer began playing top 
class chess on a chess site and the questions mounted up: ‘Was this Short’s 
Fischer, a copycat Fischer, Fischer himself, or even Jason L.?’ (Wieners, 
2002, p. 75). The fact that the question ‘Who am I playing with?’ cannot be 
answered with any degree of certainty is an essential difference between f2f 
and p2p chess. And here one can think of Goffman’s shrewd class analysis 
of English aristocratic politeness: ‘In the classic phrase of England’s gentry, 
“Anyone for tennis?” did not quite mean anyone; […]’ (Goffman, 1961b, p. 29), 
and still surely does not mean ‘anyone’. When, however,  anonymous online 
chess is concerned, the invitation ‘Anyone for chess?’ may mean literally 
this. So the answer to the question ‘Who am I interacting and playing with?’ 
when p2p chess is concerned is, therefore, ‘anyone’.
What is allowed to disturb a game?
The level of involvement, as mentioned above, may be different in social 
interaction; this is evident from the difference between focused and un-
focused interaction, but also within the category of focused interaction. 
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Focused interaction may be so engrossing that the interacting individuals 
are wholly screened from their surroundings and Goffman meant that 
such interaction is regulated by ‘rules of irrelevance’. This total engross-
ment in, and targeted attention on, some part of the reality and simult-
aneous definition of other things as irrelevant is an obvious picture of 
chess. It resembles  Coser’s ‘greedy institutions’, which create the condi-
tions for ‘total commitment’, which in its turn ‘[…] reduce[s] the anxie-
ties that spring from competing role-demands and the pull of differing 
loyalties and allegiances’ (Coser, 1974, p. 18). Puddephat (2008) obtains 
support from Coser when he puts forward the view that ‘the chess world’, 
with its ‘devoted participation’, may be perceived as a kind of greedy 
institution.
The screening that is a consequence of the rules of irrelevance finally has 
effects that resemble what Csíkszentmihályi calls flow:
Because of the structure of the game, the primary rewards people 
derive from it are autotelic. […] Like climbers, dancers, or surgeons, 
chess players shift into a common mode of experience when they be-
come absorbed in their activity. This mode is characterized by a nar-
rowing of the focus of awareness, so that irrelevant perceptions and 
thoughts are filtered out; by loss of self-consciousness; by a respon-
siveness to clear goals and unambiguous feedback; and by a sense 
of control over the environment. These are the salient features of 
that modality of experience we have called ‘flow’. (Csíkszentmihályi, 
2000[1975], p. 72)
Chess players are presented here as deeply engrossed, enthusiastic partici-
pants involved in their activity. Does this apply to all chess? Hardly. These 
descriptions presuppose that special conditions of play are in place and that 
the framing of social interaction can create the special sense that allows 
almost total involvement and makes much else irrelevant for the time being. 
These conditions of play and such framing are in place during chess tour-
naments and surely in chess clubs and possibly also sometimes in the case 
of ‘private chess’.
Where online chess is concerned, other conditions apply too.  Online 
chess is open to anyone, anywhere, is available anytime (assuming 
 Internet access), and appears to be subject to preconceived notions by 
the players involved which strongly deviate from the chess world that is 
 institutionalised. Given that the Internet players – assuming that they are 
people and not chess computers, which we cannot know for sure – are 
mostly in their homes, where there is much else to attract their attention 
(e.g., at their computer, which invites other activity while waiting for the 
other player’s move), other rules of irrelevance may apply. The framing 
of online chess seems not to result in the same level of engrossment as f2f 
chess.
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My own experience and observations of online chess, which is all that I 
can currently base these statements on, show that much else is allowed to 
disturb the chess game when this takes place on the conditions described 
above. The phone rings and the opponent then has to wait, in which case it 
is easier that our relationship is anonymous. One of the children needs help 
with homework and then the opponent gives up the chess game in progress 
or just lets the time tick on. Occasionally, nevertheless, engrossment can also 
occur. The answer to the question ‘what is allowed to disturb a game?’ varies 
with the gaming conditions: from almost nothing in tournament chess f2f to 
almost everything in online chess.
How can a player tell what the actions of the other player mean?
Social interaction implies not only that people meet one another and con-
verse, do something together, play games, or whatever the case may be; 
they also read or decode the expressions that the others give and give off. 
Why does he have a strained crease on his brow when we speak to one 
another? Why does her eye wander? Why is he sweating so profusely just 
now? Why did she say this – what did she mean really? In f2f interaction, 
the flow of expressions is extensive and the interpretation of expressions 
likewise offers many different possibilities before they are translated into 
distinct impressions. In p2p interaction, as we have seen, the flow is nar-
rower. This does not mean that attempts at interpretation cease, rather 
attempts at interpretation may become even more intensive. How can, 
for example, a player in p2p chess find out the meaning of what the other 
player does?
One way of finding out the implications of the opponent’s game is to store 
experiences from other players. This is what a ranking system does, but here 
I am thinking of making mental notes of how others play, how strong they 
are as players, and such like. This presupposes that the players use the same 
persona over a longer period. At the site where I play at this moment, every 
game is being stored in a database open to other players. However, if one 
plays as Anonymous then each game represents a new start; one is without 
ranking and reputation.
If we only take the game itself into consideration, then the players are 
spatially separated from each other. Consequently, players can only read 
their opponent through expressions by way of the game. Moves can sug-
gest how proficient the player is; the use of time can also express something; 
the circumstances under which a player offers a draw may be significant. 
Equally, when the opponent resigns, some resign at the very same time they 
end up in any situation of disadvantage; others prolong things as far as pos-
sible.  During my observations I carried out an experiment to try to find 
out the significance that can be interpreted from the use of time right at the 
very start of the game. I challenged an opponent to play a five-minute game 
but then made no opening move. I did this twenty-five times with different 
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players. Seventeen of the players gave up after 20 seconds or less, the quick-
est after only 2 seconds. Eight of the players gave up after more than 20 
seconds; the one who waited longest did so in 66 seconds. This gives the 
impression that the players frame a five-minute game as a very fast game: if 
it has not started after 20 seconds then most give up. But this is also deter-
mined by the fact that it is exceptionally easy to initiate a new game: many 
players wish to play.
My participant observation has been carried out on a chess site where 
there is the possibility to chat at the same time as one plays. This occurs on 
a series of different chess sites and, in itself, is a rather notable innovation. It 
is perhaps more a concession to the format that applies to many other social 
networking sites online than a contribution to the development of chess. 
Chatting is hardly a substitute for talking during the course of a chess game, 
as speech is strictly regulated in f2f chess. But sometimes chatting helps 
inform a player as to what the actions of the other mean.
Conclusions
Chess as game is chess regardless of whether it is played face-to-face or per-
sona to persona. In this case I mean chess considered as game as such. The 
playing of chess may, nevertheless, vary depending on differences in play-
ing conditions between these two forms of chess, as shown in the present 
text. The differences are so large that one can talk about two different game 
frames that set their stamp on the game. In its main features, f2f chess may 
be described as a silent game despite the fact that talk is possible, whereas 
p2p chess is a silent game since talk is impossible. The communication be-
tween the players in f2f chess takes place through three channels: the game 
itself, sharply limited talk, and body language. In p2p chess, on the other 
hand, the communication takes place through one channel: the game itself. 
However, there is often scope for online chat at the same time as the game 
is in progress, and in that case and by will of the players the communica-
tion is expanded with a further channel. In those cases where chat is used, 
the difference between f2f and p2p chess increases, since players are not 
expected to converse with one another when playing chess. The chat facility 
is a replacement for the loss of talk online. When it is used with chess, the 
game tends to change, since the talk, in principle, is already removed from 
the game in its f2f frame.
Even a very limited chat, like the one I have studied here and which 
comprises some twenty fixed lines, may be used in ambiguous ways, as 
indicated above. The silent respectfulness that characterises the game of 
chess may be sustained with the aid of friendly and polite chat. Players that 
lack respect for the game, and for the other player, appear to have greater 
scope, under the playing conditions that characterise p2p chess, to trans-
form chess from silent respectfulness to a loud-mouthed ego trip and from 
honourable civility to petty pinpricks. And, last but not least, players who 
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are anonymous and not in physical proximity have limited possibilities to 
maintain the etiquette of chess should anyone choose to break it. Frame 
disputes – in the players’ minds, chat, or game – are more frequent in p2p 
than in f2f chess.
Notes
 1 Historical and technical information on the game of chess, throughout, has been 
obtained from King (2000) and Hall (2014).
 2 The vizier – adviser – was in ancient times a high-placed official in Muslim 
countries.
 3 For the term ‘frame disputes’, see (Goffman, 1974, p. 322ff).
Goffman was definitely no theorist of power, but because social interaction 
is a recurring theme in his sociology, so is people’s influence on each other, 
and influence can be seen as a kind of exercise of power. On one occasion 
Goffman touched upon the relationship between state authority and inter-
actional power, and he then said the following:
The modern nation state, almost as a means of defining itself into ex-
istence, claims final authority for the control of hazard and threat to 
life, limb, and property throughout its territorial jurisdiction. Always in 
theory, and often in practice, the state provides stand-by arrangements 
for stepping in when local mechanisms of social control fail to keep 
breakdowns of interaction order within certain limits. Particularly in 
public places but not restricted thereto. To be sure, the interaction order 
 prevailing even in the most public places is not a creation of the apparatus 
of a state. Certainly most of this order comes into being and is sustained 
from below as it were, in some cases in spite of overarching authority not 
because of it. Nonetheless the state has effectively established legitimacy 
and priority here, monopolizing the use of heavy arms and militarily dis-
ciplined cadres as an ultimate sanction. (Goffman, 1983b, p. 6)
In an article from the 1950s we can read what can be understood as just such 
a description of the establishment of the order ‘from below’ mentioned in 
the above quotation: ‘societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must 
mobilize their members as selfregulating participants in social encounters’ 
(Goffman, 1955a, p. 231). Even if Hacking excludes power from his compar-
ison of Goffman and Foucault in favour of a description of the positioning 
of each of them in relation to their objects of study, his description of their 
approaches as bottom-up and top-down, respectively, also has quite a bit to 
say about power:
But Goffman was not reporting individual exchanges for their own 
sake. One of his projects was to understand how people were consti-
tuted, defined themselves and were understood by others, in terms of 
9 Interactional power – influencing 
others by framing social 
interaction
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exactly such interactions. I call this ‘bottom-up’ because we start with 
individual face-to-face exchanges, and develop an account of how such 
exchanges constitute lives. I call Foucault top-down because he starts 
with a mass of sentences at a time and place, dissociated from the hu-
man beings who spoke them, and uses them as the data upon which 
to characterize a system of thought, or rather, its verbal incarnation, a 
discursive formation. (Hacking, 2004, p. 278)
The difference between Foucault’s top-down perspective on power and Goff-
man’s bottom-up perspective can be illustrated with the help of Foucault’s 
expression ‘conduct-of-conduct’ (Dean, 2010 [1999], p. 177f; Foucault, 1982, 
pp. 220–221). Authorities conduct the conduct of the citizens. Goffman in-
stead kept the authorities behind the scenes in a state of alert and focused 
more – that’s bottom-up – on interacting individuals’ conduct (without us-
ing that particular word). The individuals are presented as self-regulating 
actors inside an interaction order supervised by the authorities. Foucault’s 
reference to the authorities/the state is detailed and well informed, while 
Goffman’s is coarse and uninterested. At the same time, Foucault’s em-
phasis on ‘apparatuses of security’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 208) looks a bit like 
 Goffman’s ‘standby arrangement’ in the citation above.
Unlike Foucault’s top-down perspective, Goffman’s bottom-up perspec-
tive was rarely defined as a power perspective by his contemporaries, but 
that connection has sometimes been made later. In what follows I will pres-
ent Goffman’s perspective as a power perspective based on interactional 
power, where influence through the framing of social interaction is a central 
part. First a few words about power theory.
How, when, and where is power exercised?
Power is a central concept in the social sciences, something to which al-
ready Bertrand Russell (1938, p. 10) drew attention when he wrote that ‘the 
fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which 
 Energy is the fundamental concept in physics’. Clegg and Haugaard begin 
their comprehensive overview of the concept of power by stating the same 
thing, while at the same time they say that the concept of power ‘is argu-
ably one of the most difficult concepts to make sense of within the social 
sciences’ (2013 [2009]b, p. 1). What does it mean that the concept of power is 
 fundamental within the social sciences? First, that there is a constant discus-
sion of the concept of power because it is an ‘essentially contested concept’ 
(Gallie, 1955; Lukes, 1974, 2005). Second, the concept of power is used to 
study  processes and mechanisms that both build up, change, and tear down 
societies and institutions over time, processes and mechanisms that develop 
the force that can be called power. The concept of power is perhaps mainly 
used in studies at the societal and institutional levels, but societies and insti-
tutions are created by individuals through social interaction, which is why 
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the concept of power can also be used on the interactional level. Against this 
background I will here briefly summarise research on power by looking for 
answers to the questions ‘how, when, and where is power exercised?’ in a few 
central theoretical works on power.
Research on how power is exercised has generated a number of different 
results. It has, for instance, been said that power is exercised through deci-
sions (Dahl, 1961), decisions and non-decisions (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970), 
socialisation (e.g., Lukes, 1974), sanctions (e.g., Blau, 1964), and power 
resources that can be used in order to reward and punish (Korpi, 1983). 
Theoreticians of power have, in addition, created theoretical systems that 
contain principally different, but in practice complementary, ways of ex-
ercising power. Weber (1968a, p. 53), for example, differentiated between 
‘power’ – the probability to carry out one’s will despite resistance – and 
‘domination’ – the will of a superior actor realised because the will to obey 
is stronger than the will to resist. Russell (1938) separated physical power, 
reward/punishment, and the influencing of opinion. Galbraith (1983) filled 
his system of the exercise of power with compulsion, compensation, and 
conditioning; and Etzioni (1975) focused on violence, norms, and symbols.
It is of course extremely relevant to reflect on how power is exercised, but 
the discussion on power is made considerably more stringent if one also 
considers the temporal aspect of the exercise of power – i.e., when it is be-
ing exercised. This is perhaps best illustrated by what can be called an in-
dividual’s gradual growing into society from birth and forward, and thus 
his or her habituation to concrete existing social and societal conditions. 
Such processes can be designated in different ways and accorded different 
meanings, but here I am after the socialisation of the individual (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967) and a critique of far too mechanistic perspectives on so-
cialisation (Freud, 1962 [1930]; Wrong, 1961), as well as similar perspectives 
that are designated in other ways; e.g., habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) and the 
emphasis in American ‘sociology of everyday life’ on the routinisation/rit-
ualisation of social interaction; e.g., Garfinkel (1967) and Goffman (1967) 
(see also Chapter 3). When the above-mentioned Lukes criticises Dahl and 
Bachrach and Baratz he is trying to do precisely this: place the exercise of 
power in a temporal context. He says that the subjective interests of an indi-
vidual who is subject to the exercise of power may have been shaped so that 
these subjective interests deviate from the objective interests of that individ-
ual, and that this may explain the lack of conflict and thus the absence of 
power in the sense of Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz. That is to say, Lukes’s 
criticism takes as its starting point the biographical aspect of the temporal 
context in which the exercise of power is located, and then emphasises the 
importance of socialisation.
The different answers to the question of when power is exercised makes 
topical a third question – that is to say, where power is exercised. If the study 
of power is focused on moments of influence, it becomes easier to delimit the 
spatial exercise of power, something that, on the other hand, becomes more 
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difficult if the exercise of power is studied biographically or historically. The 
question of where power is exercised has therefore also been answered in 
different ways. Some researchers argue that power has a centre; others that 
power is everywhere. The idea that power has a centre or a small number of 
centres has been claimed in political theory by theoreticians of elites; e.g., 
Pareto (1968 [1901]) and Mills (1956). The pluralists; e.g., Dahl (1961), believe 
that power is exercised in several competing centres of power.  Unlike these 
attempts to spatially delimit power, it has also been pointed out that power 
does not have one or several centres, but is exercised in many different 
places in society, perhaps everywhere. For instance, Barnes (1988) believes 
that power is embedded in society as a whole, and Elias (1978) describes 
power as a structural characteristic of human relations. Foucault says that 
power relations are imminent in other types of relationships  (Foucault, 
1979;  Foucault & Kritzman, 1988).
Foucault and Goffman
There is reason to dwell on Foucault because his influence has been great 
in the field of power theory during the last forty years, but in this case also 
because there are certain similarities to Goffman’s perspective. In Foucault, 
discipline represents a special form of exercise of power that results in power 
being made invisible, while at the same time the individuals who are subject 
to the exercise of power are made visible. This kind of discipline consti-
tutes a break with an earlier, more expressive exercise of power that made 
power visible as something so constant and stable that it appeared almost 
meaningless and dangerous to challenge it, a kind of exercise of power that 
I believe can be said to live on in the authoritarian regimes of the twentieth 
century and the present day. However, in many places in modern societies, 
changes have occurred that have resulted in power becoming less clear and 
visible. It is then no longer a function of the visible, but of the invisible, ex-
ercise of power.
The spirit of discipline can, against this background, be said to be eco-
nomic, because it constitutes an exercise of power that is economical with 
physical violence, while at the same time it is also economic in the sense 
that it attempts to increase the usefulness of the disciplined individuals. 
 Discipline ‘made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the 
body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon 
them a relation of docility-utility’, states Foucault, and continues,
But in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the dis-
ciplines became general formulas of domination. They were different 
from slavery because they were not based on a relation of appropriation 
of bodies; indeed, the elegance of the discipline lay in the fact that it 
could dispense with this costly and violent relation by obtaining effects 
of utility at least as great. […] The historical moment of the disciplines 
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was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was 
directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of 
its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism 
itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. 
What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon 
the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its be-
haviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that ex-
plores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. […] Thus discipline produces 
subjected and practised bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline increases the 
forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these 
same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates 
power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a 
‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the 
course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it 
into a relation of strict subjection. (Foucault, 1979 [1975], p. 137f)
The point of Foucault’s concept of discipline, unlike, for instance, that of 
Weber (1968a, p. 53) – which is based on the idea that discipline is defined 
as the ‘methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in 
which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended’ (Weber, 1968b, 
p. 1149)  – is thus not unquestioning obedience, but the combination of 
 obedience and the economising of force that turns the subordinate into a 
conscious and will-governed instrument. Foucault’s version of discipline 
does not create slaves or robots, but instead seems to be a process that is 
eventually characterised by the self-control of the individual. ‘One is,’ 
Foucault (1979 [1975], p. 153) writes, ‘as far as possible from those forms 
of subjection that demanded of the body only signs or products, forms of 
expression or the result of labour’. Discipline’s form of submission means 
instead that
the efficiency of power, its constraining force have, in a sense, passed 
over to the other side – to the side of its surface of application. He who 
is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsi-
bility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously 
upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own 
subjection. By this very fact, the external power may throw off its physi-
cal weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the more it approaches this 
limit, the more constant, profound and permanent are its effects: it is a 
perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation and which is 
always decided in advance. (Foucault, 1979 [1975], p. 202f)
In the long term, discipline thus seems to be a question of developing a soul 
that can control the body. Successful development ‘makes invisible’ the ex-
ercise of power by concealing or denying the connections between outer 
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influence and individual action. The disciplined human being can against 
this background be defined as a person who controls and governs him- or 
herself – to the advantage of other people and perhaps also her- or him-
self. The subordinate is thus transformed from an object of the exercise 
of power into a subject that contributes to the exercise of power. Foucault 
called the whole complex of ideas and practices that generate this kind of 
power, which in modern societal development is increasingly built into peo-
ple, governmentality:
First, by ‘governmentality’ I understand the ensemble formed by insti-
tutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics 
that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power 
that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form 
of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument. Second, by ‘governmentality’ I understand the tendency, 
the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has 
constantly led towards pre-eminence over all other types of power – 
 sovereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call 
‘government’ and which has led to the development of a series of gov-
ernmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other,] 
to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by ‘gov-
ernmentality’ I think we should understand the process, or rather, the 
result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages 
became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
and was gradually ‘governmentalized’. (Foucault, 2007, p. 108f)
In a way, governmentality poses the question: How does one govern a popu-
lation of free individuals? Apart from all efforts to ‘shape, guide, direct the 
conduct of others’ – i.e., the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Dean, 2010 [1999], p. 17ff; 
Foucault, 2007, p. 192f), this form of control also has to do with creating 
‘governable subjects’ (N. Rose, 1999, pp. 3, 40ff). This means that free in-
dividuals are formed with the help of different mechanisms that, e.g., make 
them ever more dependent on wage labour, on education, on money in order 
to be able to consume, and other similar things that help individuals both 
govern themselves and not define governance as control but as calculated ad-
aptation to the conditions such as they appear in the individuals’ own lives. 
Concomitantly to this transformation of the exercise of power, an increase 
in efficiency occurs: governance stops engaging in symbolic demonstrations 
of strength and instead becomes, in a manner of speaking, goal-oriented. 
From such a perspective of efficiency, the social background, sexual ori-
entation, age, skin colour, or gender of the individual who governs her- or 
himself in order to, for instance, be as efficient a bricklayer or professor as 
possible, or as good a citizen as possible, makes little difference as long as 
the efficiency goals are reached. To govern, in this sense, Foucault writes, ‘[…] 
is to structure the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 221).
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In this way there emerges what at first glance may appear to be a par-
adox: hand in hand with the transformation of power that can be called 
governmentality comes a kind of individual liberation in a number of 
areas. This development is, as ever, uneven, and as a consequence of 
this kind of modernised exercise of power another kind of modernisa-
tion emerges that is turned against power itself, and that becomes visible 
when, e.g., a person resists discrimination because of his or her skin col-
our. A kind of liberation on the individual level modernises the exercise of 
power, while at the same time this modernised exercise of power draws in-
dividuals out of their collective designations by way of individualisation: 
if, for instance, it turns out that a young person in school or at university 
has problems reading, the staff may determine that this has to do with his 
or her social or cultural background, and that there is a set of individual 
measures of assistance that can be taken in order to enable the individual 
to fulfil the requirements of the school or university. This emphasis in the 
exercise of power on the resources and problems of an individual against 
the background of efficiency requirements tends to first make visible and 
then separate the exercise of power from that individual’s social and col-
lective designations.
How does this relate to Goffman’s sociology? Goffman did not claim that 
power was a central category in his studies of social interaction. He hardly 
mentions power at all. But one of his texts comes pretty close to a more tra-
ditional perception of power: his book Asylums. In this book, events inside 
total institutions are analysed, and it would have been possible for me to use 
it as one of the examples of Goffman’s manner of conducting frame anal-
ysis. As mentioned in Chapter 6 frame analysis is sensitive to four certain 
aspects:
•	 governing mechanisms, which are far more coercive in total institutions.
•	 the situation, which is spatially much clearer.
•	 the performance of interactions, which is more hierarchically differen-
tiated in a total institution.
•	 the dynamics of the interaction in the situation, that often consist of 
conflict-filled social dynamics between, in particular, the staff and the 
inmates, which to a great extent are based on what Goffman calls ‘the 
privilege system’, which regulates rights, order, rewards, and punish-
ments, with the aim of breaking down the personality of the inmate and 
constructing another, more suitable one.1
But the precise fact that this has to do with total institutions, which are less 
contradictory than many other types of institutions, also makes the power 
that is being exercised stand out more clearly than in other institutions. 
 Although it is not an unequivocal exercise of power, Goffman portrays the 
power that is exercised in a total institution as a mixture of coercive power 
and self-discipline.
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Coercive power is characteristic of the more obvious total institutions – 
 prisons, military training, and mental hospitals – and Goffman describes how 
it is exercised already during the admission procedure, where a process of mor-
tification immediately begins in order to ‘kill’ the identities and the roles the in-
mate brings with him- or herself from the outside. Then the inmate is initiated 
into the privilege system, which aims to adapt the inmates to the total institu-
tion, and they gradually develop different ways of adapting to the coercion of 
the institution. Primary adaptation means that the inmate or client in a total 
institution does as she or he is told – cooperates – while secondary adaptation 
means ‘any habitual arrangement by which a member of an organization em-
ploys unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, thus getting 
around the organization’s assumptions as to what he should do and get and 
hence what he should be’ (Goffman, 1961a, p. 172). This is to say that Goffman 
here sees a space for social illusion-making, where the inmates can pretend 
to be adapted in a large number of different ways, and thus resist the exer-
cise of power within the institution by demonstrating to themselves that they 
are not completely defined by the institution. So when Foucault (1979 [1975], 
p. 138) writes, ‘Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, “doc-
ile” bodies’, Goffman would perhaps ask how subjected the disciplined bodies 
 really are, and issue a warning that the docility of the bodies may be a social 
illusion, not least because of the fact that there also is and has to be another 
form of power in the coercive power of the total institutions: self- discipline. 
Because in spite of the inmates’ being convicted of crimes and having diagno-
ses that result in their being seen as not accountable for their actions, they are 
expected to be able to control themselves within the total institution:
Inmates must be caused to self-direct themselves in a manageable way, 
and, for this to be promoted, both desired and undesired conduct must 
be defined as springing from the personal will and character of the in-
dividual inmate himself, and defined as something he can himself do 
something about. (Goffman, 1961a, p. 83)
Here we see, with reference to Hacking, how Goffman’s situational, inter-
actionist sociology and Foucault’s archaeological discourse analysis can be 
made to complement each other. What Foucault in his top-down perspec-
tive represents as a temporal sequence of events where coercive power is 
partially sidelined by governmentality for hundreds of years, Goffman in 
his bottom-up perspective sees as two factors in action side by side in the 
total institution: the how, when, and where of the exercise of power, on the 
one hand seen as a development over time and on the other hand framed in 
the special social dynamics of the total institution.
Power as influence and resisting influence
The few researchers who have tried to define Goffman’s perspective as rel-
evant within research on power argue with reference to the fact that his 
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studies on social interaction are also about influence. Both appear as soon 
as people are in each other’s proximity and are also played out by individ-
uals in a kind of inner dialogue before, during, and after interacting with 
other people. Goffman links this continual influence and reflection on in-
fluence to the interaction order, which is maintained by those who interact 
without really aiming to do so. It can be said that the interaction order is an 
unintended consequence of how individuals consciously and subconsciously 
influence other people and avoid being influenced by them.
Goffman’s studies of influence were made at a time when sociologists in-
stead used the concept of power to understand events at the level of social 
structure, at governmental, and international levels, and, to some extent, at 
the organisational level. All of Goffman’s active time as a sociologist came 
to be characterised by such a ‘macrounderstanding’ of power resulting 
from, among other things, the Cold War between East and West, and by 
students and, in some places, workers revolting against an unfair societal 
and world order.
Researching etiquette in interaction between people or what it means to 
hold hands in public places provoked some critics, even more so perhaps 
when it turned out that Goffman’s texts garnered great attention. Many of 
his critics felt that Goffman turned his back on the complex of problems re-
lating to class and power. One of the most persistent ones was Denzin, who 
twenty years after Goffman’s death wrote that Goffman
gave midcentury academic sociology exactly what it wanted, and what 
it needed: Men and women in gray flannel suits performing the rites 
and rituals of a postwar white collar society, […]. Goffman’s actors did 
not resist, they conformed to the requirements of a local and global 
capitalism that erased class, race, and gender in the name of a universal, 
circumspect human nature. Goffman’s moral selves knew their place in 
the order of things. (Denzin, 2002, p. 107)
Furthermore, Kemper (2011, p. 81), from a completely different point of de-
parture, felt that one of Goffman’s largest mistakes was ‘omitting the power 
dimension as one of his major conceptual foci’. On the whole, this criticism 
is fair: Goffman was no radical class theorist; he did not study race but on 
the other hand he did study gender and, as has previously been mentioned, 
power was not a concept Goffman used in a theoretically foundational man-
ner. At the same time, it probably would have been difficult for Goffman to 
use the kind of status-power model developed by Kemper, because in this 
model power is defined as ‘involuntary compliance’ and status as ‘voluntary 
compliance’ (Kemper, 2011, p. 13). This division is hardly useful if power 
is to be connected to the kind of socially interactive influence studied by 
Goffman.
There are also those who see Goffman’s sociology as relevant in the 
study of power. In an article, Rogers describes her purpose in studying 
Goffman’s significant but unexpected contribution to the study of power 
136 Framing social media, online chess, and power
in this manner: ‘to illustrate the utility of looking to “nonpower” scholars 
for insights relevant to the refinement of this central sociological concept’ 
(Rogers, 1977, p. 88). Further, in an in-depth text, she finds that Goffman 
provides a number of significant but implicit contributions regarding power, 
which she summarises as follows: ‘Goffman’s strategy is rather to indicate 
the determinative and general influences of social orders, including public 
order, and “social establishments” on behavior in everyday life’ (Rogers, 
1980, p. 128). Jenkins tries to develop this perspective on Goffman’s ‘view 
on power’ and writes:
Power, in this view, is not confined to warfare, politics or economic ex-
ploitation. It is, rather, a mundane matter of everyday relationships be-
tween ends, on the one hand, and ways and means, on the other. While 
recognizing the ubiquity of power in the everyday human world – in 
the sense that a greater or lesser degree of efficacy is fundamental to 
all human endeavours – by situating power within the practicalities of 
what people do, I attempt to avoid the problems inherent in abstracting 
‘totalising’ theories of power. […] (Jenkins, 2008, p. 159)
Goffman’s contribution then concerns primarily the influence of interacting 
actors on each other, while they simultaneously are influenced by the more 
collective order that Goffman calls the interaction order.
Influence is usually not seen as power unless there is an intention behind 
it, and Weber’s definition of power illustrates this: ‘the probability to carry 
out one’s will despite resistance’. In order to specify exactly Goffman’s view 
on power it is important to differentiate between influence and intentional 
influence, even if this can be difficult.
Goffman studies influence in all of his texts because influence is a kind 
of default value in social interaction – in other words, social interaction is 
hardly possible without mutual influence, even if the degree of influence can 
vary greatly. (In contrast, influence can be imagined without social inter-
action.) However, the forms of this socially interactive influence vary with 
the situation. The smooth manoeuvring of an individual through the flow 
of people in a public place, where it is impossible to avoid influence, but 
which to a great extent has to do with being influenced and influencing to 
the least possible extent, is one example. Goffman calls this form of influ-
ence unfocused interaction, and it exists as soon as individuals are in each 
other’s proximity. Focused interaction, on the other hand, implies a mutual 
presence in a situation where the interacting individuals have a common 
focus and mutually influence each other; e.g. a conversation. A third form 
of interaction can be exemplified by the gaming encounter, as has previously 
been mentioned. It is a form of interaction where the main activity – the 
game that follows set rules and makes the interaction predictable – can be 
threatened by a secondary activity – the interactional context in which gam-
ing is embedded and whose influence means that attention is drawn away 
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from the game itself. As has been mentioned earlier, Goffman believes that 
the participants have managed this show of force between two realities – the 
game and the gaming – by using ‘transformation rules’ to separate things 
from ‘the world outside’ that are allowed to come into the gaming encounter 
from those that are to be kept outside. This is then an example of a more 
intentional influence.
We also find such influence in what I have previously called social 
 illusion-making. One example is stigma management, which means hiding 
one’s own drawbacks because they risk leading to stigmatisation –  singling 
out and exclusion because of the dynamics of shameful differentness – 
where shame is ‘a basic social coin, with awe on one side and shame on 
the other’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 70). Another example is impression manage-
ment, which has to do with controlling how other people perceive a person 
and the shared situation. Impression management is a very commonplace 
and ‘normal’ form of social illusion-making – so commonplace that most of 
the time it is completely frictionlessly integrated into the social interaction 
and not at all as ‘acted’ as, for example, a lonely hearts racket and fraud – 
and Goffman develops his analysis of this more than is the case with other 
forms of illusion-making in which he is interested, and presents the results 
under the heading ‘The arts of impression management’. This art consists, 
as has been mentioned previously, of three main activities, and concerns 
the impression management of groups, but can just as well be applied to 
individuals, and communication within the impression-managing group is 
then replaced with the inner dialogue of the individual. The first activity is 
called dramaturgical loyalty, and means that the interacting individuals or 
groups, in order to succeed with the performance, have to be loyal to the 
impression of themselves or to the situation that is communicated to the 
person or persons with whom the individuals or groups interact. The second 
activity is called dramaturgical discipline, and it means that the interact-
ing individuals must retain control so that the performance is successful 
even when they are carried away by their own enthusiasm for the interaction 
with other people. Goffman calls the third activity dramaturgical circum-
spection, and this means that the interacting individuals must protect their 
impression management both before and after the interaction; e.g., not give 
information to outsiders that is in conflict with the impression management. 
Another part of the art of controlling impressions is the maintenance of the 
boundary between front- and backstage, because the insights of other peo-
ple backstage can disrupt the impression management, as well as the setting 
and the personal front that both support the performance.
There is also reason to mention the fact that the opportunity to influence 
and avoid influencing varies according to structural differences in different 
forms of interactions. Such a difference becomes visible in the comparison I 
have made in the two preceding chapters between social interaction face-to-
face and persona-to-persona: the difference between a broad and a narrow 
transmission of expressions. On condition that an interacting individual can 
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maintain the discipline of influence that Goffman calls the art of managing 
impressions, this management entails assuming as much control as possible 
over both expressions given and expressions given off. The maintenance of 
this control is more difficult when it comes to a broad transmission of ex-
pressions, but more efficient from a power perspective if this control is suc-
cessful. In the case of a narrow transmission of expressions – in, e.g., social 
media – the power of influence is limited when it comes to the expression 
flows themselves, and this might be considered to explain how it is that wars 
of words escalate so quickly in certain social media. The will to influence is 
not in parity with the actual opportunities to influence.
To return to the art of impression management, the final element in this 
performative influence or exercise of power is the audience – the persons 
with whom the interacting individual interacts, whether individuals or 
groups – in other words, the persons who, with the aid of impression man-
agement, are to be convinced that the performance is real. The audience can 
of course resist the impressions the performers transmit, but more often the 
audience assists and displays what Goffman in this text calls ‘tactful inat-
tention’2 and overlooks mistakes and slips of the tongue:
When performers make a slip of some kind, clearly exhibiting a dis-
crepancy between the fostered impression and a disclosed reality, the 
audience may tactfully ‘not see’ the slip or readily accept the excuse that 
is offered for it. And at moments of crisis for the performers, the whole 
audience may come into tacit collusion with them in order to help them 
out. […] Similarly, at times of inspection, whether in school, in barracks, 
in the hospital, or at home, the audience is likely to behave itself in a 
model way so that the performers who are being inspected may put on 
an exemplary show. (Goffman, 1959, p. 231f)
The influence and avoidance of influence is a kind of keynote throughout 
Goffman’s entire oeuvre, and one can, if one so desires, relate this to the 
questions posed earlier about how, when, and where power is exercised. 
The answer to the question ‘How is power exercised?’ would then be ‘by 
way of different kinds of influence and avoidance of influence in social 
interaction’, while the other two questions about when and where power 
is exercised would be answered with ‘just about always’, and ‘in principle 
everywhere’. Such an understanding of power could in addition be seen 
as an illustration of the transformation of the exercise of power described 
in Foucault’s claim that power relations are immanent in other types of 
relations.
In order to summarise Goffman’s implicit power perspective, it can be 
said to deal with influence and avoidance of influence in different forms, de-
grees of intensity, and frequency, with the exercise of power being conscious 
and unconscious, physical and psychological. Impression management is a 
clear example of influence, while civil inattention is an example of avoidance 
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of anything other than superficial influence. The power to influence is com-
pletely integrated into what Goffman calls the interaction order in two ways:
1  To influence and be influenced by unknown others to the smallest de-
gree possible.
2  To influence known others and (if to a lesser degree) unknown others in 
accordance with norms for interaction regarding respect, regulation of 
distance, apologies – in short: social etiquette.
Framing social interaction as exercise of power
There is, however, also another understanding of power in Goffman’s works, 
and it rather constitutes an answer to the question ‘Why is power exercised?’ 
and is connected to framing. Goffman argues that it is in an individual’s 
interest to gain control over the actions of other people in situations that 
are shared, and this is done by influencing other people’s definition of the 
situation:
Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind 
and of his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to 
control the conduct of the others, especially their responsive treatment 
of him. This control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of 
the situation which the others come to formulate, and he can influence 
this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the 
kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accord-
ance with his own plan. (Goffman, 1959, p. 3f)3
It is this theme of influence that is developed further in Goffman’s version 
of the frame concept, and it constitutes the most important difference in 
comparison to James’s cognitive and Bateson’s communicative concept of 
frame. As has already been mentioned, Goffman’s interactive frame con-
cept has, to a great extent, to do with creating mutual definitions in situa-
tions shared by other individuals:
At work, I think, is the possibility that every definition of the situation, 
every continued application of a wonted frame, seems to presuppose 
and bank on an array of motivational forces, and through certain ex-
treme measures any such balance seems to be disruptable. To be able to 
alter this balance sharply at will is to exert power: that is one meaning 
of the term. (Goffman, 1974, p. 447)
Here it is thus not simply a matter of influencing other people’s definition of 
oneself through a definition of the situation, as was expressed in the above 
quote from The Presentation of Self, but about influencing other people’s 
definitions of the shared situation. The exercise of power thus lies in the 
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common framing – either the reproduced one or the altered one – of the 
situation. This somewhat takes the sting out of the otherwise reasonable 
criticism directed by Denzin and Keller (1981, p. 59) at Goffman’s occasion-
ally rather one-dimensional use of the frame concept, at least in the opening 
chapter of Frame Analysis. They nevertheless exaggerate when they, in the 
same breath, claim that ‘There is no interaction in Frame Analysis’. It is true 
that some parts of the book focus more on the individual than on the inter-
action, something that Goffman himself notes in the (from the perspective 
of the power of influence) highly interesting chapter ‘Breaking Frame’:
It has been argued that the individual’s framing of activity establishes 
its meaningfulness for him. Frame, however, organizes more than 
meaning; it also organizes involvement. During any spate of activity, 
participants will ordinarily not only obtain a sense of what is going on 
but will also (in some degree) become spontaneously engrossed, caught 
up, enthralled. All frames involve expectations of a normative kind as 
to how deeply and fully the individual is to be carried into the activity 
organized by the frames. (Goffman, 1974, p. 345)
Goffman also describes how framing constitutes a kind of instrument of 
influence – indeed, even a tool for the exercise of power – that the indi-
vidual nevertheless can also consciously resist and unconsciously violate. 
He writes that ‘involvement is an interlocking obligation’, which means that 
individuals in a commonly framed situation are linked and dependent on 
each other, and therefore have an interest in adjusting not only their own 
but also other people’s actions according to the requirements of the framing. 
At the same time he says, completely in line with the dynamic relationship 
 between ritualisation, vulnerability, and temporarily working consensus 
that I have previously described, that all social activity appears vulnerable 
to violations of the framing. Goffman describes unconscious violations of 
the framing, which he calls ‘flooding out’, and which can be exemplified with 
breaking out into uncontrolled laughter, and shifts of nuance in the framing 
that lead to actions that violate the frame. Goffman describes breaking the 
frame in words that in a contrasting manner make me, at least, think about 
power: ‘the unmanageable might occur, […], with resulting bewilderment 
and chagrin’, ‘a break can occur in the applicability of the frame, a break in 
its governance’, ‘back into control by the frame’, ‘becoming interactionally 
disorganized’.
Goffman’s way of looking at power corresponds well with what Haugaard 
and Clegg (2013 [2009], p. 3) believe has characterised the development of the 
concept of power since the 1980s: ‘perceptions of power that see it as more 
generally constitutive of reality’. They also discuss the fact that Goffman’s 
perspective, like ethnomethodology, was for a long time not recognised as a 
perspective that could contribute to the theory of power. The reason for this, 
they believe, may be that Goffman’s sociology has been perceived as ‘micro’ 
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while power has been defined as ‘macro’ (Clegg & Haugaard, 2013 [2009]
a, p. 450). My contribution in this chapter, when it comes to the exercise of 
power according to Goffman’s perspective, is that the exercise of power is 
constructed from below through the constitution of the mutual definitions 
of reality of interacting actors in shared situations. This is what framing 
social interaction is about.
Notes
 1 Goffman’s analysis of and way of understanding a total institution is, to a great 
extent, based on observational studies of social life in closed mental hospitals, 
in spite of this being only one of the different kinds of institutions that Goffman 
regards as total institutions. Mental hospitals together with prisons are obvious 
examples of such institutions, convents/monasteries and boarding schools are 
not too far-fetched, while ships and ‘large mansions from the point of view of 
those who live in the servants’ quarters’ are more surprising examples (see, in 
addition, Goffman, 1961a, p. 16).
 2 In a later text Goffman calls a similar phenomenon in the interaction in public 
places ‘civil inattention’ (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84).
 3 In a footnote in connection with this excerpt from the text, Goffman refers to 
an unpublished paper by Tom Burns where Burns argues for the idea that in all 
interaction there is an underlying theme: ‘the desire of each participant to guide 





Erving Goffman drew a radical line right across the social interaction 
existence on the one side what is presented and what is or is made visible 
in the interaction with others (frontstage), and on the other side what is 
not presented or remains hidden (backstage). When the idea of such a 
boundary has been established, it is hardly possible to experience one 
side without thinking about the other. Is he or she really the way she or he 
represents him- or herself? Do the ethical guidelines at my place of work 
truly reflect what is happening there? Are the state representatives’ talk 
about democracy supported in concrete actions by democratic  institutions 
and practices? This is a very basic and radical  metaperspective because 
we – individual or collective actors – continually relate how we imagine 
we are and should be, and want to be perceived how (we  believe  that) 
other people perceive us. What distinguishes  Goffman’s sociology is 
precisely this continuously present metaperspective that is expressed in 
Frame  Analysis, but that I have shown also characterises his substantial 
analyses of social interaction.  Goffman’s approach was frame analytic 
long before he wrote the book on frame analysis as a method.
For some reason I imagine that assuming a metaperspective was not 
as common in Goffman’s day as it is today. I believe this has to do with 
faith; that there was faith in science, in the state, in society, authorities, 
media, and many other things that are distrusted today. Goffman rarely 
expressed such faith, but seemed to be constantly critical in a typically 
scholarly manner, and almost always regarded his objects of study from 
a metaperspective. This perspective is per definition critical because it 
demonstrates that other perspectives are possible. It may seem that the 
person who adopts a metaperspective does not share the common per-
spectives that everybody is assumed or even expected to adopt. I believe 
this was more pronounced in Goffman’s day; today it is in many cases im-
plied and is only made apparent when somebody is considered to have vi-
olated views that everybody is assumed to need to share. At the same time, 
one cannot disregard the fact that our time can be perceived as precisely 
a time of metaperspectives, whether they are analytic-scientific, cynical, 
experience-based, mediating, selling, persuasive, and probably additional 
10 Concluding remarks
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other kinds. I was given an indication of this recently, when two Jehovah’s 
Witnesses rang the doorbell. After explaining in an overly friendly way 
that I wasn’t interested, they handed me a leaflet where it said that god 
will improve the world. For some reason I read the leaflet, which towards 
the end poses the question, ‘Can one really believe in this?’, and my con-
viction that blind faith excludes metareflection was at first given a proper 
challenge. Then I understood that this was a metareflexively persuasive 
question that aims at trying to convince non-believers such as myself. So 
if our time is a time of metaperspectives, it is also a time when we have to 
reflect on metaperspectives. That is what I have tried to do in this book 
when it comes to Goffman’s metaperspective.
Goffman was programmatically ‘meta’, and his overriding thesis is said 
to have been ‘don’t take the world at face value’. This is a good scholarly 
point of departure, but it does not work particularly well in social interac-
tion, because there trust seems to be more important than doubt. In order 
to study social interaction, critical metaperspectives are needed; in order to 
perform social interaction, these are often a scourge. The framing of social 
interaction, the way I have tried to present it in this book, is both a scientific 
approach to social interaction as an object of study, and a practice that peo-
ple use in order to create shared realities in social interaction.
My motive in writing this book has been to create a better understanding 
of Goffman’s frame perspective for myself. I think I have succeeded in doing 
this, and my hope is that the reader who has got this far in the text shares 
this perception, or at any rate has been given tools for critically reflecting 
further on Goffman’s metaperspective.
My contribution can be summarised as follows:
1  Goffman’s object of study was the interaction order, and, within that 
framework, three themes regarding social interaction: politeness/respect, 
social illusions, and - to a lesser degree - crisis in the interaction order.
2  I have throughout described Goffman’s overarching perspective and 
interpretational framework as the dynamic relationship between ritual-
isation, vulnerability, and temporarily working consensus.
3  Goffman’s method of analysis was frame analysis, and I like to frame 
the book Frame Analysis as a book on methodology where this method 
of analysis is presented and discussed.
4  I have shown that there was continuity in Goffman’s way of working. 
His work was frame analytic long before the book Frame Analysis was 
published. However, there were also cracks; e.g., the fact that time is, to 
a great extent, absent in Goffman’s frame analysis and that this method 
of analysis for that reason may well be complemented with a tempo-
ral perspective. I attempt to show that Koselleck’s combination of the 
metahistorical categories of space of experience and horizon of expec-
tation can provide that temporal perspective.
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5  Another crack is the crisis in the interaction order that Goffman spo-
radically mentions, beginning in his book Relations in Public from 
1971 and forwards. As I have shown, vulnerability can be found 
throughout in Goffman’s texts, but from the above-mentioned book 
and forwards, vulnerability can be connected to contingency the way 
it was later represented by leading sociologists; e.g., Giddens and 
Bauman. By placing emphasis on a crisis in the interaction order, it 
is also possible to link Goffman’s microsociological question, ‘What 
is it that’s going on here?’, to increasing experiences of uncertainty in 
society.
6  I describe frame as the social dynamics of the situation, not least be-
cause Goffman often tried to describe precisely the dynamic character 
of framing, both in Frame Analysis and in earlier studies. These dy-
namics are a result of the combination of governing mechanisms, the 
unifying situation, and the actual performance of the interaction by the 
actors themselves.
7  The frame concept gives a somewhat rigid impression while at the same 
time it is a result of variation; it has the character of a frozen moment 
in a variable social existence. The concept of framing is, to my mind, 
better suited for capturing the essentially dynamic transformations that 
are about to occur when individuals interact with each other and that 
flash by in Goffman’s analysis of social interaction.
8  I see social media as a new interaction order. This consists, at bot-
tom, of the same basic elements as the face-to-face interaction or-
der, but these can be framed in various ways in social media such 
as  Facebook, online chess, and chat interaction, due to completely 
different interaction conditions. The most important difference in in-
teraction conditions has to do with dissimilarities in the transmission 
of expressions: a broad transmission face-to-face and a narrow one 
in social media. One indication of that we here have to do with a new 
interaction order, is that frame disputes are more common in social 
media; for example, in online chess and chat, than in face-to-face 
interaction.
9  Goffman’s entire project has to do with influencing others and avoiding 
influence from others. I attempt to show that Goffman has quite a bit to 
add to research on power if power is defined as influence and resistance 
to influence.
Four pages from the end of Frame Analysis Goffman asks, ‘And at the heart 
of it?’, and I urge my readers to read these pages themselves, but I can nev-
ertheless not resist quoting a few memorable lines:
There is a relation between persons and role. But the relationship an-
swers to the interactive system – to the frame – in which the role is 
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performed and the self of the performer is glimpsed. Self, then, is not 
an entity half-concealed behind events, but a changeable formula for 
managing oneself during them. (1974, p. 573)
If one wants to experience what Goffman expresses here one should visit 
Las Vegas – which we will soon do in our imaginations – where boundless-
ness itself is framed.
We fly over the Rocky Mountains from the northeast, and there in the night 
she lies, bathing in her own neon light – ‘that great whore on the other side 
of the desert’, as French sociologist Jean Baudrillard (1988 [1986], p. 3) once 
called Las Vegas seen from the horizon of Salt Lake City. On the ground an 
unusually efficient machine takes care of us, and after a moment we cruise 
in an airport shuttle along the Strip – the broad, 7 km-long street whose in-
finite multiplicity of commercial glitter is the main attraction of Las Vegas. 
This was what professor of architecture Robert Venturi et al. (1972) wanted 
us to see as a communication system where symbol is more dominant than 
place. The Strip is bordered by hotels that in many cases are copies of other 
things: they symbolise tourist attractions such as Venice, the skyline of New 
York, Paris, a pyramid in Egypt, a casino in Monte Carlo, and film versions 
of Camelot and Treasure Island. The idea of the Strip is well captured in 
the ads for the hotel Paris Las Vegas with its 2,900 rooms, spa facilities, and 
casino:
You can hit the highlights in no time. As part of its architecture, the 
resort has detailed replicas of the Arc de Triomphe, Louvre façade, 
Paris Opera House and Hotel de Ville. And you certainly can’t miss the 
50-story, half-scale replica of the Eiffel Tower, now one of Las Vegas’ 
most famous landmarks.
On the plane from Chicago I speak to a woman who is visiting Las Vegas 
for the fourth time. It is the luxury, the glamour, the strolling among the 
boutiques, and the posh hotel with its pool area that attract her. ‘Everything 
is right here,’ she says, and continues, ‘You don’t have to go to Paris, Venice, 
Cairo; everything is here in Las Vegas!’ It is madly postmodern –  authenticity, 
so what! – a burlesque fast-forwarding of the world’s tourist magnets, swell 
places, and television sagas as Disneyfied American mythology. This is not 
a place that is ashamed of being a copy.
However, the hotels are not simply copies; they also have their own iden-
tities by being among the biggest in the world. In 2007, fifteen of the world’s 
twenty largest hotels were located in Las Vegas. In the same year there were 
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151,000 hotel rooms there and another 11,000 in hotels under construction, 
which can be compared to around 80,000 hotel rooms in New York at the 
same time (Rivlin, 2007). During the last fifty years, growth in Las Vegas 
has time and again passed the limit of what was believed possible. Up until 
2007 Las Vegas had the most rapid increase in population of any metropol-
itan area in the US since 1969. During the period 2000–7 the population of 
Las Vegas increased by 31% from one and a half million to over two million 
people (Lang, Sarzynski, & Muro, 2008). Of the more than 5,000 people who 
moved to Las Vegas every month during the above-mentioned period, many 
bought properties with borrowed funds, and several ended up in trouble 
when the financial crisis broke out in 2008, which is why Las Vegas now also 
attracts people with its low property prices due to compulsory auctions. 
When we visit the city in 20111 the number of hotel rooms has decreased 
to 148,000 (according to Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority) and 
many people talk about the crisis, but it is hard to discover any sort of cri-
sis in the shimmering glitter. We don’t know whether to interpret this as a 
successful recovery from the crisis or as us dancing on a grave. We arrive at 
midnight and everything is happening as though it were daytime and per-
haps also as though nothing has changed. In the hotel room we hear planes 
land and take off; this in fact happens 1,400 times a day, and forty million 
passengers per year are transported to and from Las Vegas via McCarran 
Airport (statistics for the year 2009 according to ACI 2011). Many people 
also come in cars from Los Angeles, a ‘metropolis of the West’ to which Nils 
Runeby (2003) also counts Las Vegas. What are they after?
Action!
In Las Vegas hardly any cars or other industrial products are manufactured; 
here it is experiences that are produced, and not just any experiences but 
action, to express it in the words of Erving Goffman. In the 1960s he was 
a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, and among much 
else made covert observations in casinos in Las Vegas, both as a skilfully 
card-counting gambler and undercover as an employed blackjack dealer. 
His goal was to study both service relationships and ‘the frayed edges of 
American civilization’ in Las Vegas, as he wrote in a letter from 1960 to 
Everett Hughes (quoted in Pettit, 2011, p. 145). Few people have described 
the fleeting character of Las Vegas as Goffman did in his essay ‘Where the 
Action Is’:
Not only are money gambles made available, this type of action is 
overlaid with the consumption kind. A brief penetration into high 
living is laid on. Attendant-parked limousines are cluttered at the en-
trance. Beyond the entrance, the setting is luxurious. Liquor is served 
at the tables, often at no cost to the consumer. A quality buffet may 
be provided, allowing for discriminative gorging. A gratuity system is 
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encouraged that elevates its users and provides scantily clad waitresses, 
selected for their looks, cause to be somewhat accessible. A ‘pit’ oper-
ated signal system enables these girls to deliver drinks, cigarettes and 
aspirin anywhere on the premises upon request. […] Table contact is fa-
cilitated with the nationally known and with big spenders. Proximity to 
what some might consider the gangster element is also provided. Easy 
access to nationally famous entertainment is assured, and even some 
physical closeness to the entertainers themselves. The lounge bar is 
‘dressed’ with chorus girls clothed in their off-stage costumes. Female 
customers feel they can experiment with sports high-fashion, claiming 
an age and style they might be too modest to try out at home. In brief, 
the opportunity for ephemeral ennoblement abounds. However, should 
the consumer want to sit down during this ennoblement, he will very 
likely have to sit at a gaming table. There is a rich ambience, then, but 
each minute of it is likely to cost the risking of considerable money. 
(Goffman, 1967, p. 198f)
Action, according to Goffman, is the word that describes the special so-
cial dynamics that characterise both games of chance and other activities 
where ‘the individual knowingly takes consequential chances perceived as 
avoidable’ (Goffman, 1967, p. 194) – or, it should be added, where these in-
dividuals are in proximity to or in environments in which other people take 
such risks. Extreme sports, wild partying, and fast cars are other examples 
of this. When Tony Soprano in the television series Sopranos visits Las Ve-
gas it becomes a break even from his everyday existence as a Mafioso: sex 
with his mistress in the luxurious hotel room, mescaline from the peyote 
cactus, and games of chance. Action is living fast, partying, risk-taking, and 
whatever is ‘in’. We find all this in Las Vegas, at any rate if one leaves the 
run-down Riviera Hotel where the symposium I am visiting takes place. 
This hotel was built in 1955 in a ‘grand European style’, and was the first 
high-rise hotel (nine floors) on the Strip, since when, it is true, it has added 
up to around twenty floors, but is nevertheless dwarfed by the sixty-eight-
floor high Fontainebleau, which is located just next door. There is not a lot 
of action going on at the Riviera any longer.2 The erstwhile glamour of the 
Hotel Riviera has vanished, even the Lonely Planet guidebook informs us; 
the visitors in the shabby casino are as old as the hills, and ‘outside the front 
entrance, a bawdy bronzed statue of the Riv’s showgirls is fondly fondled 
by drunk tourists’ (Benson, 2009, p. 68). But there is action to be found in 
many other places in Las Vegas: in hundreds of casinos, in lots of bars where 
serious partying is going on, in queer bars, in the many clubs with exciting 
music and shows with well-known artists. There is a rollercoaster and bun-
gee jumping at the top of the 350-metre high tower the Stratosphere, and 
many other things. One begins to understand what Hunter S. Thompson 
(Thompson, 2005 [1972], p. 47) meant when he in 1971 wrote, ‘this is not a 
good town for psychedelic drugs. Reality itself is too twisted’.
152 Epilogue
The reason why Las Vegas took the step from a group of farms to a city 
was that the railway between Los Angeles and Salt Lake City opened in 
1905. Bars and gambling clubs sprouted up along Fremont Street, situated 
close to the railway station in what is today the old centre of Las Vegas. With 
the opening of the Golden Nugget in 1945, which was then the largest ca-
sino in Las Vegas, competition increased. Other casinos were modernised, 
and Fremont Street became known as the Glitter Gulch (McCracken, 1997). 
A few years earlier gambling and hotel businesses had started up along what 
later came to be called the Strip, which is now the centre point of Las Vegas. 
In the 1940s the Mafioso Bugsy Siegel decided to invest large sums of dirty 
money in Las Vegas, and in 1940 he built the casino hotel the Flamingo, 
which was claimed to connect Monte Carlo stylistically to Miami Beach, 
and which is today the oldest hotel on the Strip. Many other hotels followed, 
were renovated, added to, and torn down, from 1993, in the form of con-
trolled demolitions before an audience on-site and on the Internet. The ways 
of attracting tourists have gradually become ever more studied, and the ca-
sino hotels have developed into ever more luxurious and grandiose variants; 
such as, for instance, Caesar’s Palace, built in 1966, which was then followed 
by theme hotels that depict Paris, the New York skyline, an Egyptian pyra-
mid, and many, many other things.
The latest wave consists of so-called mega-resorts, enormous indoor 
landscapes where casinos are mixed with luxury restaurants, pool areas, spa 
facilities, bars, boutiques, and shows where naked bodies are intermingled 
with top artists. All this is now part of what even the guidebook calls reinven-
tion, a continuous reimagination or maybe reconstruction, in small things 
as in great, of the very idea of Las Vegas: attracting people with constantly 
new attractions that are bigger, riskier, more sinful – in short, attracting 
people with more action. This leads to many things that exist today in Las 
Vegas being something other than what they previously were: ‘Long-time 
residents still refer to the Palace Station as the Bingo Palace, to Hoover Dam 
as Boulder Dam, to Las Vegas Boulevard as the Boulevard rather than The 
Strip, and to local restaurants by their name from three to five incarnations 
ago’, write Gottdiener, Dickens, and Collins (1999, p. 197f). If one reads 
a historical reflection on Las Vegas as a hotel and casino town (e.g., Mc-
Cracken, 1997), and at the same time tries to identify the hotels and casinos 
that are mentioned on a contemporary map, one finds that there are many 
that no longer exist. Gottdiener et al. argue that one important reason for 
this reinvention is ‘the “est” philosophy: Newest, Biggest,  Fastest, Costliest, 
Loudest, Tallest’. Action in the above-mentioned and many other forms is 
an important part of what some call the experience economy (e.g., Boswijk, 
Thijssen, & Peelen, 2007), which occasionally becomes a kind of event econ-
omy, and Las Vegas is perhaps its most spectacular manifestation. This is 
where municipal councillors from Sweden come to be inspired when they 
try to transform an industrial economy into one of experiences and events, 
a transformation that we can later see illustrated in ads; for example, when 
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the shop Lager 157 is about to open a branch in a small town: ‘5 days to go 
[…] Opening soon […] Design Outlet […] a 3,500 sqm ceramics factory has 
become 3,500 sqm of fashion and experiences’. On Twitter came the addi-
tion, ‘Nothing will ever be the same’.
Framed boundlessness
In Las Vegas the motor of the dynamics of the experience economy is proba-
bly primarily action that transgresses moral and habitual limits, or, in other 
words, a framed boundlessness that makes action possible. Las Vegas is a 
kind of free zone that in principle can be likened to phenomena such as 
economic free zones, freed from, for instance, taxes, rules, and unions, free 
schools that are freed from municipal regulations and bureaucracy, and tax 
havens that are often situated on islands or in Switzerland with its bank 
secrecy. These all involve a kind of framed boundlessness – authorities draw 
a line and decide that within this boundary other rules and conditions shall 
apply than outside it. In the same way, in Las Vegas it is decisions by the 
authorities that create differentiated conditions on the one or the other side 
of a stipulated boundary. For example, entrepreneurs used the differences 
created by politically decided tax boundaries and began to build hotels on a 
site outside the Las Vegas city limits because of the lower taxes there. That 
place is today called the Strip.
In Las Vegas gambling was given sanctuary from 1931, but also other 
things that were or are forbidden in the rest of the United States are permit-
ted either in the city of Las Vegas or in the state of Nevada. Quick marriages 
came to be an aspect of the free zone when Nevada kept their liberal marital 
laws while other states passed more restrictive ones. ‘How far in advance do 
you have to know if we decide to get married?’, my wife Titti and I asked the 
wedding organiser outside our hotel chapel, which was decorated wholly in 
plastic. ‘Give me two hours,’ she answered. Quick divorces became legal in 
Nevada in 1911, and became well-known after Hollywood celebrities such 
as Clark Gable and his wife later took advantage of the opportunity to get 
an express divorce in Las Vegas (McCracken, 1997). Finally, as the only 
state in the United States, Nevada permits brothels, albeit not in cities with 
more than 400,000 citizens, which means that brothels are not allowed in the 
actual city of Las Vegas. But within an hour’s drive from the city one can 
find Mabel’s Whorehouse and The Chicken Ranch, and in these and eleven 
other brothels researchers from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, have 
conducted ethnographic studies over a period of ten years (Brents,  Jackson, & 
Hausbeck, 2010). They have primarily been interested in prostitution as 
work and the working conditions of the prostitutes, not at all issues that 
seem to engage many people in Sweden – i.e., whether prostitution should 
be seen as oppression or not. They show that legal brothels are far from a 
matter of course in Nevada. It is true that Nevada has ‘built a tourist in-
dustry on turning deviance into leisure’ (ibid., p. 2), but not deviance strong 
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enough to appear abnormal, and there are different opinions concerning 
where the boundaries of normality should be drawn. The casino industry 
opposes legal brothels, continue Brents et al., while its own marketing at 
the same time makes use of sexual innuendo. In the guidebook we can read 
about striptease clubs: ‘Vegas is the original adult Disneyland. Prostitution 
may be illegal, but there are plenty of places offering the illusion of sex on 
demand’ (Benson, 2009, p. 152).
Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (a so-called quasi- authority, 
established by the state, tax-financed by Clark County, and governed by an 
autonomous board whose task it is to market southern Nevada) has made 
a series of commercials under the motto ‘What happens in Vegas, stays in 
Vegas’. It is both an invitation and an assurance that it is permissible to do 
things one perhaps would not do at home. In one of the films we can see a fe-
male physician tear off her white working clothes at the hospital, and in the 
next moment she is in Las Vegas wearing pumps, a push-up bra, and string 
tanga, busily testing the limits of her identity. Men’s identity experiments in 
the commercials from the quasi-authority are about, among other things, 
assuming a professional title with high status and power, and then going out 
onto the street and negotiating with prostitutes.3 In spite of the commer-
sexual licentiousness in the Strip and the Glitter Gulch, the commercials 
portray the possible roles of men and women in an extraordinarily limited 
and traditionally sexualised way: she chooses to be a sex object in her iden-
tity experiment; he becomes a wealthy and powerful party who controls her. 
The identity experiments have to do with becoming something other than 
what one is at present, and in that respect they are similar to Las Vegas’s 
own reinvention.
Global tourism, from which the casino industry makes money, often 
means, according to Brents et al. (2010), the promotion of prostitution in 
different forms. The economic dynamics that characterise Las Vegas have, 
to a great extent, to do with managing boundaries: other people’s mainte-
nance of moral boundaries in other locations and the transgression of moral 
boundaries in Las Vegas. The difference between these two forms the foun-
dation of many business ideas in Las Vegas. Such differences made it possi-
ble in the 1950s to turn a loss into a profit by including a strip show, as was 
the case with the casino hotel the Dunes (Gottdiener et al., 1999).
Today it is other moral boundaries that are maintained and transgressed. 
Maintaining boundaries can, for instance, be a route that leads to differenti-
ation of the clientele. The new hotels on the Strip are veritable luxury hotels 
that cater to a certain category of customers. The Wynn (built in 2005) and 
its sister hotel, the Encore (built in 2008), for instance, leave sordidness and 
a moral balancing act behind them. The idea is, instead, elegance, exclusiv-
ity, and respectability. For this reason, the boutiques in the Wynn’s lovely 
ground floor mall display brands such as Dior, Rolex, Cartier, Gaultier, and 
Chanel, while the food in the restaurants is designed by prizewinning chefs 
and drinks are consumed with a view over an artificial waterfall. The owner, 
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Steve Wynn, has a long Las Vegas history behind him, and during recent 
decades this history seems to have developed under the aegis of respectabil-
ity. When in 1993 he replaced the Mafia-associated 1950s hotel the Dunes 
with the glamorous Bellagio, the Las Vegas Mafia era is said to have come 
to an end. And this was accomplished in a symbolically significant way: the 
Dunes was blown up before an audience of 200,000 people, and this demo-
lition can be seen on a special web page featuring demolitions of Las Vegas 
hotels.4
Against this background one can ask if it is a coincidence that the two sis-
ter hotels, the Wynn and the Encore, are constructed like a kind of reversed 
brackets, seen from above, like this:
– albeit in reality somewhat displaced laterally. Las Vegas is a place where 
brackets have been put around many things that otherwise characterise 
American society. Consequently, free reign has been given to licentiousness 
in a number of different respects: legal games of chance, quick marriages 
and divorces, partying, round-the-clock opening hours, and legal brothels 
in the vicinity. Many things, in other words, of what Elvis Presley in the 
film and song Viva Las Vegas (Presley, 1964) complains are impossible to 
have the time to experience during the far too short twenty-four-hour day. 
 Bracketing has been an especially good deal – the question is if respect-
ability, which of course is a kind of de-bracketing in Las Vegas, is also a 
good deal. The financial crisis in 2008 created serious problems in the city, 
and when Deutsche Bank wanted to sell the Cosmopolitan, the four billion- 
dollar casino hotel in Las Vegas, it also turned out that the casino hotel did 
not turn a profit. In Las Vegas it is cheap to stay in a hotel because a hotel’s 
casino is the moneymaking machine. Oldenburg (1999 [1989], p. 224) writes 
that in Las Vegas a casino-goer can lose 100,000 dollars without complain-
ing but gripe that a can of Coca-Cola is too expensive. The extraordinary 
bar of the Cosmopolitan is, however, an attraction for young people, al-
though the hotel does not consider them people from whom enough money 
can be made, since they hang out in the bar rather than gamble away their 
money in the casino, according to the New York Times (Craig, 2011), which 
also reveals the scoop that a drunken person threw up in the line to the 
nightclub at the so far respectable Cosmopolitan.
There are tensions in the framed boundlessness. The tension between 
sexual licentiousness and contempt for women is, for example, given an 
everyday but extremely clear expression when we see a man display a 
T-shirt in a shop to another man. On the T-shirt there are two women: 
) (
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‘my wife’, who is an extremely overweight woman, and ‘my girl’, who is 
exceedingly curvaceous. In the street we see large numbers of both ex-
tremely overweight women (and men) and, in some cases, ‘my girls’ in 
the form of prostitutes that totter about in extremely high-heeled shoes 
while ‘their’ pimps stand on street corners like watchful vultures, with 
their upper bodies bent forward and their wits about them. Here there 
is also tension between  commercial licentiousness and the carnivalesque. 
Everything is commodified and commercialised in Sin City, the name Las 
Vegas is sometimes given. At the same time this seems to promote an-
other kind of licentiousness, which may perhaps be described as the carni-
valesque. For a brief time people free themselves from the grip power has 
on their everyday routines, just as in mediaeval carnivals (Bachtin, 1968), 
and we can illustrate this using Tom Wolfe’s article from the 1960s on Las 
Vegas, republished in a book with the amazing title The  Kandy-Kolored 
 Tangerine-Flake Streamline Baby (Wolfe, 1971). In this article, Wolfe 
 refers to a meeting with four senior citizens who do not want go to bed, 
and he is struck by the realisation that Las Vegas is there for old people 
who shake loose. Out of the closet he then pulls all the everyday Prot-
estant taboos that the senior citizens try to violate by drinking, having 
fun, playing games of chance, being out late, getting up late, wasting their 
time, idling about, and moseying around town in capri pants. This licen-
tiousness does not cost a lot of money; above all it requires time. Here the 
framing of the licentiousness and the expression ‘What happens in Vegas 
stays in Vegas’ now gets a new meaning, when also the rebellious side of 
the carnival stays in Las Vegas, thereby being kept within its prescribed 
frame. The humdrum everyday existence, which is often programmed by 
different power-wielders, is challenged for a limited time, by both suckers 
and escapists, to quote an article by Findlay (1990).
Everyday life in Las Vegas
When Goffman describes casino activities in Nevada, he sees people with 
lively and daring attitudes to life, who, in the hope of winning, sometimes 
put their families, their assets, house and home, future education, and 
present work at stake in the casino. Goffman wants to explain this daring 
 liveliness with reference to Nevada’s special social organisation, or rather 
the social dynamics to which the special framing of Las Vegas gives rise:
The relative ease of divorce and marriage; the presence of a very large 
number of persons who have failed occupationally or maritally; a fron-
tier tradition of asking no questions about a person’s history or current 
livelihood; the clear possibility of getting an equivalent job across the 
street after being fired; the high visibility of a large number of casino 
employees known to have worked recently in better jobs in other casi-
nos; the fact that sporadic bouts of big play mean sporadic realization 
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of the ideal experience of a culture, such that however long and lean 
the days between bouts, this use of one’s money may be the best that 
Nevada can offer. (Goffman, 1967, p. 194)
When Goffman wrote this in the mid 1960s, Las Vegas (including the rest 
of Clark County) had around 150,000 inhabitants, and was probably mainly 
a gambling den, and people’s everyday existence was characterised by this. 
Since then the population has increased to over two million inhabitants, 
and Las Vegas has become one of the primary tourist resorts in the world. 
The gambling den has become a tourist industry. All kinds of infrastructure 
is needed in a city of over a million inhabitants: drains, water, communi-
cation, schools, hospitals, universities, and everything else that belongs to 
everyday life instead of to the action of the casinos and the event economy. 
Roads are needed so that people who work nights can transport themselves 
to their residences in the suburbs, and so that the people who work days can 
get from the suburbs to their jobs.
One might wonder what kind of everyday life people live in the Las Vegas 
of the tourist industry. For instance, how is it to have children there? How 
can one express the difference between how one reacts as a parent when 
one’s teenager calls out, ‘Bye, I’m going into town!’ if one lives in  Stockholm, 
Iowa City, Ystad, or Las Vegas? I asked my colleagues in Las Vegas about 
their everyday lives, and a person who had not lived there very long an-
swered that everyday life was a bit tricky and that it is probably okay as long 
as one does not have children. Another person who had lived there for a long 
time had moved up into the nearby mountains.
Everyday life is what one has become accustomed to, and the way in which 
one has adapted to the social organisation and dynamics that characterise 
life in one’s surroundings. Las Vegas is, to an extreme extent, a city organised 
for tourism, and tourists there (like in other places) are probably more in-
terested in getting away from their own everyday existence than in  engaging 
themselves other than fleetingly with the everyday lives of the locals. The 
two characteristics I have pointed to earlier, reinvention and boundless-
ness, exist in a tense relationship to everyday existence.  Reinvention seems 
to mean constant change to maintain what is characteristic of Las Vegas, 
and perhaps this affects the everyday existence of the locals most, because 
they experience the changes entailed by construction, new attractions, and 
so on. The inhabitants are said to joke that the building crane is the city 
bird of Las Vegas. With 5,000 or more people moving in per month, as was 
the case during the 1990s, one must, for instance, construct a new school 
every month (Gottdiener et al., 1999). The boundlessness, on the other hand, 
is consciously exploited in order to challenge the everyday existence of the 
tourist in many different ways, and to constantly challenge the boundaries 
between the back and front regions of individuals. Everyday existence has, 
to a great extent, to do with maintaining the boundary between these re-
gions in a special way and often in great agreement with other people, and 
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be, do, and say what is appropriate in the respective region. Licentious sex-
uality, partying, gambling, and play instead of work and everyday existence 
challenge this division into regions. To express it in words borrowed from 
a person who at a public enquiry philosophised about how to lure more 
tourists to Nevada:
Let’s talk about gaming, 24-hour availability of liquor, quickie divorces, 
all the things we do here in Nevada. We have been very successful at this 
because we recognize one overriding issue, and that is that one man’s 
morality is another man’s pleasure […] I’ve been asked many times […] 
‘What can we do here […] to bring more tourism in?’ […] you have to 
offer people something that they can’t get at home. (quoted in Brents et 
al., 2010, p. 1)
What tourists get in Las Vegas they in part take home with them, and this 
tends to change their everyday existence. It is this routinisation of difference 
that leads to what we perceive as a need for action to continually be de-
veloped. Action cannot become everyday existence. When the tourists take 
action home and begin to drink umbrella drinks while they barbecue an 
ordinary pork chop, play roulette on the Internet, and in different ways try 
to adopt less mundane lifestyles, then everyday existence changes. Thus, 
everything that happens in Las Vegas does not stay in Las Vegas. This dis-
persal of action from Las Vegas to other places also happens in other ways; 
for example, games of chance are today allowed in all US states except two, 
instead of only in Nevada, and the Internet has also become a gambling 
den. Some people feel that because of this, Las Vegas has become more of 
a pioneer than a deviant. The city’s new face is more respectability and less 
sin, more games than gambling, more family tourism than sex tourism. As 
has been made clear, backstage there are also other things.
Three tension-filled social dynamics characterise this strange city. First, 
the framed boundlessness that gives Las Vegas its distinctive character, at 
the same time that it is distributed outside of its boundaries, is diluted, and 
therefore must be constantly reinvented in new forms so as not to lose out 
in the sharp competition of the event economy. Second, folksiness, which is 
a prerequisite for the extreme mass tourism on which Las Vegas supports 
itself, and the simultaneous striving for upper-class respectability that un-
derlies the new mega-hotels that manage impressions using luxury, money, 
and class. Third, and finally, the increasing normalisation and convention-
alisation of the city of Las Vegas and its dependence on, and exploitation of, 
the ‘abnormal’ and deviant. All these things are there at the same time; one 
is not more real than the other.
We decide to walk to the Arts District that is situated halfway between the 
Strip and the old city core of Las Vegas. We pass the Fontainebleau, three 
quarters finished, Sahara Avenue and the 350-metre tower the  Stratosphere, 
and then the neighbourhoods become increasingly seedy. When we see 
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small wedding chapels and shabby motels adjacent to them with signs bear-
ing the text Adult Movies we can truly imagine the sequence of activities 
the newlyweds go through … Then we get to the Arts District, and after a 
while to blocks where we are the only white people on the street. Our bodies 
scream whiteness and our shorts are clear tourist signs. In the street there 
are groups of black men, someone shouts at us from a motel balcony. A 
black man stops in front of us, smiles his kind, toothless smile, and says, 
‘Welcome to the real Las Vegas!’
Notes
 1 This text was originally written in 2012 and is based on data up to that same 
year. 
 2 Nor at the Fontainebleau, which was only 70% complete before the financial cri-
sis hit in 2008 and transformed its ‘25 acres of prime Strip-front real estate’  (Illia, 
2011) into a construction site completely without action, and this is also how it 
can be described in April 2017 (Gillan, 2017). When it comes to the  Riviera, it 
was closed in 2015 and in 2016 it became one in a long line of Las Vegas hotels 
to be subject to controlled demolition shown live and on YouTube: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=P2-vq9Co3yk 
 3 These commercials were analysed in the Couch-Stone symposium in Las Vegas 
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